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Chaos Theory and Emergent Behavior
in the West Virginia Water Crisis
Morgan Getchell
School of English, Communication, Media, and Languages, Morehead State
University, Morehead, Kentucky, USA
ABSTRACT
Chaos theory holds that systems act in unpredictable, nonlinear ways and that their behavior
can only be observed, never predicted. This is an informative model for an organization in crisis.
The West Virginia water contamination crisis, which began on January 9, 2014, fits the criteria of a
system in chaos. This study employs a close case study method to examine this case through the
lens of chaos theory and its tenets: sensitivity to initial conditions, bifurcation, fractals, strange
attractors, and self-organization. In particular, close attention is paid to emergent organizations
and how their embodiment of strange attractor values spurred the self-organization process for
this chaotic system.
KEYWORDS: Chaos theory; crisis communication; water contamination; West Virginia water
crisis

Crises, regardless of the form they take, present unique and challenging
circumstances for those affected to overcome. Be they natural disasters
or organizational crises, they are defined by three characteristics that
set them apart from other nonroutine events: threat, surprise, and a
short response time (Seeger, Sellnow, & Ulmer, 2003). An environmental disaster in the form of a leak, spill, or contamination meets these
requirements because there is little to no warning before it happens,
affected stakeholders are not expecting this departure from the norm,
and there is the added pressure of not only stopping the leak/spill but
also dealing with the contaminated area quickly to avoid exposure
to large numbers. The Bhopal disaster, BP Deepwater Horizon oil
spill, and Exxon Valdez oil spill are examples of previous accidental
CONTACT Morgan Getchell, PhD • E-mail: m.getchell@moreheadstate.edu • School of English, Communication, Media, and Languages, 303A Breckinridge Hall, Morehead, KY 40351, USA
© 2018 by Journal of International Crisis and Risk Communication Research. All rights reserved.
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contamination events studied from a crisis communication perspective. A crisis in this form poses unique challenges, and those are only
compounded if the contamination affects the local food and/or water
supply. In addition to cleaning up the initial contamination, there are
also concerns about the long-term effects on the environment and on
those individuals exposed to the contaminant.
In January 2014, Charleston, West Virginia, experienced its environmental crisis in the form of a chemical spill that contaminated the
water supply and left 300,000 residents unable to do anything but flush
their toilets with the water in their homes. This water use ban lasted
approximately 2 weeks and required people to find alternate sources
for drinking water and ways to perform basic functions like bathing,
brushing their teeth, washing dishes and clothes, and providing water
for their pets. The organizations that should have provided pertinent
messages for self-protection failed to do so in a timely and clear manner, leaving affected stakeholders confused and unsure of how best to
protect themselves and loved ones. The bulk of the crisis communication tasks were taken up by small emergent organizations formed by
concerned and frustrated citizens. This unique circumstance, combined
with the magnitude of the event (it was the largest drinking water contamination in U.S. history at that time), makes the West Virginia case
ideal to study from a risk and crisis communication perspective. More
specifically, this case is examined through the lense of chaos theory
because its description of an unpredictable system and its tenets are
an insightful metaphor to apply to crisis events, which are nonlinear
and the complexity of which appears unpredictable (Tsoukas, 2005).
Chaos theory has long been used by scientists and mathematicians
to describe the systems and phenomena they observe. Chaos theory,
stated simply, holds that systems act in nonlinear, unpredictable ways.
The behavior they exhibit is dependent on the conditions surrounding
them, and this behavior can only be observed and described, never
predicted (Murphy, 1996). This makes sense when describing complex weather patterns, ecosystems, and difficult mathematical models,
hence why chaos theory is widely used by researchers in those fields.
However, as of late, it has come to the attention of social scientist researchers that chaos theory is a good model for describing the systems
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they study. Human systems act in just as unpredictable ways as other
systems. More specifically, crisis communication researchers see that
chaos theory is an excellent model for describing an organization in
crisis. The tenets of chaos theory—sensitivity to initial conditions,
bifurcation, fractals, strange attractors, and self-organization—can
all be observed throughout the life cycle of a crisis. Thus crisis communication researchers have created a body of literature that applies
chaos theory to crisis events (Freimuth, 2006; Horsley, 2014; Liska,
Petrun, Sellnow, & Seeger, 2012; Murphy, 1996; Seeger, 2002; Sellnow,
Seeger, & Ulmer, 2002). Though chaos theory did not originate in the
social sciences, communication scholars see the heuristic value in the
application of a scientific perspective to human systems (Berger &
Chaffee, 1987). The nature of the West Virginia water contamination
makes it a unique case to observe through the lens of chaos theory. This
study pursues two related research questions. First, to what extent were
the tenets of chaos theory observable during this crisis? Second, how
does a case with such a broad and lasting impact further advance our
understanding of crisis communication in chaotic circumstances? The
remainder of this article provides a review of literature, a summary of
the case, description of methods, and analysis of the case and ends with
a discussion of implications and conclusions that can be drawn from
this study.
Chaos and Crisis Communications
Chaos Theory

Chaos theory has its origins in the math and science disciplines. One
of its first uses was by the scientist Edward Lorenz, who used it to map
and explain complex weather patterns and systems. The main tenet of
chaos theory is that systems act in nonlinear and unpredictable ways.
Because of their inherent random behavior, it is impossible to accurately
predict the behavior of a chaotic system. Perhaps the best-known tenet
of chaos theory is the system’s sensitivity to initial conditions, which
is often referred to as the butterfly effect. Put simply, this supposition
implies that something as small and seemingly insignificant as the
flapping of a butterfly’s wings can have a much greater impact and can
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start a chain of events that leads to a large-scale event, such as a tidal
wave that devastates a coastal area.
This theory fits well when describing complex systems like the
weather, biological systems, and complex mathematical models, but as
of late, social scientist researchers are seeing the applicability of chaos
theory and the idea of unpredictable behavior to the systems they
study. As Murphy (1996) stated, “chaos theory attempts to understand
the behavior of systems that do not unfold in a linearly, predictable,
conventional, cause-and-effect manner over time” (p. 96). Murphy
wrote her seminal piece, published in the Journal of Public Relations,
and showed the clear connections between the tenets of chaos theory
and the systems often studied by social scientists and made a call for
researchers to extend this body of literature and use chaos theory in
their future research. Seeger (2002) echoed her sentiments in a followup piece published in the same journal. He argued that organizations
experiencing a crisis are an ideal model of a chaotic system and said
the field of risk and crisis communication was ideal for the application
of this theory. He pointed to each element of chaos theory—fractals,
bifurcation, strange attractors, and self-organization—and showed
how an organizational crisis contained each element across the crisis
life cycle. Herein, each of these components will be defined, explained,
and expanded—particularly in regard to strange attractors and selforganization. Finally, chaos theory is applied to the 2014 West Virginia
water contamination as an example of an ideal case that clearly exhibited
all tenets of a system in chaos.
Fractals. Mandlebrot (as cited in Murphy, 1996) defined fractals as
self-similar and repeating mathematical patterns. He often explained
the intricacy of fractals by asking his students to measure the coast of
Britain in various quantitative measures. When the coast was measured
in miles, there was a different measure than when done in feet, inches,
centimeters, grains of sand, and so on. This example demonstrated
the problem with using quantitative units of measurement. Rather,
Mandlebrot (as cited in Murphy, 1996) suggested fractals as a qualitative
measurement that can describe “the relative degree of complexity of an
object” (p. 100). Murphy also addressed the importance of considering
scope and scale and said that
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the difficulty of perceiving pattern in chaos relates to the scale at which
one views a phenomenon. . . . Chaos theorists note significant differences in the very structure and dimensionality of an object depending
on the observer’s standpoint and measuring tools. (p. 98)

Thus the object can look very different depending on the standpoint of
the individual. Horsley (2014) described fractals as changing with each
successive iteration, but the evolution of the pattern from beginning to
end can be observed when looking at the whole picture. In her examination of the Washington, D.C., sniper attacks, she said that at first it
was difficult to determine a fractal pattern among the sniper victims
because they were of different genders, ages, races, and so on, and the
killings happened at random times and in different places. However,
by observing the fractal sets from the point of view of the sniper who
was targeting his wife (who had a restraining order against him), it
became clear that he was targeting places like shopping malls and craft
stores, where he thought she would be, thus revealing the pattern to
his attacks (Horsley, 2014).
Sellnow, Seeger, and Ulmer (2002) noted the key difficulty with
fractals by observing their role in the case of the historic Red River
floods that affected residents in North Dakota and Minnesota. According to them, the problem was “the communication of excessive
confidence in a measurement system that lacked the precision needed”
(p. 276). In this case, they referred to the imprecise measurement
tools and system that had been previously used to estimate flood levels but in this case did not account for the sensitivity to initial conditions, such as ice blockages, that had rendered the measurement
system imprecise and irrelevant. However, because all the predictions had shown that flooding would be at a certain level, this was
communicated with confidence by meteorologists and a number of
other officials. Because of this, the area was wholly unprepared to
deal with the record-setting flood levels, exacerbating the chaos and
representing a failure of viewing a fractal pattern from the wrong perspective. These examples demonstrate the complexity of fractals and
the potential consequences of viewing the system from an incorrect
perspective.
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Bifurcation. According to Freimuth (2006), “bifurcation is associated with a collapse of sensemaking. At these points, observers realize
that the routine ways of operating have collapsed” (p. 145). These are
points at which the system deviates from the established path and routine operations. In relation to the crisis life cycle, bifurcation could be
considered the beginning or initial phases of the crisis and the point
at which the system begins to act in a chaotic, unpredictable way. As
Seeger (2002) stated, “organizational crises are points of system bifurcation or radical change where a system’s direction, character, and/
or structure is fundamentally disrupted or departs from the previous
path” (p. 332). In some cases, this collapse in sense making can result
in what Weick (1993) referred to as a cosmology episode. A cosmology
episode is one in which people feel that “I’ve never been here before, I
have no idea where I am, and I have no idea who can help me” (p. 634).
In some instances, people and organizations respond to bifurcation by
sticking with routine procedures or what has worked in the past, but
as history and the literature have shown, for a system to pull itself out
of bifurcation/chaos, it must acknowledge that the current conditions
are new and unfamiliar and that the old ways of operating and functioning must be abandoned before the system can begin the process
of self-organization. As Venette, Sellnow, and Lang (2003) contended,
“crisis is a process of transformation in which the old system can no
longer be maintained” (p. 224). Thus bifurcation is marked by the
system deviating from normal operations and a failure of previously
effective interventions to get the system back on track. This was true
of the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) after it experienced a disaster in the form of a coal ash spill that rained down tons of coal ash on
the town of Kingston, Tennessee, destroying many homes, displacing
many residents, and creating a sense of chaos for the affected area.
In hindsight, CEO Tom Kilgore and others at the TVA were able to
recognize six points of bifurcation that took them off the established
path and eventually led to the spill (Liska et al., 2012). Most of these
bifurcation points dealt with information siloes and a lack of communication between departments within the organization. Because
they were able to recognize how these bifurcation points put them on
the path to disaster, the organization went through a self-organization
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process and established new procedures and practices that would (it
hoped) prevent the same thing from happening in the future (Liska
et al., 2012). Bifurcation points mark the system’s departure from the
norm and the beginnings of chaos. It is important to recognize these
points and to remember that bifurcation, though highly disruptive to
the system, is temporary.
Strange attractors. Strange attractors are
the fundamental points of connection and order, or lines of force and
influence that exert a continual regulation on the form and behavior
of a system regardless of the specific conditions. They are the points
to which a complex system naturally and continually returns. (Seeger,
2002, p. 334)

Strange attractors are elements that help a system in chaos begin the
process of self-organization and start to emerge from bifurcation. Seeger
said that attractors can take many forms, including family, community,
and economic ties that lead to rebuilding after a disaster. As Freimuth
(2006) said, “an attractor is an organizing principle such as a common
set of values to which a system will return even as it moves through
bifurcation” (p. 145). In this sense, strange attractors are those things
present in the chaotic system that help it find a new order and begin
the process of self-organization. It is because of strange attractors that
a chaotic system begins to move away from bifurcation. Murphy (1996)
referred to attractors as “an inherent shape or state of affairs to which
a phenomenon will always tend to return as it evolves, no matter how
random each single moment may seem” (p. 98). Thus organizations
that experience a crisis that throws them into chaos and bifurcation
should seek out those strange attractors that can help them begin selforganization and moving out of chaos.
Sellnow et al. (2002) described the presence of the National Guard
and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) after the
historic Red River floods as embodying the organizing principles that
helped citizens begin to move from bifurcation to self-organization.
As they described it, the presence of these two organizations gave
the confused, disoriented citizens something/someone to look to as
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they began the recovery and rebuilding phase (Sellnow et al., 2002).
Horsley (2014) pointed to a similar strange attractor in her analysis of
the chaos surrounding the D.C.-area sniper attacks. She claimed that
the police chief at the helm of the case, Chief Moose, “personified the
investigation and became a strange attractor” (p. 310). He embodied
the principles of a strange attractor, as he was the one leading the case,
handling the press conferences and media interactions, and using his
position of authority to speak directly to the suspects. His presence was
reassuring and helped give the community a sense that things would
eventually return to normal (Horsley, 2014).
Strange attractors are present before the crisis and will exist after
the crisis. That is why all chaotic systems eventually emerge from bifurcation. However, applying this concept metaphorically to a human
system in crisis allows those strange attractors to manifest in different
forms and be embodied by different individuals or groups. They help a
system begin the process of moving from bifurcation and a cosmology
episode into the process of self-organization that eventually pulls the
system out of chaos. The system that emerges often looks and functions
differently than it did prior to bifurcation because of the changes that
the system underwent during the chaos and self-organization periods,
which will be described later.
Self-organization. Self-organization is often referred to as the “antichaos” mechanism. In the crisis life cycle, this is the point at which
the recovery and renewal phases begin as the system moves away
from chaos/bifurcation and toward stability. Seeger (2002) defined
self-organization as “a natural process whereby order re-emerges out
of the chaotic state brought on through bifurcation. This reordering process is sometimes characterized as the antithesis of chaos and
as the outgrowth or consequence of bifurcation” (p. 332). Wheatley
(2006) described the nature of self-organizing systems as adept and
said that “self-organizing systems are never passive, hapless victims
forced to react to their environments. . . . [The system] uses available
resources more effectively, sustaining and strengthening itself ” (p. 83).
Vicki Freimuth was at the helm of the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC) when the 2001 anthrax attacks occurred, and she
described the self-organizing process that the organization had to go
through to handle such an unprecedented event. Though the CDC
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handles disease outbreaks and epidemics regularly, never had such
an instance (what many felt was the first major instance of bioterrorism on American soil) occurred that required such a large response.
Freimuth (2006) described how every part of the CDC communication
branch underwent a change—from the way calls from the public were
received and handled to the way media requests and statements were
handled. In some instances, entire new teams/organizations/structures
needed to be assembled to handle tasks never before handled by the
organization. These emergent structures were created in response
to meet these new needs. As she stated, “the other new structures
created were not modifications of previous ones but were new and
filled gaps made apparent during the anthrax crisis . . . new structures
emerging out of the chaos” (p. 146). Self-organization often results in
the emergence of new structures and organizational policies. Horsley
(2014) also saw this in her analysis of the D.C. sniper shootings. She
described new behaviors, such as citizens standing between car doors
as they pumped gas, schools going into lockdown mode, and people
cancelling extracurricular activities and avoiding going outside unless
absolutely necessary. These behaviors emerged in response to the unique
situation.
For a system experiencing bifurcation to survive, it must go through
the process of self-organization. If this does not occur, the system will
succumb to chaos. To avoid this and reap the benefits of self-organization requires effort; otherwise, the system will dissolve. The nature
of this process is largely dependent on the nature and type of strange
attractors present in the system. When the system partners with its environment, it will develop new capacities that make it more resourceful
and allow it to seek out a new form as a response to the environmental
changes (Wheatley, 2006). Regardless of the nature, self-organization
must occur to get the system back on track. As Wheatley stated,
the viability and resiliency of self-organizing systems comes from its
great capacity to adapt as needed. . . . Neither form nor function alone
dictates how the system is organized. Instead they are process structures,
reorganizing into different forms in order to maintain their identity. . . .
It is capable of organizing into whatever form it determines best suits
the present situation. (p. 82)
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Chaotic systems do not remain in chaos forever because of the process
of self-organization and the presence of strange attractors. In other
words, these systems can be self-healing. Self-organization is not inherent in chaotic systems, however, and sometimes strange attractors
fail to produce the necessary conditions for self-organization to occur.
These concepts are closely related, and they are the reasons why organizations emerge from bifurcation, often looking very different than
they did before the chaos began.
Case Summary

On January 9, 2014, residents of Charleston, West Virginia, and the
surrounding counties began noticing an unusual smell in the air and
in their homes, particularly when the water was running. The first
formal complaint to this effect was registered with the Department of
Environmental Protection (DEP) at 8:15 am; however, the West Virginia American Water Company was not made aware of the situation
until noon and, at that time, was under the impression that the water
treatment facility’s carbon filtration system would be able to handle the
problem. However, it soon became apparent that the contamination
exceeded the system’s capabilities, and at 5:45 pm, a full 9.5 hours after
the first complaint was registered with the DEP, a “do not use” ban was
issued to 300,000 customers (Ward & Gutman, 2014).
The source of the contamination was the Freedom Industries plant,
which is located on the banks of the Elk River. This company stores
chemicals for use in the mining, cement, and steel industries. Workers
at the plant noticed a leak coming from a 1-inch hole in a tank that
contained the chemical 4-methylcyclohexylmethanol (MCHM). This
is a chemical used in the coal-cleaning process to remove grit and dirt
from the outside of coal. Employees reported first noticing the leak
at 10:30 am; they reported taking all the appropriate steps to stop the
leak and clean up the damage to the best of their abilities (Ward, 2014).
However, there was nothing to be done about the 7,500 gallons that had
already leaked into the Elk River.
The “do not use” ban instructed the 300,000 affected residents
not to drink, bathe, cook with, or wash with the water. Although this
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information was pertinent for self-protection, because of the almost
10-hour span between the beginning of the contamination and the issuing of the ban, 122 residents had already sought treatment for nausea,
vomiting, and/or diarrhea, which are common symptoms of exposure
to MCHM. By January 14, nearly 700 people had contacted the poison
control hotline reporting symptoms including nausea and rashes, and
14 people were hospitalized (Heyman & Fitzsimmons, 2014).
Authorities began lifting the ban on January 13; however, shortly after
the initial announcement, officials quickly amended the statement based
on recommendations from the CDC to exclude pregnant women and
the immune compromised “out of an abundance of caution” (T. Frieden,
personal communication, January 15, 2014). Before resuming normal
water use, residents were informed that they first needed to flush their
pipes to ensure that all the contaminated water had been cleared out
of their systems (Plummer, 2014). This is where the confusion began,
as clear, explicit instruction on how to properly flush one’s pipes was
not given. For example, how long should the water run? Should I open
my doors and windows while doing this? What about external spigots?
It was also imperative that the residents shut off their hot water heaters before beginning this process, but this instruction was not always
explicit (Whelton et al., 2015). Thus, when people ran their hot water
taps, the MCHM was transformed into a noxious gas that filled people’s
homes, causing headaches, nausea, and nosebleeds. The ambiguity
of the information given only served to heighten uncertainty among
the affected population, precisely the opposite of the intended goal of
emergency/crisis communicators.
Despite the fact that the ban was lifted and all federal aid in the form
of bottled and potable water deliveries had ceased, 6 weeks postcontamination, many residents still refused to drink or use the water in their
homes. When they attempted to resume regular use, the odd smell and
funny taste remained, continuing the distrust in the safety of the water
(Goldenberg, 2014). Besides the obvious frustrations of having to use
bottled water for consumption and for all basic household functions,
West Virginians also faced the added challenge of finding the bottled
water on their own. Most grocery stores and supermarkets could not
keep shelves stocked with water, further complicating matters.
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On July 3, 2014, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA) leveled fines against Freedom Industries that totaled $11,000.
The company was fined $7,000 for not having a liquid-tight wall surrounding its tanks and $4,000 for not having standard railings on an
elevated platform (Boucher, 2014). On February 17, 2016, Freedom
Industries’s president, Gary Southern, was sentenced to 30 days in jail
and was ordered to pay a $20,000 fine for his negligence and role in
the Elk River spill. Four other Freedom Industries officials received
probation-only sentences (Ward, 2016a).
Method

Because of the time and attention paid by the researcher, this study
qualifies as a robust and in-depth case study of an event. According to
Yin (2013), a case study approach is most appropriate when three conditions are met: the main research questions are “how” and “why,” the
researcher has little to no control over behavioral events, and the focus
of the study is a contemporary rather than a historical phenomenon.
Others who have applied chaos theory to crises have employed this
interpretive method as well (Horsley, 2014; Liska et al., 2012; Sellnow
et al., 2002).
This was a public crisis that elicited a response from organizations
at the local, state, and federal levels. From the outset, there was a large
amount of uncertainty surrounding the case. Though the spill and
subsequent water ban only lasted approximately 2 weeks, the consequences of the event were felt for more than 2 years. Because of its
impact, the event garnered national news coverage, in addition to the
large amount of social media activity surrounding it, creating a large
body of data for exploration. These characteristics, combined with the
observable behavior of individuals and groups in response to this event,
make it optimal for study from a social science case study perspective.
According to Yin (2013),
whatever the field of interest, the distinctive need for case study arises
out of the desire to understand complex social phenomena. . . . A case
study allows investigators to focus on a “case” and retain a holistic and
real-world perspective. (p. 4)
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Tracking of this event began the week after the spill happened and
has continued for the 3 years following. The case was tracked by observing the traditional media and new media for updates about the unfolding
event. This case differed from other cases in which chaos theory has
been applied because the established organizations were either absent
from the crisis response or failed to provide useful information and
pertinent messages for self-protection in a timely manner. Thus affected
citizens turned to other sources for information. These sources took
the form of emergent organizations using social media. To identify
emergent organizations, the following definition was employed: an
organization that did not exist prior to the contamination of the Elk
River on January 9, 2014, but was formed in response to that event and
used some form of information communication technology to carry
out the majority of its functions. Using this definition, the tracking
process revealed five emergent organizations: three Facebook pages,
a blog, and a Twitter account. The content posted to these sites was
closely tracked in addition to coverage of the spill in traditional media.
These two sources provided ample data for constructing a rich case
description, which Yin (2013) described as an “analysis organized on the
basis of description of the general characteristics and relations of the
phenomenon in question” (p. 5). Tracking of this case was undertaken
with the goal of understanding the complex interactions surrounding
this spill and its implications for those affected.
Analysis

Chaos theory holds that systems act in nonlinear and unpredictable
ways (Murphy, 1996). Chaos theory comprises several components:
sensitivity to initial conditions, bifurcation, fractals, strange attractors,
and self-organization. Each of these plays a part in the life cycle of a
system in chaos. As has been established, an organization experiencing a crisis is an excellent fit for the metaphorical application of chaos
theory (Seeger, 2002). The West Virginia water crisis is no exception.
There are unique facets of this incident that align clearly with the tenets
of chaos theory and demonstrate how this system experienced several
points of bifurcation and descended into chaos before strange attractors
appeared and spurred the process of self-organization and anti-chaos.
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Sensitivity to Initial Conditions

Because of a system’s sensitivity to initial conditions (i.e., the butterfly
effect), simple things that might seem insignificant (like the flapping
of a butterfly’s wings) can have a much larger impact on the system
(Murphy, 1996). For example, in the West Virginia crisis, the hole that
developed in the bottom of the tank was not due to corrosion from
the chemical it held but rather from rainwater that entered through
the top of the tank. According to Chemical Safety Board inspectors,
“corrosion from water pooling inside the leaky tank likely caused the
holes. The substances traveled through soil, gravel and water systems
under the Freedom site before hitting the Elk River” (Mattise, 2014).
Thus two commonplace natural phenomena (rainwater and freezing
temperatures) set off a chain of events that resulted in the largest drinking water contamination in American history at that time.
The proximity of the plant to the Elk River, Freedom Industries’s
lax attitude toward safety, the absence of a proper plant safety inspection in more than 20 years, the unfortunate trajectory of the chemical
flowing toward the river, and the use of the river as a drinking water
source all combined to create a complex system with a greater potential
for bifurcation. Systems/organizations with higher levels of complexity
are more susceptible to instability and are more likely to experience
crises (Seeger, 2002). This is precisely what happened to the complex
system in West Virginia.
Bifurcation

Bifurcations are the points at which the larger system begins to deviate from the norm and head down another path (Murphy, 1996). It is
at these points that the system begins its descent into chaos. In West
Virginia, there are several points of bifurcation to note. The point at
which the hole developed in the bottom of the storage tank marks
the beginning of the problems. Obviously, these tanks are meant to
contain the chemicals, so the failure to do so marks a departure from
the norm. When the DEP officials arrived at the scene, they described
what they saw at tank 396:
They found a 400-square-foot pool of chemical that had leaked from
the tank into a block containment area. Pressure from the material leak-
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ing out of the tank created what DEP officials called an “up-swelling,”
or an artesian well, like a fountain of chemical coming up from the
pool. (Ward, 2014)

Because of the dike failure, the chemical flowed freely into the Elk
River, and “they saw a 4-foot-wide stream of chemicals heading for
the containment area’s wall, and disappearing into the joint between
the dike’s wall and floor” (Ward, 2014). At this point, several changes
in the direction and structure of the system resulted in bifurcation and
a departure from standard operating procedures. The chaotic system
grew when the West Virginia American Water Company decided to
issue the “do not use” order to 300,000 of its customers. The failures at
the Freedom Industries site combined with the contamination of the
Elk River and with it the drinking water supply for a major city created
a chaotic environment and marked the point of bifurcation.
The issuing of the “do not use” ban also marks a cosmology episode
for the affected residents. Cosmology episodes are a condition spurred
by bifurcation. They occur when a person is in uncharted territory,
does not know how to respond to this unknown situation, and does
not know where to seek help. Weick (1993) described these incidents
as a collapse in sense making and noted that individuals typically make
sense of events by comparing them to past events. However, crises are
unique events that often do not bear much resemblance to prior events.
Instead of feeling déjà vu (I feel like I have been here before), a cosmology episode causes feelings of vu jade (I have never been here before).
For the 300,000 residents, it is highly unlikely that many (if any) had
experienced a water ban like this before. One West Virginia resident,
identified only as Sarah, said, “In all my 25 years of life this is the first
time I have ever had to deal with something like this” (Bryson, 2014).
Another affected resident, Nate Halstead, was quoted in a Washington
Post article: “I drank a 32-ounce glass of it right before they put it on
TV . . . I don’t know what to do, honestly” (Achenbach, 2014). Boil
water advisories are more common and are easier to contend with
than a complete and total inability to use the water in the home for
any purpose other than flushing the toilet. Thus this was likely a new
and unsettling situation the stakeholders found themselves in and one
that caused great uncertainty and left them with few options of where
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to turn for answers. In addition to affected residents, those involved
in the response were also blindsided because “there was no testing
method immediately available to determine how much MCHM was
in the water, and no limit set by any regulatory agency or public health
official for how much of the material was dangerous” (Ward, 2016b).
This was unfamiliar territory and complicated the response efforts, as
decision makers had no previous experience to guide them and were
unsure where to begin.
Approximately 10 days after it had been introduced, officials began
lifting the “do not use” ban. Affected residents were told it was safe
to resume normal water use as long as they flushed their pipes for a
certain amount of time to ensure the stagnant contaminated water was
cleaned out of the system. People followed the instructions that were
given by the established organizations. However, even after flushing,
they found that their water still had a funny smell and odd taste. This
instance of a prescribed intervention failing to yield the desired results
represents another bifurcation point. Because the odd smell and taste
lingered, many people chose to continue using bottled water and did
not resume normal use of their tap water as the established organizations had expected them to do. Resident Melanie Kipp said,
Even after flushing, the water continued to smell like MCHM and
whatever other chemicals were in the mix. It left an oily film on dishes
and the skin. We continued to avoid it. Showering resumed, but they
were quick and followed with a final rinse of heated bottled water.
(Gerken, 2015)

These signs were obvious to stakeholders and were clear indicators that
problems persisted, despite reassurances from established organizations. What was meant to be the point at which things began to return
to normal actually became a point at which things continued in chaos.
Fractals

A third component of chaos theory is the idea of fractals. Fractals are
concerned with the measurement of systems and are the larger observable patterns within the overall system (Murphy, 1996). Fractals are
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sometimes difficult to observe and are largely dependent on perception.
When the DEP alerted the West Virginia American Water Company
to this chemical contamination around noon, it was initially
working under the assumption that it was a flocculent, common in
water treatment. Officials there did not learn the correct identity of the
chemical until two hours later. . . . The company’s standard and emergency water treatments are applicable to chemicals commonly found in
water and were not effective on the chemical that leaked. (Ward, 2014)

Because these decisions were based on a pattern and measurement that
only applies in normal operating conditions, they did not recognize
the abnormal conditions created by a system experiencing bifurcation.
Relying on standard operating procedures is largely ineffective in a
chaotic system. It was not until several hours later, after observing the
failure of the filtration system to operate effectively in these abnormal
conditions, that the company recognized its error in judgment and issued the “do not use” ban. Unfortunately, the amount of time that had
elapsed before people were warned meant a greater number of people
were exposed to this chemical.
A second example of reliance on an imprecise measure revolves
around the creation of an acceptable threshold for MCHM in drinking water. No such threshold existed prior to this event; thus the CDC
and several other organizations worked together to quickly come up
with a recommendation for an acceptable level of MCHM in drinking
water. The original recommendation the team gave was one part per
million (Ward, 2014). However, after publicly announcing that as an
appropriate level, they had to quickly amend that statement to exclude
pregnant women, infants, and the immune compromised “out of an
abundance of caution” (T. Frieden, personal communication, January 15,
2014). The CDC made this initial recommendation based on a study
done on rats by the Eastman Kodak Company in 1990 (Zwerdling,
2014). But Lynn Goldman, the former director of the Environmental
Protection Agency’s toxic chemical division, said there was not sufficient
data to make a recommendation. A major issue with the study was
that
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it looked only at how MCHM might affect adults, in this case by testing it on grown rats. The researchers didn’t consider how the chemical
might affect fetuses or newborns. . . . A lot of chemicals that don’t hurt
adults can wreak havoc on the young. (Zwerdling, 2014)

This is the same issue experienced by officials making predictions
about the flood levels for the Red River, who used the traditional
measurement methods without accounting for the sensitivity to initial
conditions. As Sellnow et al. (2002) stated, “the key problem associated with fractals in this case involved the communication of excessive
confidence in a measurement system that lacked the precision needed”
(p. 276). This was also the issue in West Virginia and was compounded
by the fact that little was known about MCHM, as it had never been
the culprit in a contamination event like this one. Because of the time
constraints and the lack of any preexisting test to measure MCHM
levels in drinking water, the teams charged with creating such a test
made the mistake of relying on imprecise measures, which ultimately
did more harm than good and exacerbated the uncertainty surrounding
the situation.
Strange Attractors

Strange attractors are those things which “emphasize order and pattern
within chaos. An attractor is an organizing principle such as a common
set of values to which a system will return even as it moves through a
bifurcation” (Freimuth, 2006, p. 145). For as much as a system is sensitive to initial conditions and seemingly minuscule events can cause
it to descend into chaos, it is also susceptible to the presence of those
things that cause it to move out of bifurcation and toward a more organized and less chaotic state. Strange attractors can take many forms.
However, in West Virginia, no immediately observable force provided
the reassurance necessary for the affected stakeholders to move toward
a sense of normalcy. Freedom Industries had closed its doors, and
its officials refused to cooperate with the media or investigators and
never offered an official apology. The West Virginia American Water
Company was focused on shifting blame, constantly reminding stakeholders that it was not the source of the spill and, therefore, was just

Chaos Theory and Emergent Behavior in the West Virginia Water Crisis

191

as much a victim of Freedom Industries as they were. While its lack of
fault for the spill is true, the victims were looking for answers and help
getting clean water, not more corporate blame shifting. As for the state
government, it, too, failed to meet the needs of the people. In a notable
and cringe-worthy press conference on January 12, 2014, Governor
Earl Ray Tomblin fumbled and failed to provide satisfactory answers
to questions about how the spill happened and what was being done
to make it right (Vingiano, 2014). Again, an established organization
that should have been prepared to handle the event more effectively
proved to be incapable of doing so.
When Governor Tomblin and President Obama declared an emergency at the state and federal level, respectively, the affected area was
given access to special funds and services set aside for use in such a
disaster. Immediately following these declarations, the National Guard
arrived on-site with tanker trucks full of potable water and other supplies. Additionally, FEMA was dispatched to the area. These organizations worked alongside local FEMA and Red Cross chapters to distribute
water and provide necessary aid to the victims. According to a FEMA
spokesperson, it provided approximately 7 million liters of water and
130,000 meals during the initial response (Marks, 2014). When the
water company began lifting the “do not use” ban and provided flushing
instructions, this signaled the end of acute phase of the crisis. However,
as was described previously, people found that even after following the
flushing guidelines, the water still had the funny smell and taste that
were present at the outset of the crisis. Therefore they continued to
distrust the water and sought alternative sources for water. However,
a new obstacle was now introduced, because the National Guard and
other relief organizations had left the area. When the water company
proclaimed the water to be safe again and the “do not use” order was
lifted, so, too, were the emergency declarations put in place by Governor
Tomblin and President Obama. Thus the state’s access to disaster relief
funds and the reassuring presence of FEMA and the National Guard
and their trucks full of bottled water had vanished. At this point, the
chaotic system experienced another period of bifurcation, and the organizations that could have functioned as strange attractors and created
points of self-organization were no longer present in the system. Those
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affected found themselves with a set of unique needs precipitated by a
crisis that those in power felt was no longer an issue.
Self-Organization

Self-organization is referred to as the anti-chaos mechanism. It is the
antithesis of bifurcation. It is because of self-organization that a system
in chaos does not remain in chaos indefinitely. One cannot discuss
self-organization without discussing strange attractors. According to
the literature, self-organization cannot happen without the presence of
strange attractors in the system. Eventually, for the system to move out
of bifurcation, the strange attractors present within the system must
begin the self-organization process (Seeger, 2002). In West Virginia,
the self-organization process happened in a unique way. Typically,
established organizations express the values that represent strange attractors. However, the established organizations in West Virginia failed
to do this and therefore did not spur the self-organization process. To
compensate for this, West Virginians self-organized in such a way as
to represent these strange attractor values and become the catalyst
for self-organization. While this sounds redundant, when one takes a
closer look at the emergent organizations that formed in the wake of
the crisis, it becomes clearer the role they played in moving the chaotic
system away from bifurcation and toward self-organization.
Because affected stakeholders could not rely on the established
organizations to do their part, nor could they rely on the reassuring
presence of the relief organizations, they had to find alternate ways to
respond and create order within the chaotic system. They did this by
self-organizing into emergent organizations that performed a variety
of relief functions and worked to meet the previously unmet needs of
the affected stakeholders. They harnessed the power of social media
and other information communication technologies to form quickly
and coordinate efforts for maximum effectiveness. One of these groups,
the WV Clean Water Hub (n.d.), created a Facebook page. The “About”
section describes its purpose:
We have been coordinating deliveries of water and needed supplies
through direct response to requests from community members as well
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as establishing relationships with particular communities in need . . .
and we are working with community leaders to see how we can help
address the long-term needs of the community.

This is just one example of several groups that emerged in the
wake of this crisis to fill a variety of unmet needs within the affected
community. These groups, usually through the connective power of
social media and information communication technologies, provided
necessary information and instructions for self-protection, solicited
donations of supplies, and disseminated supplies among victims. These
activities were necessary for those affected not only to get the water
they desperately needed but also to feel like there was a proverbial light
at the end of the tunnel. These roles were no longer being filled by the
relief organizations and were being ignored by the established organizations; therefore the emergence and presence of these organizations
was the driving force behind the self-organization process in the West
Virginia water crisis.
Chaos theory has been applied to a number of different crisis events,
and this case represents another instance where the tenets of chaos
theory are present through the crisis life cycle. This application builds
on the existing body of literature and extends it to a new crisis type.
When the tank at Freedom Industries began leaking on the morning
of January 9, 2014, it marked the first in a series of departures from the
norm that would put this system into chaos and a point of bifurcation.
Because the established organizations were largely unaware of these
points of bifurcation, they failed to respond appropriately or effectively.
On two occasions, a failure of perspective caused them to misread the
fractal patterns and rely on imprecise measures. The first occasion was
when the water company learned that its water uptake source had been
contaminated but did not shut the system down because it felt the purification system would be sufficient to handle the contamination. This
was later to prove to be an incorrect assumption. The second instance
occurred when the CDC, working in conjunction with the National
Guard and the water company, made an initial recommendation of
one part per million as an appropriate threshold for MCHM in drinking water. Further research proved this to be imprecise and incorrect.
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Thus the CDC amended its recommendation to be one part per billion.
However, the damage to its credibility was already done, and people
continued to distrust the water and rely on alternate sources. This kept
the system in bifurcation rather than moving it toward self-organization,
which was contrary to the goals of the organizations.
Strange attractors are common values and points of organization to
which a system in chaos is naturally drawn. The established organizations usually represent these values, and they provide stakeholders with
a sense of order and the reassurance of an eventual return to normal.
In West Virginia, the established organizations failed to represent these
values and sense of order. Freedom Industries failed to cooperate and
offer any helpful information or even a simple apology. The water company failed to acknowledge the lack of normal operating procedures
and made several missteps that sent the system back into bifurcation.
Though the National Guard and FEMA were able to provide relief for a
short period of time, they left the system before order was restored and
the crisis had ended. Because of these failings, it fell to the stakeholders
to take on this role. Motivated by community ties and strong values,
they self-organized into emergent groups and became the strange attractors that spurred the system toward self-organization and away from
bifurcation. They represented the strange attractor values and provided
the much-needed sense of order. Because of this, they connected as
strange attractors and precipitated self-organization.
Conclusion

Organizations that experience a crisis fit the model of a system in chaos.
The body of literature cited herein shows its successful application to
a number of different crisis events, from natural disasters to criminal
activity (Freimuth, 2006; Horsley, 2014; Liska et al., 2012; Sellnow &
Seeger, 2001). However, this case is the first application of chaos theory
to an environmental contamination event of this nature and the first
application to a water contamination crisis. Thus this work builds on the
existing body of literature and applies the theory in a new context. This
case also highlights a situation in which a system did not “right itself ”
through modes of self-organization seen in previous cases but rather
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required the intervention of important stakeholder groups to spur that
process. This case could serve as an example to others experiencing a
crisis who feel that established organizations are not doing their part to
move the system from bifurcation to self-organization. The actions of
the West Virginia residents provide a good model for others to follow
if they find themselves in a similar situation, as the citizens of Flint,
Michigan, did. Their water was contaminated not by an accidental spill
but rather due to negligence in the water treatment process, allowing
the water to be contaminated with high levels of lead. As this case drew
more media attention, citizen groups formed in response to the crisis,
and several groups in West Virginia have posted messages of solidarity
on social media. This is one example, but it demonstrates the potential
for stakeholders in the midst of a chaotic system to become participants
in the self-healing process.
In the same vein, for relief organizations and those called to respond
to a crisis, this case shows the willingness of certain stakeholders to be
involved in their own recovery process. It could be beneficial for all to
expand their view of the affected population from simply being “victims”
who require service and aid to realize that some could be willing to be
active participants in the response. Having additional hands on deck to
help with the many tasks necessitated by a crisis is helpful, but the local
knowledge and connections that these people bring to the table can
prove invaluable to those coming from the outside to provide assistance.
From the moment the hole developed in the bottom of the tank at
Freedom Industries, a chain of events and points of bifurcation began
that set the system into chaos. When the water company issued the
“do not use” ban to its 300,000 customers, it created a large amount of
uncertainty and fear for those individuals. Given that most, if not all,
had not experienced a water ban of this magnitude before, they most
likely experienced a collapse in sense making. Weick (1993) referred to
this as a cosmology episode, because people experience the feeling of
having never been in that situation before and having no idea where
to turn for answers.
Fractals allow the observer to see the overlying patterns in an otherwise chaotic and disordered system. However, observing the pattern
is difficult if one relies on an imprecise measurement system. This was
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the case in West Virginia on two occasions. First, the water company
failed to issue the “do not use” ban immediately after learning of the
contamination because it assumed the filtration system would take care
of the problem. However, this failed to realize the absence of normal
operating conditions due to the system experiencing bifurcation. The
second failure occurred when the team charged with creating an acceptable recommended threshold for MCHM in drinking water made
an initial recommendation of one part per million. The team quickly
retracted this recommendation when they realized it did not take into
account the safety of pregnant women, small children, and the elderly.
After adopting a more precise measurement tool, they made a new
recommendation of one part per billion.
Strange attractors and self-organization go hand in hand in a chaotic
system. Strange attractors are those things present within the system
that spur the self-organization (anti-chaos) process. In previous studies,
strange attractor values have been expressed by official relief organizations, such as FEMA and the National Guard or a top law enforcement
official (Horsley, 2014; Sellnow et al., 2002). In West Virginia, the established relief organizations and top officials who should have led the
response and functioned as strange attractors failed to perform their
duties effectively. Therefore the system had to create other strange
attractors to pull itself out of chaos. This process occurred through
self-organization among the concerned citizens and victims themselves.
Future Directions

The application of chaos theory to organizations in crisis is a budding
area of research that calls for more widespread use and careful observation. Particularly, this study calls for more exploration of the selforganization component of chaos theory and how crisis communication
messages can help or hinder that process. Observing messages that are
successful at meeting the informational needs of stakeholders and how
they can move the system away from bifurcation can strengthen the
link between effective communication and self-organization.
The MCHM contamination of the Elk River created a crisis for the
300,000 affected residents whose health and well-being were threatened
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and daily routines were upended by this event. The unique characteristics of the event made it ideal for studying from a crisis communication and chaos theory perspective. This in-depth case study adds to
the growing body of crisis communication literature using chaos as a
theoretical lens, and it is the first to focus on a crisis in the form of a
water contamination. This study also contributes to the literature by
closely examining how a chaotic system moves from bifurcation toward
self-organization when established organizations fail to exhibit the
values of strange attractors.
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ABSTRACT
This article applies the crisis renewal model to a multinational organizational crisis in Nigeria not
only to analyze the crisis points of conflict in the multinational’s corporate rhetoric but also to
examine how global relations; situated exigencies; and cultural, social, and economic tensions
contextualize corporate communication strategies during crises. Rhetoric of renewal was evident
as the multinational corporation responded to a prolonged crisis involving multiple state and local
stakeholders. Although the renewal model itself redresses traditional Aristotelian crisis rhetoric
models, the Nigerian situation calls for a significant reframing of rhetorical strategies accountable
to the colonialist legacies, cultural traditions, political volatilities, and socioeconomic particularities
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in an age of increasing global interconnectedness are offered.
KEYWORDS: Renewal; corporate rhetoric; cultural exigence; crisis response; multinational

Dutch Shell, a multinational energy and petrochemical corporation,
established an oil venture in Nigeria’s Niger Delta in 1936. It soon ran
into oppositional struggles with the locals in the oil-rich region following heavy and frequent oil spills and gas flaring in the communities (McGreal, 1993). Local communities have protested against the
multinational’s operations in the region, disputing ownership of oil
and land and accusing Shell of environmental degradation, including heavy pollution, poisoning of fishing grounds, and destruction of
farmlands by frequent oil spills and gas flaring. In addition, accusations
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of exploitation, human rights abuse, corruption, and killings continue
to haunt Shell in the Niger Delta (Steele, 1995; see also Amaize, 2011;
Iwori, 2014; James, 2015). The company has responded to these issues
with crisis renewal communication strategies that appear to shift toward
a responsive revision of relationships with local stakeholders. Yet my
analysis calls into question the adequacy of current crisis communication models to address how situated exigencies and cultural, social, and
economic tensions contextualize corporate communication strategies
during multinational crises.
Between the early 1990s and mid-2000s, Royal Dutch Shell’s response
to the Niger Delta crisis very much contrasted with the approach it took
from 2006 to 2016. Shell refers to its response to the crisis in the 1990s
to mid-2000s as an “old” or “previous” approach; its “new approach”
to crisis response was effectively implemented starting in 2006 (see
Shell Nigeria, 2012). The old approach, according to data analyzed in
this study, was predominantly a rhetoric of denial. The new approach
conforms to the discourse of renewal. This article focuses on this new
approach.
I apply the discourse of renewal model (cf. Seeger & Ulmer, 2001,
2002; Seeger, Ulmer, Novak, & Sellnow, 2005; Sellnow & Seeger, 2013;
Ulmer, Seeger, & Sellnow, 2007) to assess the model’s application in a
contemporary African context. The Nigerian case stands out as a compelling example of the model’s application outside Europe and North
America. I begin with a brief overview of three crisis communication
models (including the renewal model) widely applied in the field. This
is followed by a detailed analysis of the discourse of renewal model as
applied by Royal Dutch Shell in its response to the crisis in the Niger
Delta region. I conclude with lessons learned about corporate communication, crisis, and renewal in an African context.
Models in Crisis Communication

Corporate crisis communication has developed through case descriptions of the communication strategies used by corporate leaders and
spokespeople in reaction to image threats. Based on post hoc rhetorical analyses, crisis scholars have categorized these strategies. The first
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schemas drew on classical Aristotelian conceptions of apologia, a
speaker-centered approach that mitigates the threat to corporate image
through various strategies of apology or denial (Benoit, 1997; Ware &
Linkugel, 1973). A later schema is informed by psychological theories of
attribution to offer schemas based in stakeholder perceptions of responsibility and blame (see Coombs, 2007). Yet the emphasis on corporate
leaders, defensive strategies, and the goal of protecting or reinstating
corporate image remained. More recently, a proactive and positive
approach to corporate crisis communication has been advanced that
shifts from post hoc analyses and defensive strategies to ethical communicative relationships: the renewal model of crisis communication
(see Ulmer et al., 2007; Ulmer, Sellnow, & Seeger, 2011).
Introduced by Ulmer, Seeger, and Sellnow in 2007, the discourse of
renewal shifts from reactive image repair and reputation management
accounts to a proactive relational perspective (Seeger & Ulmer, 2001,
2002; Seeger et al., 2005; Ulmer et al., 2007). Early formulations of the
discourse of renewal (Seeger & Ulmer, 2001, 2002) raised concerns
about the absence of a critical perspective in crisis rhetoric. They argued for ethical, optimistic, provisional, and prospective communication, evidenced in their study of the “virtuous responses” offered by
CEO Aaron Feuerstein of Malden Mills and Milt Cole, owner of Cole
Hardwoods, during the fire disasters that razed their firms. Seeger et
al. (2005) further invoked the notion of “change” that accompanies
crises, grounding their argument in a study of a “postcrisis discourse
of renewal” in the response of executives in the firm Cantor Fitzgerald
after the September 11, 2001, World Trade Center attacks in which the
firm is reported to have lost 658 of its 960 employees. As is evident in
these case studies, renewal carries implications for leadership, ethics,
and rhetorical response.
Ulmer et al. (2007) noted the following key characteristics that
provide a discourse of renewal framework for analyzing crisis communication: (a) advancing provisional as opposed to strategic responses,
(b) adopting a prospective rather than retrospective vision, (c) capitalizing on the opportunities embedded in the crisis, and (d) supporting
an ethical leader as the face of the company advocating for corrective
action and change. Among the conditions conducive for such a renewal
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discourse are crises based on natural causes, the “entrepreneurial spirit
and greater autonomy” exercised by private owners over public companies, a willingness to correct mistakes and instigate change, and prior
positive stakeholder relationships that can support renewal (Ulmer et
al., 2007; see also Reierson & Littlefield, 2012).
Ulmer et al. (2011) elaborated four theoretical dimensions of the
discourse of renewal: (a) organizational learning, (b) ethical communication, (c) prospective rather than retrospective vision, and (d)
effective organizational rhetoric. Notably, a prospective vision includes
optimism and emphasizes the need to focus on future opportunities.
Effective organizational rhetoric has to do with organizational leaders constructing or “structuring a particular reality for organizational
stakeholders and publics” (Ulmer et al., 2011, p. 219). The goal is to
make use of opportunities inherent in crises such that organizations are
able to renew themselves and their stakeholder relationships. I draw on
the elements of the renewal model in analyzing the Niger Delta crisis.
Data and Procedures

Cases are widely applied in crisis communication research. The current renewal model developed through case analyses (Seeger & Ulmer,
2001, 2002; Seeger et al., 2005; Ulmer, 2001; Ulmer & Sellnow, 2002).
The method of case analysis that examines contemporary complex
phenomenon in real-world contexts makes case analysis a suitable
research method (Yin, 2009). The case development in crisis communication is descriptive, and the analysis proceeds deductively by
fitting the rhetorical model to the description of the case. However,
these models were originally developed inductively by examining cases
of corporate crises to identify rhetorical strategies. For example, the
image repair model has been expanded by examining particular cases
for additional elements of classical apologia. Similarly, the discourse
of renewal model was developed by identifying affirmative responsive
strategies in particular exemplars of corporate crisis response.
Accordingly, the present study applied the four theoretical dimensions that inform the discourse of renewal model as the frames of
analysis (Ulmer et al., 2007; Ulmer, Sellnow, & Seeger, 2011). Data
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for the study were collected from 351 newspaper articles, company
documents, and local and international nongovernmental organization
(NGO) reports spanning the period 1990–2016. Data sources included
newspaper reports and radio texts, company documents (e.g., environmental impact assessment reports, mission and value statements, ethical
code of conduct statements, and press releases on company websites),
NGO reports, and reports by other independent organizations (e.g.,
Center for Investigative Journalists). The newspaper reports and radio texts were downloaded from LexisNexis Academic database. The
reports came from local Nigerian and international newspapers and
wire services. The radio texts were specifically from the BBC World
Service. Other Web databases and archives owned by Nigerian and
international NGOs also served as sources for data. These sources
documented information about the crisis and the communities affected
and came from both company leaders and spokespersons as well as
villagers and leaders from local communities. The unit of analysis was
specific statements made during and about the crisis drawn from these
data sources.
Data analysis proceeded through three stages. First, direct quotations
(statements) by organizational leaders, spokespersons, and members
of local communities were identified and inductively categorized according to their characterizations of the conflict. The quotations were
assembled by reading through the newspaper reports, radio texts, company documents, NGO reports, and studies conducted by independent
organizations. A separate file was created for these direct quotations.
The direct quotations provided a rich description and sense of the oppositional struggles and points of conflict in the crisis from the point
of view of the organization and from the perspective of affected communities. The second stage involved matching these direct quotations
to the discourse of renewal to determine which of the four theoretical
dimensions of the renewal model were evoked by organizational leaders
and spokespersons. This technique is one of three data analysis procedures, that is, pattern matching identified by Yin (2009). The third
stage critically analyzed the omissions, discrepancies, and divergences
between the discourse of renewal model and the rhetoric of the Shell
crisis that emerged following the pattern matching in Stage 2 of the
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data analysis. At this stage, it was possible to see how the major points
of conflict in the crisis emerged.
The Crisis in Nigeria

Protests against Shell have been mounting since 1990, as local communities hold the company responsible for the plight of the people
(see McGreal, 1993). These protests have often stalled the company’s
operations in the region. I will briefly describe three issues enflaming
tensions in the region: a history of local anger and violent protest, the
environmental degradation caused by oil spills, and the daily oppression of gas flaring.
The history of anger and protest among local communities against
Shell is illuminated by the story of protests by the people of Ogoni, a local
community in the Niger Delta (McGreal, 1993; Steele, 1995). The leader
of the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP), Ken
Saro-Wiwa, led vigorous protests that attracted national and international attention, first against Shell, then against the then military regime
over the neglect of the oil-rich region. Together with eight other Ogoni
people, Saro-Wiwa was sentenced to death by hanging on November 10,
1995, by the military regime (Steele, 1995). This provoked anger and
condemnation against Shell by both the people of Niger Delta and international human rights and environmental activists, as they accused
Shell of supporting the executions. Jonathan Steele (1995), a reporter
with the Guardian (United Kingdom), offered a poignant description of
the perception that Ken Saro-Wiwa was paying the price for daring to
take action against the rape of their land, which left their soil and water
polluted and gave them nothing except a legacy of rusting pipelines,
thousands of unsightly wells and refineries, and no material benefits
from the oil profits at all. (p. 3)

In subsequent years, the MOSOP vowed to continue protesting any
resumption of oil production in Ogoniland (Amaize, 2011). Over 20
years since Saro-Wiwa’s death, the Ogoni communities have continued
to accuse Shell and hold the company responsible for environmental
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degradation (e.g., oil spills, gas flaring). In 2013, a resident quoted in a
newspaper report stated that “for owning” oil resources, the people of
the Niger Delta “have been paid with tears and blood” (Nzeshi, 2013,
para. 8), adding that “lands have been contaminated, water polluted,
economic life destroyed, environment abused and the people brutalized”
(Nzeshi, 2013, para. 8). The Ogoni communities are just one among
many local communities in which ongoing protests have disrupted
Shell’s operations and attacked pipelines operated by the company,
continuing through the present day.
Environmental degradation caused by oil spills is a contentious
issue in the crisis. According to company documents, oil spills occur
year-round. For example, between 2011 and 2016, there have been spills
every month. The monthly average for spills was a little more than 11
spills per month in 2014 (“Shell Oil Spill Data,” n.d.). McGreal (1993),
in a newspaper report, painted the picture of oil spills in the Niger
Delta, quoting a resident of one of the communities in the region who
is said to have watched for weeks as a “fine spray of petroleum coated
the bamboo and palm trees around the Sasiga rivulet until, mixed with
acid rain and humid air, it gave the plants the milky brown sheen of
a chocolate forest” (p. A8; see also Amanze, 2012). The news report
indicated that this was the result of a burst pipe from one of Shell’s
pumping stations.
Finally, the practice of gas flaring creates oppressive conditions
for local residents. In January 2012, oil companies in Nigeria flared 30
billion standard cubic feet of gas (Cook, 2012). In one of the communities in the Niger Delta, a fisherman narrated the ordeal of gas flaring:
“Because of the flares it is so hot, it is smoky, the air is thick and it is
constantly daytime here” (Mark, 2012, p. 7). The fisherman further
stated, “Our rivers are black and the [acid] rain eats our houses. Our
bodies are covered in oil. You feel that if you live to old age here, it is
a miracle” (p. 7).
In recent years, Shell has had to face several lawsuits over its operations in the Niger Delta. In January 2015, the company agreed to a
settlement in a case in the United Kingdom by paying £55 million as
compensation to the Niger Delta community of Bodo for oil spills and
other environmental damage (Alike, 2015). Supported by NGOs like
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Amnesty International, local communities have brought suit against
Shell in international courts in an attempt “to hold Shell to account”
(Alike, 2015, para. 2) for its operations in the Niger Delta region. In
2018, the British High Court ruled that the two communities could not
pursue legal settlement for Shell’s abuses in British courts, “a setback
to attempts to hold British multinationals liable at home for their subsidiaries’ actions abroad” (George & Owolabi, 2018, para. 2). Clearly
there are ongoing tensions and anger fueling the opposition among
local communities to Shell’s practices and presence. These immediate
tensions are complicated by a complex exigence embedded in the crisis.
A Complex Exigence

The prolonged crisis which Shell faces in the Niger Delta region is
complicated by several exigencies embedded within the region’s history,
cultural, social, and economic relations. These exigencies are briefly
explained in the following paragraphs.
Protesting communities describe their ownership over land as “ancestral” (Iwori, 2014, para. 5). Ancestral claims over ownership of land
are creating a complex situation in which host governments lease out
lands to multinational corporations and these corporations are confronted by oppositional struggles from local communities who not
only see the land as their inheritance but also consider the resources
on these lands (such as forest products and crude oil) as belonging to
the communities. Their claims are grounded in precolonial relations
and the bureaucratic impenetrability, corruption, and exploitation of
colonial and postcolonial land regulations.1
The inequitable distribution of wealth from oil resources is well
documented; both self-assessed poverty and low standards of living
and education are critical factors in local dissatisfaction with both
government and multinational management of oil resources. Not only
have the dominant occupations in the area, such as fishing and farming,
been undermined but the distribution of resources between the federal,
state, and local governments has not trickled down to local communities (see Niger Delta Development Commission, 2005).
Along with economic issues, a critical social factor complicating
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relations between multinationals and local communities is the presentness of tradition and history in everyday life. Alagoa (2004) has argued
that in the Niger Delta, “the past is so manifestly a part of the present
among communities of the region” (p. 63). In fact, Alagoa argued that
conflicts occur in the region when “history” is not considered by parties involved. He pointed out that
policymaking . . . has proved ineffective to contain the enormous problems of the Niger Delta region . . . in part, the result of disagreements
over historical interpretation within communities, and the lack of a
historical perspective or neglect of the historical factor by government
and oil corporations. (p. 64)

Any present actions or conduct are contextualized within communities’ history.
I have identified situated exigencies that trouble the relations between
Shell and local stakeholders: claims over land and crude oil by local
communities complicated by colonial and postcolonial reforms and
social and economic relations enshrined in the modes of organizing
contextualized within communities’ history. The next section discusses
Shell’s communication response to the crisis.
Royal Dutch Shell Crisis Response

The multinational’s rhetoric of renewal emerged in 2006 when the
company brought forth a Global Memorandum of Understanding
(GMoU). The GMoU is a written statement of understanding between
Shell and clusters of communities that details roles of all parties in the
implementation of community development projects as the company
sought to improve its community relations. Shell has referred to this
document as a “new way of working with communities” (Shell Nigeria,
2012, para. 1).
According to Shell, “the GMoU represents an important shift in
approach, placing emphasis on more transparent and accountable processes, regular communication with the grassroots, sustainability and
conflict prevention” (Shell Nigeria, 2012, para. 5). Shell has explained
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this new approach as being bottom-up. The GMoU represents Shell
and the state and local governments in Nigeria as actors who simply
facilitate the implementation of decisions made by communities. In
concrete terms, Shell described its role in the GMoU as a funding and
capacity-building body. Shell explained that communities “take key
decisions” and “drive” their own development as they elect representatives to community development boards; these boards decide on community development (Shell Nigeria, 2012, para. 2). Shell contended that
this approach has been successful, pointing to these aspects: (a) more
representative and transparent management; (b) improved cohesion
and cooperation; (c) increased local ownership and accountability;
(d) increased participation, including from women; (e) improved innovation and learning; and (f) creation of a platform for other development actors (Shell Nigeria, 2012, para. 3). The GMoU has realized
a discourse of renewal in that it has restructured relationships among
key stakeholders and positioned Shell as a benefactor and facilitator of
communal and inclusive local decision-making groups.
Along with this revision of Shell’s community relationships, related
elements of the discourse of renewal were evident in the multinational’s communication response. The ethical element emerged as the
company’s leaders repeatedly pointed to virtues of accountability, transparency, and responsibility in their communication. Company officials
touted the new approach to managing the crisis as a strategy that “seeks
to increase transparency and accountability around project delivery and
give communities greater ownership of projects from their inception”
(Nwachuku, 2015, para. 14). Following an oil spill in a local community
called Bonga, the country managing director of Shell positioned the
company as a responsible organization when he stated, “As a prudent
corporate citizen, [Shell] will tackle all the oil its teams can see offshore
or which has come onshore in this area, including oil spilled by third
parties” (“Shell First Oil Produced,” 2011, para. 3). In another statement,
the country managing director praised the company for being socially
responsible, declaring that “this is one of the biggest corporate social
responsibility portfolios operated by a private company in Sub-Saharan
Africa, and it shows that we care for the wellbeing of the communities in which we do business” (Alike, 2011, para. 5). Furthermore, the
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company, through its leaders and spokespersons, frequently communicated “commitments” to working with communities (Oyadongha, 2011,
para. 5) and would frequently portray the company as an organization
that fulfills promises and respects and implements agreements reached
with clusters of communities and international bodies: “[Shell] has
always been committed to contributing its share of the environmental
restoration fund,” a company official said in a statement (Alike, 2015,
para. 60; see Chinwo, 2013; Onukwugha, 2011).
The ethical component of the discourse of renewal was also evident
when company leaders touted the importance of the company’s “quality community leadership” (Chinwo, 2013, para. 6) and also that the
company “believed in value-driven partnership” with communities
(Oyadongha, 2011, para. 10).
Shell’s communication response also evoked the element of learning.
The country managing director of Shell in Nigeria is quoted in a 2011
newspaper report as he justifies the new approach to management in
the Niger Delta region, asserting that Shell has “improved upon how
it engaged its host communities to deliver projects and programs,”
adding that the company “introduced the Global Memorandum of
Understanding in 2006 as a novel way of working with communities” (Onukwugha, 2011, para. 4). This statement strongly suggests
the element of organizational learning and willingness to implement
lessons learned for positive change. Earlier in 2010, another company
official evoked the fact that Shell has learned from the previous failed
management approach, saying, “The overall purpose [of the GMoU]
was to eliminate the inherent weakness in previous social performance
strategies and to involve communities in project identification, implementation and management” (Onah, 2010, para. 7). In a meeting in 2012
with then Nigerian president Goodluck Jonathan, following accusations
from the president against Shell for not doing enough to clean up oil
spills and prevent further spills, Shell’s outgoing Managing Director
Brindel evoked lessons learned by the company. He pointed out that
“they [Shell] have come a long way which led to the fashioning of the
Global Memorandum of Understanding” and that the company was
already addressing the issues (Ogbu, 2012, para. 21). Statements from
company officials also frequently pointed to how they “continue to
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seek ways to improve” community relations (Gbemudu, 2010, para. 9).
As could be seen from these statements, the company positioned itself
such that stakeholders perceive it as being proactive in addressing the
mistakes of the past. Proponents of the discourse of renewal suggested
that organizations that engage in communicating learning are able to
move beyond defensive communication, which focuses more on issues
of blame.
Shell’s communication also suggested elements of prospective vision as opposed to retrospective vision. Seeger et al. (2005) explained
prospective vision as a situation in which organizational leaders focus
their communication on a brighter future for both the organization and
stakeholders, stressing the need for leaders and spokespersons to look
beyond the crisis. In contrast, organizations enacting a retrospective
vision during a crisis apply blame tactics and spend more time attributing responsibility for the causes of the crisis. Seeger et al. called on
leaders and spokespersons to communicate in a manner that emphasizes
a bright future, as this could spur optimism and willingness for stakeholders to collaborate with the organization to navigate the crisis. In
many press statements, Shell officials portrayed the company as being
proactive rather than defensive, focusing on the future. For example,
the managing director and country chair of Shell in a 2014 news report
promoted Shell’s community development projects as indications of
the “company’s commitment to a long-term future for Nigeria” (Alike,
2014, para. 5). On another occasion, the director said, “Shell remains in
the forefront of converting Nigeria’s oil and gas resources to more jobs
and opportunities for Nigerians” (“Shell Emerges Best Company,” 2014,
para. 5). This clearly takes the focus off a past crisis and encourages the
people to anticipate a bright future with the company. Describing the
performance of the company in the Niger Delta, the country director,
speaking to communities at an award ceremony, explained that the
development projects in Niger Delta communities “provided the best
road map towards ensuring that the communities achieved socioeconomic empowerment and improved standard of living” (Oduma,
2011, para. 9). In another instance, the director told communities that
the company’s projects are “on course to significantly increasing Nigeria’s oil and gas production while at the same time, delivering great
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benefits to the host communities” (“Shell to Sell,” 2011, para. 4). These
statements effectively point to an enviable future for the communities.
The managing director told communities, “We remain committed to
the sustainable development of the Niger Delta” (Oyadongha, 2011,
para. 9). By continually evoking the terms “sustainable development”
and “sustainability,” Shell’s communication clearly tied the company
to a prospective vision.
Proponents of the discourse of renewal call on organizational leaders to effectively structure their crisis rhetoric such that organizational
publics or stakeholders can make informed decisions. The emphasis
is for leaders and spokespersons to frame the bigger picture in a crisis rather than focusing on the immediate causes of the crisis. But in
doing so, leaders and spokespersons are advised to “frame the crisis
in a way that inspires, empowers and motivates” (Sellnow & Seeger,
2013, p. 98). In almost every instance wherein company officials communicated with communities, there were visible attempts to structure
or construct public perception on the crisis and ensuing events. For
example, addressing some communities in the Niger Delta during the
launching of electricity-generating power plants, Shell’s general manager
for sustainable development and community relations told the people,
“We recognize that electricity is key to socio-economic development,
and that is why we have implemented these projects in addition to
our interventions in economic empowerment, health, agriculture and
human capital development” (“Shell Undertakes Electricity Projects,”
2010, para. 3). In this statement, local communities are made to perceive
a “bigger” picture of Shell by looking beyond electricity, which was
actually the issue in question. At another address to communities, the
managing director stated that the company has “a history of investing
in social projects and programs in many communities in the [Niger
Delta] region” (Onukwugha, 2011, para. 2). This statement implies a
“history” of commitment to the welfare of communities. Another Shell
official addressing local communities said, “We will continue to invest
in the wellbeing of our people as we do business in the Niger Delta,
and ask other stakeholders including communities themselves to be
part of this noble effort” (Alike, 2011, para. 16). Officials promoted
this theme of caring for communities by using catchphrases such as
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“powering progress together” (Alike, 2011, para. 3). This indeed is effective rhetoric framed such that organizational publics are “inspired”
and “motivated” (Sellnow & Seeger, 2013, p. 98). Similarly, Shell Nigeria’s managing director told communities that the company “shall
remain in the forefront of converting Nigeria’s oil and gas resources
to more jobs and opportunities for Nigerians” (“Shell Emerges Best
Company,” 2014, para. 5). At another occasion, the country director of
Shell explained that a gas and oil project that was under construction
was “good news for Nigeria” (“Shell First Oil Produced,” 2014, para. 1),
adding that being “a new source of oil revenue,” the project “strengthens
Nigeria’s deep-water expertise” (“Shell First Oil Produced,” 2014, para. 1),
which the director said is a “key driver of economic development”
(“Shell First Oil Produced,” 2014, para. 1). These are some instances of
effective organizational rhetoric that not only attempted to structure
reality but did so in a manner that motivated stakeholders true to the
spirit of the discourse of renewal.
Summarily, Shell’s discourse of renewal portrayed the multinational
as being more transparent, accountable, responsible, honest, and trustworthy in its relationship with local stakeholders. The multinational also
sought to show that the company was now engaging local communities in the management processes especially through the GMoUs, by
emphasizing the need for teamwork and suggesting that communities
could now “decide” and “drive” development projects. The company
also portrayed itself as aligning with values of “sustainability,” that is,
achieving sustainable development in those communities. Also significant was the perception the company sought to construct among communities by portraying itself as a company working to prevent conflicts
within and among local communities, continually stressing the need
for peace among communities. By portraying the company as having
learned from its past crisis management approach and actually showing
how it was implementing lessons learned, Shell was repositioning itself
as a benefactor of the renewal of the Delta region and its resources.
Outcomes of Shell’s Discourse of Renewal

Despite evidence that Shell adopted a discourse of renewal in recent
years, conflicts, disruptions, and general opposition to the company’s
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presence in the Niger Delta have continued. The primary point of
contestation remains land and oil ownership claims, and these claims
remain unaddressed in the company’s discourse of renewal.
First, while Shell executives advanced a prospective rhetoric of regional renewal, people in affected communities remained disaffected
and unwilling to abandon ancestral lands and communal claims. During
one riot against Shell, 3 people died and 100 were injured. The leader
of one of the protesting communities asserted,
It is a known fact that Uzere kingdom has been blessed with oil and
gas in its land. It is also a known fact that Shell took the advantage to
exploit these natural resources on our fatherland for the past 52 years.
(Amaize, 2011, para. 9)

In another instance, community protesters in another community
charged that “Shell is taking our oil,” and they seemed to reject the
company’s vision of a shared prosperity for a narrative of Shell as exploiting gas reserves: “We were told that gas Shell is taking from our
land is the largest, our community being the largest natural gas reserve
in West Africa” (Yafugborhi, 2012, para. 4). These persistent claims
over land construct a counterreality in which Shell’s land leases and
petroleum-sharing contracts signed with the Nigerian government
cannot legitimize its operations in this region nor frame the vision of
cooperative stakeholder relations that the company espouses.
Similarly, despite a rhetorical emphasis on transparency, accountability, and trustworthiness, local communities perceived a failure of
the company to negotiate with the people and a lack of respect for their
authority. As one villager observed, “the company did not enter into
any agreement with the people” and failed “to come to [our village]
to discuss” (Amaize, 2011, para. 12). Given the traditional structure
of communal decision-making in the contemporary Niger Delta (see
Amodu, 2013), these perceptions constructed a counterreality about
Shell’s outreach efforts in the Delta region. Negotiation was also evoked
as protesting communities justified their protests, asserting that
“the protest and the shutdown of the two flow stations were due to the
failure of the [company] to respect the host communities” noting that
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“to our greatest displeasure and dismay, we were made to understand
through the media” that an oil well “has been sold out, yet we are not
in the picture.” (James, 2015, para. 7)

The failure of negotiation is also related to another point of contention—community representatives. Protesting communities continue to
contest who should negotiate on behalf of communities and to insist that
Shell’s companies in the Niger Delta “commence negotiation, with the
proper authorized agents of the communities” (Dugbe, 2014, para. 2).
Shell was accused of inviting “unauthorized members of affected communities” (Uwugiaren, 2016, para. 6) into negotiations. In one newspaper
report, protesters accused Shell of inviting “chairmen of 24 communities
to sign nefarious agreements on behalf of the impacted communities” (Uwugiaren, 2016, para. 8), adding that the affected communities
“will definitely file a separate claim against Shell in any court of law
should Shell fail to commence negotiation with our said representative/attorney” (Uwugiaren, 2016, para. 18). The complexities of land
and authority thus complicate a discourse of renewal in the Nigerian
context.
Third, the company was perceived as not implementing the lessons
its leaders and spokespersons claimed the company had learned. Shell’s
discourse of renewal was belied by ongoing oil spills and gas flaring,
unemployment, and inadequate basic services. A Taylor Creek community leader who led a protest of 200 women said, “Shell is taking
our oil and has continued to deny the community potable water, health
center, light; employment of our youths and adequate intra community
roads” (Yafugborhi, 2012, para. 5; cf. James, 2015; Senior, 2011; “We’ve
Not Violated GMoU,” 2011). Perceptions of the company’s leadership
were also undermined by widespread public perceptions of corruption
in the company.
Fourth, while the GMoU agreement is depicted as contributing
to community autonomy and creating a participatory relationship
with the people themselves—evidence of renewal—these relationships
nonetheless reproduce neocolonialist relations in that they create artificial empowerment and patronizing benevolence, like a benefactor
giving money to a dependent rather than respecting the authority and
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autonomy of the community itself. Therefore the renewal Shell is touting has to do with “renewing” a neocolonialist relationship in which
an external agent “colonizes” the resources of the Delta communities.
Despite all the ethical promises, this relationship remains at the heart
of the company’s presence in Africa.
Lessons Learned

The case of Royal Dutch Shell in Nigeria inspires reflections on applying
crisis communication models in multinational and African contexts:
1. Expand the parameters of “crisis” beyond the interests and
reputation of the corporation to give adequate attention to situational exigencies in a crisis communication plan. In the case of
Royal Dutch Shell in Nigeria, the complex nature of claims over
land and oil ownership are identified as compelling examples
of how histories and situational exigencies contextualize crisis
communication practices.
2. Revisit the conception of leadership to move beyond a Westerncentric focus on corporate executives and spokespersons. At the
same time, the emphasis on leadership encourages an unreflective focus on titular leaders as community representatives and
may deflect attention from more communal and distributed
modes of decision-making. The way communities in the Niger
Delta are organized shows clearly that there are communal
modes of organizing, which suggests that authority is more
broadly distributed, that leadership cannot be read off social
positions, and that leaders cannot adopt a model of communication as the transmission of a preferred vision of reality to
passive stakeholders (even if it is prospective).
3. Reframe a prospective stance to acknowledge ancestral presence and cultural traditions as integral to an orientation that is
present oriented.
4. Consider a more radical conception of renewal that addresses
the dangers of corporate benevolence and neocolonialism. In
the case of Shell, the GMoU may empower village groups to
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determine development projects, yet these groups, their authority, and their projects depend on Shell’s funding, support,
and resources. Renewing relations with villages in the Delta
region that move beyond corporate largess may entail redefining renewal.
Conclusion

The Nigerian case offers an example of crises that cannot be addressed
only by responding to the accusations of wrongdoing and immediate
causes of the crisis. Beneath these accusations are contextual tensions,
situational exigencies that could better be understood and addressed
by paying critical attention to the histories and the cultural, social, and
economic relations within which these allegations of wrongdoing and
tensions emerge. The precolonial, colonial, and postcolonial experiences
within which Nigeria emerged hugely contribute to the complexities
of the crisis in the Niger Delta region. The conflicting claims over land
and crude oil, for example, are the result of conflicting land use acts
enacted during the colonial and then postcolonial administrations.
Despite Shell’s enactment of a discourse of renewal through GMoUs
that restructure relationships with local communities, an emphasis on
values and ethical leadership, and a prospective vision, protests and
local resistance persist. In the parlance of popular management prescriptions, multinationals must not only talk about renewal but have
also to “walk the talk.” While it is beyond the scope of this article to
expand on this injunction, at a minimum, this entails a grounded understanding of everyday life in local settings so that “renewal” is appropriate and responsive to lived cultural, social, and material conditions.
Regardless of how well Shell’s communication strategies realize tenets
of renewal, the difficult work of changing established and legally justified practices and distributions is where a redefined renewal becomes
actionable. The lessons learned in this case offer a first step toward
amending the model of renewal to account for non-Western exigencies
and legacies.
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ABSTRACT
Existing models of organizational crisis response effectiveness provide useful insights but are
limited in terms of offering a guide for practitioners dealing with actual crisis situations. This
analysis examines the relative effectiveness of image repair tactics based on differences in root
causes of crisis events. Results suggest that certain image repair tactics are seen as the most and
the least effective regardless of crisis type. At the same time, there were some differences across
crisis types that could guide practitioner tactic choices. Limited results here and in past research
raise questions about whether image repair tactic effectiveness can be usefully mapped to situational variables, such as audience or crisis type. This article concludes with discussion on this
matter and suggestions for future research.
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Organizations must be continually prepared to respond to crises, recognizing the potential for high financial and/or reputational costs.
Crisis practitioners must understand how to deal with crisis situations
quickly, avoid speculation, and apply strategy grounded in “insights that
can be applied effectively and ethically under extraordinary pressures
of limited time and severe scrutiny of the organization’s legitimacy”
(Heath, 2010, p. 3). Ideally, clear crisis plans based on such strategy
are readily available, but the reality is often quite different. According to a 2014 international crisis management survey, 20%–25% of
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respondents, including organizations that classified themselves as highrisk operations, did not have a plan (“Preparing for Crisis,” 2014).
Understanding how and what to communicate during a crisis is a
critical part of any crisis plan. It is essential that researchers engage in
work to help determine what constitutes effective crisis communication and what industry best practices should be. However, according to
Coombs (2014), “effective applied communication does help to improve
the field to which it is applied. Unfortunately, the academic literature
on crisis communication is both vast and difficult to assess at times,
making it of limited value to crisis communicators” (para. 30).
Some have called for more empirical testing of crisis communication tactics (An & Cheng, 2010; Avery, Lariscy, Kim, & Hocke, 2010;
Blaney, 2016; Pfeffer & Sutton, 2006), and in response to that call, this
quantitative analysis examines the relative effectiveness of image repair
tactics for various organizational crisis types. It applies Benoit’s typology, one of the most recognized frameworks for examining corporate,
political, and organizational crisis responses (see Benoit, 1995b, 2006;
Benoit & Brinson, 1994; Benoit & Czerwinski, 1997; Brinson & Benoit,
1999; Coombs & Schmidt, 2000; DiSanza, Legge, Allen, & Wilde, 2012;
King, 2006). Most research using the typology comprises qualitative
case studies focused on singular crisis events. These approaches have
obvious limitations in terms of making general claims about the impact
of different tactics in crisis situations. Because testing the effectiveness of such claims is vital if research is to advise practitioner choices,
research must begin to map tactical choices onto contingencies like
audience and crisis type. This study, therefore, was guided by the following research question: What specific image repair tactics result in
more positive and/or more negative perceptions of an organization
based on differences in crisis type?
Literature Review

Some quantitative tests of image repair in organizations have focused
on the relative effectiveness of different tactics. For example, Twork
and Blaney (2013) tested the premise that mortification combined with
promises of corrective action would be more effective than mortifica-
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tion only. They found no significant differences between approaches.
Dawar and Pillutla (2000) discovered that, in the case of a harmful
consumer product, clear mortification, clear recall measures (corrective
action), and restitution (compensation) were superior to stonewalling
and ambiguous attempts at mortification and corrective action. In a
related study, Spence, Lachlan, and Omilion-Hodges (2016) looked
for differences in the impact of mortification and corrective action on
participants’ perceptions of organizational reputation; however, both
were found to be equally effective. Cos, Worrell, and Blosenhauser
(2016) exposed audiences to different paired tactics and found that
audiences exposed to mortification and corrective action had more
positive feelings toward the organization than those exposed to minimization and transcendence. When respondents in the study were
asked what they would have liked to have heard from the offending
organization, 53% responded with comments that could be categorized
as corrective action.
Some past work has tied image repair tactic effectiveness to crisis
type in ways that are similar to our goals in this study. Most of this
work tests Coombs’s (2007) situational crisis communication theory
(SCCT). SCCT suggests that crisis managers will select more effective
persuasive response tactics if they understand the kind of crisis situation they are experiencing. Based on attribution theory, Coombs’s
(2006) theory suggests that the reputational threat a crisis presents
is defined by the audience’s perception of four things: (a) crisis type,
as determined by the audience’s perception of whether responsibility
for the crisis was external or internal; (b) severity of the damage; (c)
whether organizational history includes many or few past crises; and
(d) relationship history, defined as the audience’s attribution of the
quality of the relationship it has with stakeholders.
Audience attributions are seen as resulting from how the media
“frame” and cover the crisis—specifically the facts and values that they
choose to emphasize—thereby influencing how the audience perceives
the crisis. According to Coombs (2007), except in cases of crises that
unfold online, “the frames used in the news media reports are the frames
that most stakeholders will experience and adopt” (p. 171).
Coombs’s (2007) model includes a set of recommended response
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tactics to match crisis type that should produce maximum image repair
benefits. Empirical support for matching response tactics to crisis types
is mixed. Coombs and Holladay (1996) found that matching crisis response to crisis type produced significantly more reputational benefits
to the organization than mismatched responses, although the effect sizes
were small. Other studies (Brown & White, 2011; Claeys, Cauberghe,
& Vyncke, 2010) found no significant improvement in organizational
reputation when crisis strategies were matched to crisis type.
This study is consistent with the goals of work grounded in Coombs’s
model. However, as explained later, we take a different approach to operationalizing crisis type in an attempt to uncover findings that are both
more robust and more useful for real-world practitioner applications.
Method

This study adds to the body of quantitative research testing image repair strategy effectiveness. It was designed as a continuation of earlier
exploratory work (Gribas, DiSanza, Legge, Hartman, & Santee, 2016) in
which audience type, based on audience perceptions of responsibility
and severity, was considered as a possible influence on tactic impact.
In the current study, the focus is not on audience type but rather on
crisis type.
Classifying Organizational Crisis Types

The approach to defining crisis type here is grounded in practical application. When crises arise, public relations (PR) practitioners are called
on to make quick messaging decisions that are truthful and ethical, that
protect affected publics, and that also minimize image damage and/
or maximize image repair. As noted earlier, it would be best for these
decisions to be based on solid, empirically verified guidelines rather
than on speculation or instinct.
Models provided by both Benoit (1995a, 2015) and Coombs (2006)
offer valuable insight into the world of organizational image repair;
however, both are limited in their capacity as the basis for a real-world,
real-time guide. Benoit’s (1995a, 2015) model is, by design, a typology
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only rather than a predictive tool. The many case studies based on
the typology offer valuable help, as practitioners, aware of these case
studies, can draw connections between a current crisis and what has
worked (and not worked) in the past in a similar situation. However,
PR practitioners would need to be extremely well read to be aware of
enough cases to make this approach viable. Also, inevitable differences
between past organizational crises and any current situation make even
the most informed reasoning by analogy tenuous at best.
Coombs’s (2006) SCCT model, on the other hand, is designed for
predictive insight. As noted, empirical support for its theorized predictions is limited. Yet even if SCCT had stronger empirical support,
its usefulness to PR practitioners would be questionable. To apply
Coombs’s model, a PR manager would need to accurately gauge the
following in the very early stages of a crisis: audience determination of
responsibility as external or internal, audience assessment of damage
severity, audience awareness of the organization’s past crisis history, and
audience’s judgment of the relationship quality between organization
and stakeholders. Gauging such perceptual complexity would be difficult, if not impossible. These are essentially individual-level variables,
and as Benoit (2015) has pointed out, audiences are not monolithic. For
example, some may view crisis damage as relatively small, while others
see the same result as severe, or while some are keenly aware of past
crises in the organization’s history, others are unaware of that history. It
is likely, especially in the early stages of a crisis, that the organization is
“simultaneously in multiple situations” (Benoit, 2015, p. 38). Additionally, almost every organizational crisis today unfolds online as well as
in the mainstream media. The explosion in online news sources, social
media, and microblogs has reduced the mainstream media’s ability to
frame the particulars of a crisis in any unified way, likely exacerbating
the perceptual fragmentation in any target audience.
To provide usable advice for practitioners, we wanted something
more than an image repair strategy typology, but we also wanted a way
to assess crisis type based on something less complex and more immediately accessible than individual attributional and perceptual variations.
We considered Campbell’s (1999) list of nearly 40 crisis types, Coombs’s
(1999) somewhat reduced list (natural disasters, malevolence, technical
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breakdowns, human breakdowns, challenges, megadamage, organizational misdeeds, workplace violence, and rumors), and numerous PR
or business communication textbooks that contain similarly extensive
lists of possible threats to organizations. From this, we sought to identify a small number of mutually exclusive and reasonably exhaustive
categories. The result was a four-category scheme for organizational
crisis type based on general root cause: malevolence, managerial failure,
systemic failure, and natural disaster.
A malevolence crisis occurs when an actor inside or outside the
organization takes serious action, often to express anger toward the
organization. Such action includes shootings, bombings, sabotage,
product tampering, or malicious rumors designed to damage the organization. For example, in 1982, a still unknown person laced Tylenol
capsules with potassium cyanide, killing seven people. Other examples
include the Pepsi syringe scare of 1993 and the Wendy’s finger incident
in 2005. In these cases, people made fraudulent claims about a product
to bring a tort lawsuit against the firm.
In a managerial failure crisis, management knowingly acts in ways
that cause harm or risk of harm for organizational stakeholders or
knowingly chooses not to act to prevent such harm or risk. Lerbinger (1997) suggested that manager-created crises usually result from
some combination of skewed management values, deception, and
misconduct. The uncontrollable acceleration problems of some Toyota
vehicles were blamed on Toyota’s skewed emphasis on production over
quality and clearly fit into the managerial failure category. The subprime
mortgage crisis that led to the Great Recession was created by all three
managerial causes at several of America’s biggest investment banks and
mortgage insurers.
Systemic breakdown crises can occur in any complex, tightly coupled
organizational environment and usually include unlikely or difficult to
anticipate technological failures or technology–human interface errors.
The Chernobyl disaster and the flawed Affordable Care Act online
rollout fit into this crisis type category.
Finally, a natural disaster crisis occurs when there is damage to
life, property, or the environment through weather or other “acts of
God.” For example, an airliner crashing because of an unpredictable
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microburst is an example of a natural disaster. Another example is
when fires forced almost 90,000 people, the entire community of Fort
McMurray, Alberta, Canada, to be evacuated in May 2016.
While it has some similarities to what Coombs (2007) called “crisis
clusters,” this categorization scheme differs in that it does not ask PR
practitioners to assess complex patterns of audience perception to
match an appropriate image repair strategy. An overarching narrative
about the root cause of a crisis is more identifiable, consensual, and
stable than estimations of audience organizational knowledge, judgments, and attributions. It is in this way that we believe our approach
offers promise as the basis of a more practitioner-friendly and usable
crisis response guide.
Image Repair Strategies and Tactics

This study employed Benoit’s (1995a, 1997, 2015) typology, which outlines
five general ways people and organizations respond to accusations of
wrongdoing: denial, evasion of responsibility, reducing offensiveness
of the event, corrective action, and mortification.
Denial includes both simple denial and shifting the blame. Simple
denial occurs when the accused rejects the existence of or involvement
in the wrongdoing, and shifting the blame occurs when the accused
attempts to avoid blame by shifting it to another individual or organization.
Evasion of responsibility includes making one of four tactical arguments: (a) The act was in response to another’s wrongful act (provocation), (b) it was not possible to act otherwise given a lack of information or ability (defeasibility), (c) the act was an uncontrollable mistake
(accident), or (d) the motivation for the act was positive or virtuous
(good intentions).
Reducing offensiveness of an event includes six tactical variants: (a)
redirecting negative perceptions by focusing on positive characteristics
or good things the accused has done in the past (bolstering), (b) arguing
that the act is not as bad as some may think (minimization), (c) making an untoward act look more favorable by comparing it to other less
favorable options (differentiation), (d) reframing an issue with a focus
on higher and more important issues (transcendence), (e) questioning
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the credibility of whoever is making accusations (attacking the accuser),
and (f) alleviating blame by reimbursing victims (compensation).
Finally, corrective action occurs when the accused promises a plan
to deal with the consequences of the problem and/or to prevent a similar problem in the future, and mortification occurs when the accused
admits responsibility and asks for forgiveness.
Other typologies exist (e.g., Coombs, 1998), though they are less
comprehensive. Few have even suggested additions to the Benoit typology, and when suggested (e.g., Brinson & Benoit, 1999), the additions have not been adopted by later researchers. Therefore the more
exhaustive and discriminating nature of Benoit’s typology made it the
best option for this study.
Participants

Participants were students attending a mid-sized public university in
the Intermountain West of the United States. Instructors of various
communication courses were contacted and asked to assist in recruiting individuals from their classes by announcing the opportunity to
participate during a class session. Interested students were given information related to accessing an online questionnaire. Cooperating
instructors were asked to offer some minimal extra credit as incentive
for participation, and all participants were given the opportunity to
be entered into a drawing for one of two $100 Amazon gift cards by
voluntarily identifying themselves by name and cooperating instructor.
A total of 323 individuals provided surveys usable for this study. Most
students were enrolled in courses that were part of university general
education requirements, resulting in a sample broadly representing
the campus population.
Online Questionnaire

Online materials directed participants to indicate consent by marking a
check box and advancing to the survey questionnaire. The online questionnaire first directed each participant to read one of four scenarios—
determined by a random selection process—relating to the collapse of
a university building balcony that resulted in 95 injured students and
3 deaths. The basic scenario/crisis outcome was the same for all, but
each participant received a scenario edited in a way that framed the
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organizational crisis as one of four types based on the ultimate root
cause of the crisis: malevolence, managerial failure, systemic failure, and
natural disaster. For example, the following was the unique crisis framing for participants who were presented with the malevolence scenario:
Further investigation revealed that the support struts had been purposely weakened. The investigation quickly focused on a disgruntled
former employee at the university’s maintenance shop who was recently
fired. When he was arrested and questioned, the former employee
admitted to the crime.

This manipulation allowed for examination of differences in perceived
effectiveness of tactics across crisis types.
Then each participant considered 14 possible organizational responses made by the president of the university in follow-up to the
crisis. Organizational responses each represented one image restoration
tactic reflected in the Benoit (1995a, 2015) typology. For example, the
following item was designed to have participants consider a “simple
denial” tactic:
Take a moment to reflect again on what you just read about the incident
at Millersville State University. Be sure to think through the scenario
carefully, stopping to reflect on all the information provided.
Now imagine that, approximately one week after the collapse, you
are watching a televised report related to the incident. Part of the report
includes video of the President of Millersville State University who has
prepared an official statement.
Now imagine the following—Even though the President addresses a
number of issues, at the end of the presentation, it seems clear to you
that his main point could be summarized as follows: “The university
was not in any way responsible for the incident.” If the President focused on this in the report, indicate the likely impact that would have
on your perception of the university.

Participants were presented with each response individually, one at
a time, and rated each response before moving to the next for consideration. They rated each response on a 10-point scale ranging from 1
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(This would have a very negative effect on my perception of the organization) to 10 (This would have a very positive effect on my perception of
the organization). The sequence of these 14 organizational responses
was randomized for each participant to avoid order bias.
Analysis

Consistent with the analysis approach taken by Gribas et al. (2016), the
data were examined in two ways. First, mean scores for positive and/
or negative impact of each image repair tactics were calculated. These
average scores were calculated for the total sample as well as for each
of the four crisis types (malevolence, managerial, systemic, natural disaster) to allow for a simple comparison. Second, MANOVA was used,
with crisis type serving as the single fixed factor and effect ratings for
each of the 14 Benoit image repair tactics serving as multiple dependent
variables. Post hoc analysis was performed for all dependent variables
showing significance.
Results

As explained earlier, a random selection process was used to place
online survey participants into one of four crisis type groups. Of the
323 participants included in this analysis, 74 responded to a crisis suggesting malevolence, 70 to a crisis suggesting managerial failure, 93 to
a crisis suggesting systemic failure, and 86 to a crisis suggesting natural
disaster as the root cause.
Rankings of Image Repair Tactics for Crisis Types

Table 1 shows the means and relative rank ordering of the image repair
tactics for each crisis type as well as the means and rank orderings for
the overall sample. One thing that stands out from this table is that
there is a good deal of similarity across crisis types in terms of the
relative rankings of the 14 tactics. Compensation and corrective action
were ranked 1 and 2 (or tied for 2), respectively, for all four crisis types,
suggesting that these tactics are perceived as having the most positive
impact on organizational image regardless of crisis type. In fact, these
two tactics along with mortification and good intentions made up the
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top four spots across all crisis types. These consistencies offer support
for previous claims that
corrective action, compensation, and mortification are all likely to help
in a crisis and almost certainly will not hurt an organization’s image,
as long as the image repair messages are perceived by audiences as
sincere, and the organization follows through with commitments to
correct problems or compensate victims. (Gribas et al., 2016, p. 54)

On the other end of the ranking spectrum, with only minor exceptions, attacking the accuser, provocation, shifting blame, and simple
denial were the four tactics perceived as having the most negative impact
on organizational image across crisis types. So, overall, the rankings
show a good deal of similarity across crisis types for both the highest
ranked and lowest ranked tactics. Comparisons of these data to data
from earlier research (Gribas et al., 2016) suggest that certain tactics
just seem to be overall better and worse regardless of the crisis situation.
MANOVA and Post Hoc Analyses

The purpose of this study was to uncover ways in which the positive or negative impacts of particular image repair tactics seem to be
dependent on crisis type. The foregoing consideration of means and
relative rankings of tactics across crises suggests that crisis type makes
rather little difference. However, results from a more robust analysis,
applying MANOVA and follow-up post hoc procedures, offer more
finely tuned insights.
The results of the MANOVA were statistically significant, F(42,
924) = 3.436, p < .000, Pillais’s trace = .405, partial η2 = .135, supporting the idea that the degree to which image repair tactics influence
audience perceptions of an organization during a crisis is impacted
by crisis type. Because of this, follow-up ANOVAs were conducted to
determine which of the 14 tactics seem to be dependent on crisis type.
A Bonferroni correction suggested applying an alpha of .0036 or lower
to indicate significance for the follow-up ANOVAs.
From the follow-up ANOVAs, 5 of the 14 tactics showed significance based on the corrected alpha: simple denial, F(3, 319) = 9.961,
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TABLE 3

Significant Tactic Effectiveness Differences for Crisis Type Pairings
Crisis type

Crisis type
Malevolence

Managerial

Systemic

Natural disaster

simple denial

simple denial

shift blame

shift blame

shift blame

accident

defeasibility

accident

accident
good intentions
Managerial

defeasibility

simple denial

accident

defeasibility

good intentions

accident
good intentions
transcendence

Systemic

p < .000; shifting blame, F(3, 319) = 11.693, p < .000; defeasibility,
F(3, 319) = 10.989, p < .000; accident, F(3, 319) =22.457, p < .000; and
good intentions, F(3, 319) = 6.692, p < .000. Results for transcendence,
F(3, 319) = 3.885, p < .009, approached significance at the corrected level
and would have been highly significant for an uncorrected ANOVA.
Because of this, and because of the unique nature of transcendence
noted in related research by Gribas et al. (2016), it was included in
follow-up considerations.
Tables 2 and Table 3 show relevant information for the six tactics
considered here. Table 2 includes mean scores for interpretation and
also includes superscript designations that identify sets of crisis types
for which specific tactic ratings significantly differ. Table 3 simplifies
this same information by eliminating mean scores and, instead, listing
all tactics that showed significant differences for particular crisis type
pairings.
None of the tactics in Table 2 was among the very highest ranking overall tactics (see Table 1). Of the tactics that showed significant
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differences across crisis type, good intentions, transcendence, and accident were ranked 4, 5, and 6, respectively, overall; defeasibility fell in
the middle of the tactic ranking order; and simple denial and shifting
blame were the bottom two ranked tactics overall. So the consistency
in relative rankings for the highest ranked tactics noted earlier appears
to be validated by the lack of significant differences found in the post
hoc analysis. On the other hand, despite general consistency in relative
rankings for lowest ranked tactics (Table 1), simple denial and shifting blame in particular still reflect statistically significant differences
across crisis type.
Table 3 shows that there were significant differences for five tactics
across the managerial–malevolence crisis type pairing. The same was
true for the managerial–natural disaster pairing. In fact, four of the five
tactics showing significant differences in these two pairings were the
same: simple denial, defeasibility, accident, and good intentions. In all
cases, these tactics were perceived as having a more negative impact
on organizational image in the managerial crisis case than in either
the malevolence case or the natural disaster case. For the managerial–
malevolence pairing, shifting blame showed a similar pattern, and for
the managerial–natural disaster pairing, transcendence showed the
same pattern.
So these two pairings, managerial–malevolence and managerial–
natural disaster, reflected the greatest number of significant differences.
The managerial–systemic pairing also reflected significant differences;
managerial significantly differed from systemic for the simple denial,
shifting blame, and accident tactics. All three of these tactics were
viewed as more problematic for the managerial crisis situation than
for the systemic failure crisis situation.
As noted, the malevolence crisis situation differed significantly
from the managerial crisis situation. Malevolence also showed significant differences from systemic and from natural disaster. Specifically,
simple denial, shifting blame, and accident differed significantly in
the malevolence–systemic pairing, while shifting blame and accident
differed significantly in the malevolence–natural disaster pairing. So
just as managerial differed from all other crisis types in some way, malevolence similarly differed from all others. In every case of significant
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difference, tactic effectiveness ratings were lower for managerial than
for all other crisis types, but that was not true for malevolence pairings.
The accident tactic was viewed less positively for malevolence than
for systemic or natural disaster, but in all other cases, tactics showing
significant differences were viewed more favorably in a malevolence
crisis situation than for other crisis types.
Finally, the only crisis type pairing for which no significant differences emerged was systemic–natural disaster. This does make some
intuitive sense, especially given that image repair is always a response
addressing issues of crisis event responsibility and causality. Systems
may be designed by human agents, but the interdependence of system
parts and the complexity of many systems are such that identifying any
individual source for blame or for attributing causality would be difficult
at best. Similarly, most accept that a natural disaster is an unpredictable
event that defies any kind of causal attribution.
Discussion and Conclusions

Effective crisis planning requires reliable insight into image repair tactic
selection. The root cause crisis type scheme applied in this study seemed
to work well to identify unique variations regarding tactic appropriateness. Overall, our results demonstrate that compensation, corrective
action, and mortification are broadly effective strategies to use, while
the remaining strategies are either not recommended or should be applied only after careful consideration of root cause as well as audience
and situational particulars.
We have noted that effective crisis planning must allow practitioners
to deal with a crisis quickly, avoid speculation, and “provide insights that
can be applied effectively and ethically under extraordinary pressures
of limited time and severe scrutiny of the organization’s legitimacy”
(Heath, 2010, p. 3). Given this challenge, guidelines like the ones just
suggested, although helpful, may be too general to guide truly strategic
crisis planning. Therefore we offer the following crisis planning tactic
selection guidelines based on the results of this study.
Recall that the scale used to rate image repair tactic appropriateness ranged from a low of 1 (This would have a very negative effect on
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my perception of the organization) to a high of 10 (This would have
a very positive effect on my perception of the organization). It makes
some intuitive sense to split that range exactly in half at a score of 5.5
and to consider tactics rated in the upper half as ones we would recommend. This approach would be reasonable because we would be
recommending tactics rated as having at least some overall positive
effect on improving people’s perceptions of the organization. However,
given the somewhat negatively skewed distribution of scores for these
tactics, such an approach would lead us to “not recommend” the vast
majority of strategies under any circumstances. This would offer a
very limited and limiting set of options to practitioners designing crisis response plans. Instead, for the purposes of suggesting crisis plan
recommendations, we determined that tactics scoring an average of
above 5.0 should be categorized as “recommend” and anything at or
below 5.0 categorized as “do not recommend.” Though a tactic with
an average score between 5.0 and 5.5 is still technically on the “would
have a negative effect” side of the continuum, we can safely deduce that,
to achieve that average, a good percentage of respondents did rate it
positively. For example, the overall average across crisis types for the
accident strategy was 5.0; however, almost 40% of all respondents rated
that strategy from 6 to 10, indicating that it would have some degree
of positive effect on their perceptions.
In the world of crisis management, it is often the case that the goal
is to minimize damage rather than to prevent it and to do as much
good as possible with as many as possible. Finding strategies that make
sense for a particular crisis situation that are likely to have a positive
impact on most or all is likely unrealistic. Therefore we suggest the
following in terms of tactics recommended and not recommended for
consideration as part of a crisis response plan targeted to particular
crisis types:
For Any Crisis Type
• Recommend: compensation, corrective action, mortification,
good intentions
• Do not recommend: simple denial, shift blame, attack accuser,
differentiation, bolstering, provocation
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Additions for Malevolence Crisis Type
• Recommend: transcendence
• Do not recommend: accident, minimization, defeasibility
Additions for Managerial Failure Crisis Type
• Recommend: N/A
• Do not recommend: accident, minimization, defeasibility, transcendence
Additions for Systemic Failure Crisis Type
• Recommend: transcendence, accident, minimization
• Do not recommend: defeasibility
Additions for Natural Disaster Crisis Type
• Recommend: transcendence, accident, minimization, defeasibility
• Do not recommend: N/A
These guidelines reinforce our earlier discussion; a handful of tactics, no matter the crisis, are most likely to improve the organization’s image among audience members. Three of these—compensation, corrective action, and mortification—are consistent with what
Coombs called “accommodative” strategies or tactics that focus on
victims’ concerns. Conversely, six tactics appear to have a more negative effect on audience perceptions of the organization across all crisis types. Four of these—simple denial, shifting the blame, attacking
the accuser, and provocation—are similar to Coombs’s description
of “defensive” strategies that work more to protect the organization.
Therefore the results reinforce that, if it is at all possible, organizations
experiencing a crisis should adopt accommodative tactics and avoid
defensive tactics.
However, this general principle cannot be fully embraced, because
accident and defeasibility are clearly defensive rather than accommodative, and these show on the “recommend” list for some crisis types.
Additionally, avoiding the defensive tactics is not always possible or
reasonable. During the 1993 Pepsi scare, when foreign objects (syringes,
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bullets, etc.) were found in the soft drink’s cans and plastic bottles, the
Pepsi crisis team engaged in simple denial, claiming that the objects
could not have been introduced at the bottling plant. Pepsi circulated
press releases with vivid graphics showing bottles hanging upside down
until a split second before they were filled, demonstrating the difficulty
of inserting objects at the plant. Pepsi’s claims were supported by the
Food and Drug Administration’s commissioner, David Kessler, who
agreed Pepsi was the victim of copycat hoaxes. Additionally, surveillance cameras in a Colorado supermarket showed a woman opening
a Pepsi and inserting a syringe into it. Though simple denial is not an
accommodative strategy, most experts believe Pepsi was successful
in restoring its image (Holmes, 1993). However, the Pepsi example
also demonstrated that, for denial to be effective, organizations must
summon an enormous amount of evidence for this defensive tactic to
work effectively.
Managerial Crisis

It is clear by looking at the “recommend” tactics that the managerial crisis presents the most difficult situation for the PR practitioner,
because only the four tactics recommended for all crisis types seem
likely to improve the audience’s perception of the organization. Managerial crises are created through skewed management values, deception,
misconduct, or some combination of the three. Because responsibility
for the crisis rests so heavily on the organization and its leadership, it
makes sense that the only real options available all admit that a crisis
occurred and then attempt to compensate, correct, or apologize for that
event. For example, in 2016, Wells Fargo Bank experienced a serious
managerial crisis when thousands of employees created 1.5 million fake
accounts and 565,000 credit card accounts for existing customers, none
of which were authorized by those customers, to earn bonuses and
meet aggressive sales targets (Comcowich, 2016). Although the firm
apologized and eventually engaged in corrective action by discontinuing the incentive program, they shifted the blame to (and fired) 5,300
lower level employees. Unfortunately, this failed to address the real
problem: skewed management values that focused on the short-term
profits of cross-selling.
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Our tactical guidelines imply that shifting the blame likely would
have had a negative effect on people’s perceptions of the organization,
and that is exactly what happened with Wells Fargo. The organization’s attempt to shift the blame overshadowed its other image repair
tactics and brought them stinging rebukes from the media and Senator Elizabeth Warren on the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing,
and Urban Affairs, among others (Peck & Carter, 2016). Therefore, in
a managerial crisis, organizations must focus on compensation, corrective action, mortification, and good intentions and do everything
possible to steer clear of other tactics.
Malevolence Crisis

Five tactics have potential to improve the audience’s perception of the
organization in a malevolence crisis situation: compensation, corrective
action, mortification, good intentions, and transcendence. Significance
tests showed that, although shifting the blame does not necessarily help
the organization’s image, it is at least a significantly more acceptable
tactic for malevolence than for any of the other three crisis types. This
makes sense given that the malevolent actor is an easy target for blame
shifting, and this tactic, combined with several of the recommended
tactics, might be effective at improving the organization’s image.
Systemic Crisis

There are seven recommended tactical options available for improving
the organization’s image in a systemic failure crisis: compensation, corrective action, mortification, good intentions, accident, transcendence,
and minimization. In systemic failure crises, even a number of tactics
considered defensive seem to be seen as potentially effective. Significance testing shows that good intentions is viewed more positively in
the systemic crisis than in the managerial crisis, and accident is viewed
more positively in the systemic crisis than in either the managerial or
malevolence crisis. Although shifting the blame is not recommended
for any crisis type, it is seen as significantly more positive (or less negative) for the systemic crisis than for the managerial crisis.
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Natural Disaster

The natural disaster crisis offers the organization the largest number
of recommended image repair tactical options, including compensation, corrective action, mortification, good intentions, transcendence,
accident, minimization, and defeasibility. By its definition, a natural
disaster is difficult to predict and impossible to control. Given the
unpredictable nature of natural disasters, it makes sense that good
intentions and appeals to accident would work in these circumstances,
despite the fact that they are on the defensive end of the continuum.
The natural disaster suggests little to no organizational responsibility,
and therefore there seems to be a larger number of legitimate tactical
possibilities.
Limitations

These results and our tactical guide clearly identify strategies that are
and are not recommended. However, recommendations based on the
public’s positive or negative ratings of tactics may not be consistent with
realities faced by PR practitioners. For example, we outlined earlier some
instances where denial might need to be used, even though generally
it is not seen positively as a strategy. On the other hand, mortification
(taking responsibility and making an apology) was rated positively for
all crisis types. However, PR practitioners must be aware that an apology can come with legal ramifications. According to Meyers (2016),
there are currently 38 “I’m sorry” laws taking multiple forms spanning
37 states and the District of Columbia. Twenty of the jurisdictions
exempt fault-based apologies from evidence, while 18 jurisdictions
include fault-based apologies in evidence. When considering an apology, PR practitioners must be aware of state laws, and when legal and
financial liability risks are high, they must consider the use of language
that emphasizes sympathy and empathy while minimizing fault. This
would be in line with findings by Coombs and Holladay (2008) that
“respondents had similar reactions to sympathy, compensation, and
apology response strategies” (p. 255). PR practitioners must also evaluate and manage any nonverbal apologies (Meyers, 2016).
For a practitioner guide to be truly useful, it should be dependable as a resource across crisis types, contexts, and audiences. While
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we hope our proposed guidelines offer such versatility of application, we know that the design of this study has limitations that make
broad application something to be proved in practice and over time.
To consider the relative impact of 14 different crisis tactics and avoid
impossible complication of research design and analysis, it was necessary to work with a single crisis scenario with some modifications to
suggest various crisis types. We believe this approach was justified to
avoid seriously confounding the results. If, for instance, the managerial
crisis had dealt with some financial impropriety while the malevolence
crisis dealt with some dangerous equipment failure and the systemic
and natural disaster crises were similarly distinct in nature, this would
have introduced a confounding variable into the study. So, for purposes
of control, the approach taken here was to keep the crisis scenario
consistent across conditions. At the same time, it does mean that the
results and implications could be limited to similar crisis scenarios.
Our scenario involved an organization that was relatively large, loosely
coupled (Weick, 1976), and institutional, and the crisis outcome was
rather serious in that it resulted in bodily injury and multiple deaths.
It is reasonable to question whether the same results would be seen if
considering these same crisis types for a smaller, for-profit, corporate
firm in a rapidly changing competitive market or with a crisis that had
different, much less serious consequences.
We also acknowledge the limitations of looking at individual tactics
out of context. Respondents were directed to consider a crisis response
characterized by 14 image repair tactics, but, by design, they were asked
to consider the tactics individually and one at a time. However, it would
be a rare occurrence indeed for even a very brief crisis response to rely
on a single tactic. In response to crises, multiple image repair tactics are
typically used together in ways, it is hoped, that are seen as consistent
and complementary.
Future Research

We believe that the preceding guidelines have face validity. In light of
the limitations discussed, though, we suggest that they should be applied
with due caution, at least until future research offers greater validation.
Such research would do well to intentionally consider a different crisis
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scenario than used here or, even better, to limit consideration to one or
a few image repair tactics applied to a variety of crisis scenarios. Additionally, future work might do well to explore the interplay of tactic
combinations. Given the promising results by Gribas et al. (2016) and
from the current study, we believe that such research building on, extending, and, we hope, validating this work is warranted.
Although we advocate this continued exploration, we also note that
the findings here, as well as in past related research, were not particularly
striking in terms of application. For example, in this study, most of the
tactics showing significant differences across crisis type were middleof-the-road tactics; that is, with the exception of simple denial and
shifting the blame, they were tactics viewed as not highly effective nor
as highly ineffective. For the most part, crisis type seems most relevant
when considering image repair tactics that, at best, may have a slightly
positive to slightly negative impact on audience perception. Stronger
findings related to tactics with greater positive or negative impact would
have offered something more worthy of a PR practitioner’s attention.
What is striking is how similar these findings are to those from
other studies (Brown & White, 2011; Claeys et al., 2010; Coombs &
Holladay, 1996; Gribas et al., 2016). The search for the ideal tactics to
suit particular crises, audience types, and other situational variables
has yet to reveal exceptional and compelling prescriptive advice for
practitioners. Given this, it seems possible that the way people perceive
organizational image repair attempts may rest in something less situational and more in cultural notions of effective “apologia.” As applied
in rhetorical criticism, apologia is understood as a formal defense or
justification of actions. The results of these organizational image repair studies, all of which have utilized U.S. participants, suggest that
there might be an underlying cultural apologia script that demands
organizations in crisis embrace certain culturally appropriate accommodative responses and avoid certain culturally inappropriate defensive
responses. So it may be that there are culturally derived social scripts
dictating proper organizational image repair efforts, no matter the type
of crisis or audience.
Initial support for this possibility has been found in a work in progress by DiSanza, Legge, Hartman, Carr, and Gribas (2017) that compared
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U.S. and Middle Eastern respondents in regard to their perceptions of
the effectiveness of various image repair tactics. Preliminary analyses
suggested that U.S. participants responded very favorably to accommodative tactics and very negatively to defensive tactics; however, Middle
Eastern audiences did not seem to have the same degree of negative
response to defensive tactics. In fact, for this Middle Eastern sample,
differences between the most defensive tactics and the most accommodative tactics were negligible. Though this is still quite speculative,
we suggest that cross-cultural studies of the effectiveness of image
repair tactics is one fruitful new direction for future organizational
crisis response research.
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ABSTRACT
Social media have established a growing prevalence and influence in social change, in political
movements, and as vehicles for messages related to crisis. The movement #deleteuber demonstrated this growing trend. Using quantitative content analysis, 2,000 tweets posted on Twitter
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In today’s world of 24/7, around-the-clock news and networking platforms, the act of protest has taken on a new form in the age of social
media (Tucker et al., 2015). First, social media provide a platform for
building protest—drawing attention to issues and allowing for their
quick dissemination to a wide audience. Second, once in existence,
social media sites play a role in recruiting participants to support the
protest and continue to spread the word, while continually and simultaneously encouraging participation. Third, once in full swing, social
media continue to spread information about the protest.
In this case study, we analyze the Uber crisis and resulting #deleteuber protest movement on Twitter. We draw on literature from media
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studies, organizational communication, and crisis communication to
analyze how a specific protest was discussed and framed via this social
media platform. Conducting a content analysis allowed us to systematically investigate the content and wordage using a specific hashtag. First,
we review the topics of framing and organizational identity in news
and social media discourse, organizational communication, and crisis
communication, leading to the presentation of our specific hypotheses.
Next, we present our methodological approach in full detail and offer findings from our data collection and analysis. This project adds
to literature by exploring organizational identity from a quantitative
perspective to expand on the distinction between organizations and
stakeholders in online environments.
Review of Literature

The purpose of this study is to evaluate organizational identity in
crisis, specifically when provoked by an individual leader, and how
social media has a stake in the crisis. More specifically, whereas previous literature has primarily focused on how organizations frame and
communicate crises, we chose to explore how publics and stakeholders
on social media respond to and frame a specific crisis—whether communicating to the organization and its leaders specifically or voicing
opinions with the hope of garnering support from others online.
Theoretical Framework: Thematic and Episodic Framing

Hallahan (1999) explained that frames define or limit a “message’s
meaning by shaping the inferences that individuals make about the message. Frames reflect judgments made by message creators or framers”
(p. 207). This is particularly relevant in online spaces, where users
frame an issue or situation—positioning them in either a positive or
negative light.
Within framing discourse, particularly in political research, two
fundamental types of frames often used in communicating issues are
thematic and episodic frames (de Vreese, Peter, & Semetko, 2001; Gross,
2008; Iyengar, 1991). Iyengar (1990, 1991) defined thematic frames as
those that “focus on political issues and events in a broader context
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and present, collective, abstract, and general evidence” (Iyengar, 1990,
p. 22). Thematic frames focus on broader implications—placing an issue
in general societal or political/governmental contexts (An & Gower,
2009). In contrast, episodic frames focus on and “describe concrete
events and particular cases that illuminate the issue” (Iyengar, 1990,
p. 22). In other words, episodic is individualistic—focusing on specific
events (An & Gower, 2009). For example, content framed thematically
would place the issue at a general level—“a societal problem requiring a societal response” (An & Gower, 2009, p. 108). Content framed
episodically, therefore, would be very specific—presenting the issue or
topic as an individual problem that has an individual solution.
At the core, thematic and episodic frames deal with levels of responsibility surrounding an issue or topic of public debate and discussion.
An example of prior work includes An and Gower’s (2009) exploration
of how news media frame crises. We analyze a particular case of crisis
and protest on social media by looking at how users characterize the
responsibility of this crisis at either the episodic level (i.e., CEO and/
or organization) by referring to a specific event or moment or at the
thematic level by considering what broader implications of this issue
may be. Overall, these two framing categories are fundamental types of
political news communication, so it is fitting that we use these in our
study to analyze Twitter users when discussing a politically related incident. Historically, thematic frames carry more abstract information—
“presenting policy problems as impersonal figures and do not provide
specific ‘lots’ or characters at which the receivers may direct their emotional reactions” (Aaroe, 2011, p. 210). In contrast, episodic frames often
include “human interest details” that put “a real face and specific face
on the presentation of a political problem” (Semetko & Valkenberg,
2000, p. 95).
As Muralidharan, Rasmussen, Patterson, and Shin (2011) noted,
little research has analyzed the use of framing on social media. This
study adds to literature by focusing primarily on Twitter and the ways
in which the public frames a response to organizations, instead of the
commonly studied reverse effect. In their study on the use of Facebook and Twitter by nonprofit and media organizations during the
aftermath of a recent Haitian earthquake, Muralidharan et al. found
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that the dominant frame used by organizations when communicating
crisis on both Twitter and Facebook was episodic in nature. Owing
to our interest in studying the politically charged protest against the
company of Uber, we place social media framing in an organizational
communication context.
The Case: Uber, Trump, and the #deleteuber Movement

On Friday, January 27, 2017, President Donald Trump signed an executive order restricting and limiting entrance by immigrants and by visa
and green card holders into the United States from seven majorityIslamic countries. Following the news of the immigration ban, the New
York Taxi Workers Alliance called for a strike at New York’s John F.
Kennedy (JFK) airport (Lutz, 2017). On January 28, Travis Kalanick,
CEO of Uber—a widely popular global car-sharing service and app—
faced severe criticism for his ambiguous response to the immigration
ban and Uber’s decision to remove surge pricing at JFK, continuing to
service travelers amid the taxi strike. The hashtag #deleteuber began
trending on Twitter with a public call to delete the app, with support
turning to the ride-sharing rival Lyft as an alternative (Isaac, 2017;
Siddiqui, 2017; Wendling, 2017), with nearly 200,000 reported users
cancelling their Uber accounts as a result (Carson, 2017). Additionally,
Kalanick was tied to the Trump administration for his role as one of
nearly 20 top executives to advise President Trump on an economic
advisory council and for his ambiguous comments regarding the ban
(Lutz, 2017).
Together, these events left Uber and Kalanick in the midst of an organizational identity crisis with media, public, and political consequences.
Although Kalanick was arguably the crux of the issue, the organization
Uber was also left in crisis and had to make efforts to handle the online
and offline public backlash. This analysis is especially relevant given
the resulting implications and response from Uber and Kalanick’s decision to step down from his seat on Trump’s CEO advisory board on
February 2, 2017 (Issac, 2017).
Organizational Communication and Social Media

Organizational communication scholars have explored the impact
of social media on the communicative landscape between corpora-
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tions and their publics. The introduction of these sites in the 1990s
impacted “the way organizations communicate with people, the way
people communicate and connect with each other, be they employees,
customers, partners, competitors, adversaries, advocates, the general
public, members of the media, or others” (Doorley & Garcia, 2015,
p. 129). Practically, Tucker et al. (2015) defined social media as “any
web-based application that allows users to contribute content, modify
content already posted by others, and share content that can be viewed
by others” (para. 9). Social media platforms, particularly Twitter, have
become a commonplace for organizations and the public to interact
and communicate regularly online. The mission of Twitter, a microblogging site with nearly 320 million active users per month, according
to its corporate website, “is to give everyone the power to create and
share ideas and formation instantly, without barriers” (Twitter, n.d.).
Since its inception now over a decade ago, Twitter has been a place for
news, journalism, pop culture, debate, and general conversation in 140
characters or less.
As Gioia, Schultz, and Corley (2000) argued, it is during these periods of ongoing interaction, and possible tension and discrepancies
between internal and external audiences and messages, when issues of
organizational identity and image intersect. As an increasing part of
corporate communication efforts, social media have allowed organizational leaders to connect actively with a variety of audiences (Feldner &
Berg, in press). However, with this comes the risk, as Powell (2015)
noted, that “Twitter presents a double-edged sword for high profile
people, from celebrities to CEOs, making them accessible to fans but
also open to online attacks” (p. 6). Thus organizational communication
and identity take on new meanings in these spaces.
Organizational identity in the age of social media. In their study,
Feldner and Berg (in press) sought “to identify how organizational leaders’ Twitter use can be understood as a representation of a company’s
reality.” They looked specifically at the blurred demarcation between
individual and organizational representation on Twitter due to the
modern debate regarding individual employees, particularly leaders,
engaging on social media. In our case, while Kalanick did use his own
individual Twitter account to respond to the negative backlash, we
specifically seek to reverse what has previously been done by Feldner
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and Berg. By taking the public perspective and analyzing their collective
response on social media, we can establish what or how frames were
used to represent a certain reality and image of Kalanick’s actions as an
organizational leader, and also of the Uber organization in this crisis.
Salient to this study is the fact that stakeholders and the general
public now have direct access to engaging organizations and those in
leadership positions (i.e., CEOs) in conversation. Facebook and Twitter
have been invaluable tools for organizations to utilize during times of
crisis or change and have revealed benefits of two-way communication
(Muralidharan et al., 2011). From individual to organizational levels,
“social constructions of the self . . . are complicated by the multiple
potential audiences for any given post, as contexts of work, family, and
friends co-exist and collide in many social media spaces” (Molyneux,
Holton, & Lewis, 2017, p. 1). As Molyneux et al. argued, this can be
particularly challenging for individuals who may blend their personal
and professional identities as they present themselves online. Thus
scholars have increasingly examined these tensions.
When Travis Kalanick publicly joined President Trump’s advisory
committee, the news and the opinions of the public went viral. As
Kalanick received backlash and hateful comments via Twitter, so did
the Uber organization. Interestingly, as one individual was responsible
for an individual action, the news received a societal and collective
response to the larger organization as a whole. This issue relates to
the question of how the organization and its individual members are
merged as one online identity and how this may affect the presence of
organizational identity in the digital space. Historically, organizational
identity has been defined as “that which is stable, enduring, unique,
and central to the organization’s character” (Grandy & Mavin, 2011,
p. 767). Often without intent or awareness, organizations create a certain
identity on social media.
Through this, leaders of that organization are inevitably connected
to that identity—simultaneously representing and communicating for
their organization through online engagement. As Grandy and Mavin
(2011) noted, organizational identity is socially constructed—“created
through ongoing interactions with internal and external constituents
including media, government, customers, suppliers, employees, and
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management” (p. 767). Organizational communication scholars have
been increasingly interested in the issue of identity/identification in the
digital age, particularly when the lines existing in the physical world
between employee and employer are not clearly defined in online
spaces. As a result, Twitter and other social media giants have changed
corporate communication. More and more, we are seeing organizations
receive feedback, often transmitted via media outlets (Gioia et al., 2000).
Individuals may come to know or understand an organization based
on the actions and words of its leadership. Feldner and Berg (in press)
argued that particularly due to today’s corporate communication environment, “the separation of CEO statement and official corporate
statements is virtually impossible.” Undoubtedly, the same could be
said for a leader’s individual discourse. This aligns with this study’s
purpose in understanding how publics frame specific organizational
crises, particularly in their attribution of individual versus collective
(i.e., organization) in their communication or posts. However, we argue
that CEO actions, communicative or otherwise, not just statements, are
also rarely separated from those of the organization. Thus we examine
our data for use of certain pronouns, attributing a message response or
direct blame to either the CEO as an individual or the organization as
a collective, even when it is not necessarily responsible for the leader’s
actions.
Traditionally, how organizations respond to and present their identity following a crisis event and how that may affect or alter the public’s
response, interpretation, or resulting actions in regard to the issue at
hand have been the primary focus of extant literature. Additionally,
CEOs or those in leadership positions are often seen as the spokesperson of their represented organizations (Feldner & Berg, in press).
Therefore these users may inevitably associate the CEO and his or her
organization collectively through one identity, thus presenting response
or blame to the organization as a whole without distinguishing it from
its leader in a crisis context.
Crisis and Activist Communication on Social Media

Activism has taken a new form in the digital age, primarily due to the
constant communicative nature of social media. Smith (2005) defined
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activism as “a process by which groups of people exert pressure on
organizations or other institutions to change policies, practices, or
conditions” (p. 5) that are found problematic. Particularly in online
spaces, publics attempt to create a perceived need for an organizational
reform and strive to develop a network of support and followers of
mass populations on digital platforms such as social media sites. As
Heath and Palenchar (2009) argued, “internet and web capabilities have
been a boon to activists as these individuals can join a movement and
express support behind a computer screen or mobile device” (p. 181).
Scholarship in social movement discourse has increasingly explored
how social media platforms contribute to the development and popularization of protests and crises online. Coombs and Holladay (2004)
defined crises as events “for which people seek causes and make attributions” (p. 27). Recent studies (Bennett, 2003; Castells, 2012; Earl
& Kimport, 2011; Van de Donk, Loader, Nixon, & Rucht, 2004) “have
asserted that the internet can help activists diversify their engagement
repertoires, move beyond previous spatial and temporal confines, and
organize and coordinate participation in protest events more effectively” (Theocharis, Lowe, van Deth, & Garcia-Albacete, 2015, p. 203).
The Internet, and social networking sites specifically, have allowed for
“faster and easier distribution of movement information, and [have]
enabled individuals to stay in touch with more people, communities,
and diverse causes” (p. 204). This has led to a shift in how crisis information is disseminated and shared across online spaces.
Twitter has been especially useful and effective in joining and initiating political conversation and distribution of information. Meraz
and Papacharissi (2013) argued that this site is particularly salient for
these debates, providing a platform for diverse audiences to engage.
Theocharis et al. (2015) noted that Twitter also “enables crowds to create their own thematic categories through hashtags and to organize
conversation around specific themes or keywords” (p. 205). Hence
we see popular ideas or opinions “trending” on Twitter often around
political, celebrity, or other highly publicized events. Additionally, the
#deleteuber campaign grew from just a theme or keyword to a politically charged protest on this site. And undoubtedly, users have framed
this campaign in a certain light.
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On the basis of the current literature in organizational identity and
crisis communication, particularly in online contexts, as well as framing in media studies, we hypothesize the following:
H1 : The dominant frame by users will be political as opposed to

nonpolitical.
H2 : Users will frame the crisis as episodic.
H3 : Users will mention the name of the organization (i.e., @Uber,
#Uber) more frequently than just the CEO.

Method

To analyze the response to this ongoing crisis in an online environment,
we completed a quantitative content analysis. Tweets were gathered
from Twitter via hashtag (#) utilizing API search apps. In this case,
the trending #deleteuber hashtag movement resulted in a reported
200,000+ users deleting the Uber app within weeks and CEO Travis
Kalanick leaving his position on Trump’s advisory council (Isaac, 2017).
Data Collection

All data collected were accessed using means and tools that were freely
available, utilizing API search applications TAGS and TwitteR,1 to collect
an initial population size of 23,691 tweets. Search parameters included
#deleteuber between the dates of January 28, 2017, and February 10,
2017. These dates correspond to the enactment of the controversial
immigration ban executive order signed by President Trump on Friday evening on January 27 and Uber CEO Kalanick’s comments to the
travel ban and Uber’s surge stalling at JFK Airport on January 28. The
call to #deleteuber started trending later that day, with another spike
on Thursday, February 2, when it was announced that Kalanick would
be stepping down from the president’s council.
To collect tweets, we created a Twitter app account to gain access
to the limited API data Twitter makes freely accessible to all registered
app users (Twitter Developer, n.d.). We were able to conduct specific
searches for tweets incorporating the #deleteuber hashtag, following
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similar procedures from extant research utilizing social media as data
(Boyd & Crawford, 2012; Chae, 2015; Giglietto & Selva, 2014; Humphreys, Gill, Krishnamurthy, & Newbury, 2013; Kim, Heo, Choi, &
Park, 2014; Wang, Callan, & Zheng, 2015).
In the TAGS search, a total of 2,691 tweets were retrieved. TwitteR
was run using RStudio, and 21,000 tweets were gathered across four
search queries. All tweets were consolidated into a combined Excel
document. It should be noted that API collection measures provide
access to data but are limited in their capacity and lead to an inevitable
loss of data. API limits are set in place for the number of tweets that
can be collected as well as limiting archive access. This makes our
conclusions tentative, while generalizability may be later confirmed
across different crisis cases in future research.
Sample

In this content analysis, a sample size of 2,000 tweets was included
and coded for analysis. Tweets were systematically gathered by hand,
with every 24th tweet brought into the sample. Systematic analysis
was chosen over a random sample because tweets represented text
that was “regularly appearing . . . in repetitive or continuous events”
(Krippendorff, 2013, p. 116). We felt it important that the whole data set
be represented, as trends may be noticed as the crisis communication
changed and adapted over time. Every 24th tweet ensured the whole
tweet population was sampled (Krippendorff, 2013).
Measures

We established a codebook to best evaluate how this organizational
crisis was framed. Together, we went through several revisions of the
codebook, adding clarification or examples or removing unnecessary
codes before landing on a final version for reliability and individual
coding. Measures of subject, content of tweet, and type of frame were
established to help distinguish how the crisis was being addressed and
consumers were identifying with Uber as an organization.
Unit of analysis. Each individual tweet was our unit of analysis and
independently evaluated for the inclusion of our set coding measures.
Tweets were evaluated strictly based on content. Links and images were
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not considered or used for context in this assessment—a limitation of
the study to consider for future research. All tweets also included the
#deleteuber hashtag, but this was not taken into consideration in our
coding measures. In other words, additional content besides the hashtag
was needed to meet our coding qualifications.
Code measures. In our sample of 2,000 tweets, 18 codes were divided into six main categories: (a) mentioning the event explicitly, (b)
tweet content, (c) mentioning the CEO, (d) mentioning the organization, (e) pronouns, and (f) framing (see Table 1 for examples and code
designations). Categories were developed to help organize the codes
and streamline the approach in working through our codebook.
The codebook targeted organizational identity, communication on
social media, and how organizations communicate throughout a crisis.
Our initial code cited criteria that explicitly mentioned the incident
that prompted the resulting Twitter trend #deleteuber (Coombs & Holladay, 2004). This was a critical coding measure that flagged the tweet
as directly relating to the incident. We determined the tweets needed
to make explicit references to the incident at JFK Airport, Kalanick’s
actions and comments relating to the immigration ban, Kalanick’s
removal from President Trump’s advisory council, and so on. In this
evaluation, the #deleteuber hashtag was disregarded and other content
was required to be listed and relevant to the crisis.
All of the following codes then required a mention of the incident.
Additional codes measured the rhetorical content of the tweet itself.
Again, this was taken with an explicit approach. The content of the
tweet was broken down into the following categories: Uber promotion,
political, narrative, competitor mention, competitor promotion, and
boycott promotion. By analyzing the nature of the tweet, we were able
to better understand how tweets were addressing and engaging with the
trending hashtag on Twitter and resulting real-world events (Grandy &
Mavin, 2011). Mentions of the CEO and Uber as an organization were
also coded outside of mentions of the hashtag.
Finally, tweets were analyzed for the use of pronouns and the framing of the content. Specifically, we looked for instances of thematic and
episodic framing devices. The language of the tweet was the opportunity
to measure a different approach to how individuals were connecting
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TABLE 1

Coded Variables

Variable

Description

Example

Mention of
incident

Explicitly mentions incident
(i.e., immigration ban, Uber CEO
response to immigration ban,
cancelling surge prices at JFK
Airport following ban, CEO leaving
advisory council)

RT @TwitterMoments: Spurred by
the #deleteuber backlash, Uber
CEO Travis Kalanick has quit Trump’s
economic advisory board.

Tweet content:
Promotion of
organization
(Uber)

Mentions incident, promotes
organization (e.g., Uber discount
advertisement, promotion for free
ride)

#deleteuber no matter what you
do Uber is still helping millions
passengers per second over the
entire world even if helping Trump

Tweet content:
Political

Mentions incident, also mentions
political content (e.g., Trump
administration, immigration ban,
policy)

RT @jimdandeo: Thanks to Trump
ties, #DeleteUber campaign grows
on social media.

Tweet content:
Narrative

Mentions incident as narrative/
story (i.e., any story related to
incident and/or Uber organization,
e.g., driver interaction, reviews,
personal experience, news story)

Uber CEO Travis Kalanick is
resigning from President Donald
Trump’s economic advisory council,
according to the . . . #deleteuber

Tweet content:
Mention of
competition

Mentions incident, also mentions
competition (i.e., Lyft, taxi/cab
company)

#deleteuber #uber #lyft
#donaldtrump #free #lyftcode
#lyftpromocode #follow #repost
#lyftpromo #protest #retweet

Tweet content:
Promotion of
competition

Mentions incident, also promotes
competition (i.e., Lyft, taxi/cab
company)

Want up to $20 in free ride credit
on @Lyft?https://t.co/KPv1ziFNb8
#powertrip #deleteuber

Tweet content:
Boycotting
organization

Mentions incident, boycotts Uber
organization (e.g., call to action,
participate in boycott)

Sign the petition: Tell @Uber @
travisk to stop collaborating with
Trump #DeleteUber

Mention of
CEO

Mentions incident, also mentions
CEO by name, Twitter handle, or
position title

RT @TwitterMoments: Spurred
by the #deleteuber backlash,
Uber CEO Travis Kalanick has quit
Trump’s economic advisory board.
#deleteuber

Mention of
organization

Mentions incident, also mentions
organization Twitter (in addition
to #deleteuber)

Catching up on #deleteUber. People
are idiots. Didn’t Internet outrage
START Uber’s habit of cancelling
surge pricing for important things?

Pronoun use:
He/him/she/
her

Mentions incident, pronoun of
his/him/she/her affiliated with
organization and/or CEO

Following the #DeleteUber
backlash, Travis Kalanick, Uber‘s
CEO, has said that he will step down
from President . . .
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Description
Mentions incident, pronoun of I/
me affiliated with organization
and/or CEO

Example
RT @LexieS1723: Uber CEO: I’m with
Trump
Twitter: #DeleteUber
Uber CEO: naw run that back, I aint
even mean it like that #deleteuber

Pronoun use:
We/us

Mentions incident, pronoun of
we/us affiliated with organization
and/or CEO

We at Uber are proud to stand
behind our CEO, don’t #deleteuber
continue support

Pronoun use:
They/them/
their

Mentions incident, pronoun of
they/them/their affiliated with
organization and/or CEO

RT @sahluwal: That #deleteuber
trend really woke up their CEO, too
bad it’s too late. Activism coupled
with action works, march on.

Pronoun use:
You/your

Mentions incident, pronoun
of you/your affiliated with
organization and/or CEO

RT @DanaCJones: Too late @uber
Travis Kalanick - #DeleteUber - you
made yet another @Lyft customer

Framing:
Thematic,
general

Mentions incident, frames
incident as generally thematic (i.e.,
systemic, broader context, societal
issue/response)

Perception was that Uber was
exploiting executive order on
immigration #DeleteUber @
lendevanna #crisis

Framing:
Thematic,
systemic

Mentions incident, frames as
thematic and systemic (i.e.,
societal, regarding immigration
ban, anything nonpolitical)

RT @TEN_GOP: Muslims take over
Dallas/Fort Worth International
Airport. Great to see gender
equality in action!
#MuslimBan #DeleteUber #Bat . . .

Framing:
Thematic,
political

Mentions incident, frames as
thematic and political (i.e.,
government-oriented only, not
mentioning immigration ban or
immediate crisis)

@Uber: Stop profiting off
hate. Refuse to work with @
RealDonaldTrump’s White House
#deleteUber

Framing:
Episodic

Mentions incident, frames
as episodic (i.e., specific,
individualistic account or
response to incident; news report
or headline)

Amid #DeleteUber pressure,
Travis Kalanick backs out of Trump
advisory
Was it because I deleted Uber - both
app and account - that caused
the CEO to leave Trump’s advisory
committee? I think so! #deleteuber
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and communicating with the organization and CEO throughout the
crisis and to resulting engagement with the Twitter hashtag #deleteuber.
Thematic framing was separated into political and systemic due to the
political component of the crisis. We felt that intentionally delineating
between the two was important in understanding different frames.
Again, we hoped these different coding measures would distinguish
trends that measured how the tweet content was being framed and how
individuals were identifying with Kalanick or with Uber as a whole
organization.
Coding Procedures

Once the finalized codebook was established and agreed upon, intercoder reliability was completed (Krippendorff, 2013). We both independently coded 10% (n = 200) of the final sample (n = 2,000) until an
acceptable level of reliability was reached using Krippendorff ’s alpha
with a value at or above .67 for each code (see Table 2). Once intercoder
reliability was reached, the remaining data set of tweets was evenly split
between coders for independent coding.
To code, each tweet was initially evaluated to determine if the crisis
event was explicitly mentioned (our codebook explicates what specific
terms or phrases were sought). If the tweet mentioned the crisis incident,
then remaining codes were applied to the tweet. Multiple codes within
each category could be identified with a single tweet. If the tweet did
not mention the crisis, then no remaining codes were evaluated for
inclusion in our sample.
h1 and h2 rely on how crisis messages were framed on Twitter. For
h1, we examined dominant messages used by users to frame the crisis.
Further breakdown in the content of these explicitly crisis-oriented
tweets helped orient how users were framing both the crisis event and
Uber’s position toward the crisis event. For h2, we examined how framing was used when responding to the crisis on Twitter. h1 demonstrated
dominant political and narrative/opinion messages, while this explores
how these messages were being framed and shared. Specifically, we
differentiated between thematic and episodic approaches.
h3 anticipated how users affiliated with the crisis: with Kalanick as
CEO or with Uber as an organization. Kalanick’s individual actions in
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Intercoder Reliability Measures
Coding variable

Krippendorff’s alphaa

Mention of incident

.85

Tweet content: Promotion of organization

1

Tweet content: Political

.87

Tweet content: Narrative

.77

Tweet content: Mention of competition

.67

Tweet content: Promotion of competition

1

Tweet content: Boycotting organization

.69

Mention of CEO

.95

Mention of organization

.71

Pronoun use: He/him/she/her

1

Pronoun use: I/me

.67

Pronoun use: We/us

1

Pronoun use: They/them/their

.80

Pronoun use: You/your

1

Framing: Thematic, general

.72

Framing: Thematic, systemic

.87

Framing: Thematic, political

.85

Framing: Episodic

.70

α = minimum of .67.

a

response to a political action prompted #deleteuber to trend; however,
Uber as an organization became a part of the conversation.
Results

For the purposes of this research, we wanted to see how the crisis event
itself was being discussed in relation to Uber as an organization. Four
hundred and forty-three (22.2%) coded tweets explicitly mentioned the
specific actions (i.e., JFK Airport, immigration ban, etc.) that led to the
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TABLE 3

Tweet Frequency Table

Coding
category
Event
Tweet content

Framing

Organization
CEO
Pronouns

Code

Frequency

All tweets
(%)

EventMention
(%)

EventMention

443

22.2

100

Political

390

19.5

88

NarrativeOpinion

313

15.7

70.7

BoycottPromotion

64

3.2

14.4

CompetitionMention

38

1.9

8.6

CompetitionPromotion

12

0.6

2.7

OrgPromotion

3

0.2

0.6

EpisodicFrame

322

16.1

72.7

ThematicFrame

120

6

33.2

Political Thematic

67

3.4

15.1

SystemicThematic

65

3.3

14.7

OrganizationMention

284

14.2

64.1

CEOMention

276

13.8

62.3

Ime

30

1.5

6.8

You

22

1.1

5

HeShe

15

0.8

3.4

WeUs

7

0.4

1.6

They

6

0.3

1.4

trending hashtag topic as the EventMention code. Table 3 shows values
ordered in coding categories from most to least frequent occurrences.
To further examine how users on Twitter were attributing CEO or
organization to the crisis, we ran a binominal logistic regression to measure the probability of factor occurrence and how variables influenced
one another. We ran two regression tests to determine the effects of the
crisis event against the inclusion of Uber as an organization versus the
inclusion of the CEO with our total sample of tweets. Different variable
factors influenced the probability of a mention of the organization or
the CEO and thus contributed to the framing of Uber or Kalanick with
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CEO + Organization Logistic Regressions

Binominal logistic
regression
CEO

CEO goodness fit
Model chi square

Code

Wald chi
square

df

Significance

EventMention

0.000

1

0.984

Political

0.000

1

0.999

NarrativeOpinion

0.563

1

0.453

Organization

81.309

1

0.000

EpisodicFrame

5.619

1

0.018

Constant

0.000

1

0.983

Chi square

R

df

Significance

5

0.000

2

0.964

2

1,132.474

Cox and Snell R2

0.433

Hosmer and Lemeshow

0.074

Organization

Code

Wald chi
square

df

Significance

EventMention

38.006

1

0.000

Political

0.000

1

0.999

NarrativeOpinion

3.198

1

0.074

CEO

81.193

1

0.000

EpisodicFrame

15.596

1

0.000

Constant

252.693

1

0.000

Chi square

R2

df

Significance

5

0.000

1

0.398

ORG goodness fit
Model chi square

1,049.818

Cox and Snell R2
Hosmer and Lemeshow

0.409
0.715

Trump’s immigration ban. Variables tested in the model were chosen
based on their frequency counts in the content analysis. Codes that
emerged with a frequency above 60% were evaluated in a regression
test, including the EventMention, Political, NarrativeOpinion, EpisodicFrame, OrganizationMention, and CEOMention codes.
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Our first logistic regression tested event mention, political, narrative/opinion, mention of organization, and episodic framing on the
likelihood that the CEO would also be mentioned in relation to the
crisis event. The model showed statistical significance, χ2 = 1,132.474,
p < .005, thereby rejecting the null hypothesis. The model correctly
classified 94.8% of cases regarding the CEO. Notice in Table 4 that
independent variables of organization (Uber) and episodic framing
showed significance in this model, tentatively showing that attribution
toward the CEO and the organization is not separated but in fact that
both identities are connected to the crisis.
In our second regression, we flipped identities and tested event
mention, political, narrative/opinion, mention of CEO, and episodic framing on the likelihood that the organization would also be
mentioned in relation to the crisis event. The model also showed statistical significance, χ2 = 1,049.818, p < .005, thereby rejecting the null
hypothesis. The model correctly classified 94.3% of cases. We find further support for H3 here as Uber the organization showed significance
with the following variables, as noted in Table 4: event mention, CEO,
and episodic.
In considering our hypotheses, the models demonstrate some interesting trends. In both tests, CEO and organization were connected
in 89.2%, or the majority, of the tweets. When considering content,
however, the CEO had a lower probability of being connected to politically oriented tweets than the organization, while content regarding
narrative/opinions was more evenly distributed. Finally, in the CEO
test, episodic framing saw a higher correlation when connected with
narrative/opinion content versus political content. Uber as an organization saw the direct opposite trend, where there was a higher probability
of being connected with political content versus narrative/opinion
content.
Discussion and Conclusion

In regard to our hypotheses, we explored how organizations are identified by users in a social media–driven crisis. Our findings point
to several theoretical and practical implications. Confirming h1 and
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h2, users framed the crisis as episodic and individualistic in terms of
personal opinions and/or experience. Additionally, when mentioning the incident of the crisis at hand, tweets were framed as political
(n = 390) as opposed to nonpolitical. Because the Uber crisis surrounding Kalanick was politically charged, this is unsurprising. Simply
looking at the frequencies presented some anticipated trends: Political
connections exist in organizational crisis, and organizations have difficulty separating the brand from a crisis event. Uber is not a political
entity; however, the actions of its CEO politicized its corporate identity,
which is reflected in how users responded to the crisis.
Additionally, owing to limited space in Twitter’s message platform
and highly personalized nature, responses framed as episodic were
unsurprising. Similarly, episodic frames are purposeful in putting a
face on the presentation of a problem, most often political in nature,
while in contrast, thematic frames do not attribute messages to individuals or specific events (Semetko & Valkenberg, 2000). Therefore
episodic frames were most evident (n = 133) in framing the crisis as an
individual problem and opinionated in communicating particular cases
that illuminate the issue at hand (Iyengar, 1990). Comparably, tweet
content surrounding the crisis was presented as narrative or opinion
(n = 313)—highlighting again the individual and specific nature of
episodic frames. Thus h1 and h2 are supported.
Additionally, this study sought to understand how Twitter users
communicated and responded to the Uber crisis online by presenting
a certain image or identity of the organization, which we found to be
political in how it was framed and portrayed online. As presented in
the literature review, while CEO Kalanick received backlash on Twitter for his personal involvement on Trump’s advisory board, the Uber
organization did as well. Our goal with this work was also to see if users
attributed an individually caused crisis to the collective, as this attribution between the two in online spaces is often blurred. Specifically,
h3 asked how these individuals respond to the crisis by mentioning
either the CEO or organization. As expected, our results confirm that
users most often included the name of the Uber organization (n = 284).
Therefore h3 is supported.
Interestingly, Kalanick was most often mentioned along with Uber.
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In other words, the CEO was most often connected to the organization—mentioned together in the same tweet. In contrast, the organization was not connected to the CEO as frequently. So again, while the
crisis may be the leader’s personal responsibility due to an individual
act, response and attribution were given to the organization as a whole.
Rare was it that Kalanick was mentioned alone, without some comment to or about the Uber organization, even though direct access to
individuals on a site such as Twitter is available to users. In terms of
theory, we see this blend of personal and organizational identities as
the individual was most often mentioned with the company simultaneously, while this was not the case in reverse instances. Therefore, from
a pragmatic standpoint, as organizations have little to no control over
the particular image and messages constructed online (Feldner & Berg,
in press), the framing and attribution of crisis to either an individual
leader or a collective he or she represents are also uncontrollable. Thus,
in online contexts, the two are virtually impossible to separate.
This study takes an important step in examining online activism and
communication by publics in response to organizational crisis, exerting
pressure and advocating for change by an institution. We know that
digital platforms, such as social media, change the nature of activism
by allowing the masses to join in a movement through the touch of a
button (Heath & Palenchar, 2009). This work encourages a conversation surrounding how trends on these sites, particularly Twitter, turn
into an emotionally charged and change-seeking crusade. In the case
of the #deleteuber protest, one individual act, while rather political and
controversial, resulted in the boycotting and extreme criticizing of a
multibillion-dollar international organization. This content analysis
demonstrates that organizations must recognize the role of social media
in times of crisis, particularly in how publics communicate, react to,
and frame such events, as well as the larger implications for postcrisis
recovery and identity. From a broader and more global standpoint,
this study acknowledges the potential consequences of organizations
engaging on social media and the public response to those particularly
connected to political bodies or individuals. Uber is an international
company, operating in more than 70 countries (Uber, 2018), and while
having a connection to President Trump was situated in an American
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context, the implications expanded far beyond the United States, as the
Twitter and Uber communities are also global ones. Thus this case study
was an attempt to show how Twitter as a social media platform could
magnify a crisis and impact organizational identity in an online context.
We acknowledge several limitations of this study. First, there were
few to no tweets analyzed from organizational members (e.g., Uber
employees, internal stakeholders), Kalanick himself, or those users in a
population that may support the Uber organization and/or CEO regardless of the political ties or response to the taxi strike at JFK. Therefore
a few of our codes centered on pronoun use (i.e., I/me, you/us) were
rare and thus not expanded on in data analyses. Second, our logistical
model, though statistically significant, could be improved. In both cases,
not all variables were individually significant, and so our conclusions
and noted trends are made cautiously. The model may benefit from an
increased sample size or further manipulation of variables.
Third, our analysis was limited in terms of timeline. We collected
tweets approximately 2 weeks from the time of the incident and its publicity. Future research could consider a longer span of time to allow for
analyzing how certain frames change or evolve over time. Finally, our
method of tweet gathering should be noted as a limitation. We utilized
Twitter’s API services that are freely available and as such sustained an
inevitable loss of data due to the sheer size and scope of trending tweets.
In summary, Kalanick’s and Uber’s actions and response prompted
a reaction on Twitter that called for the protest action of #deleteuber. Social media perpetuate much noise, content, and reactionary
responses; however, with a trending topic targeting an organization,
such as the situation Uber faced with Trump’s immigration ban, it is
important to understand how these messages are framed and discussed.
This study provides support for current literature on framing and organizational identity but moves it to an online context. Social media
activism is a fast-growing phenomenon that has both societal and
political implications that are affecting organizations as identity lines
become blurred and social media exert the power to prompt change.
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Since the inception of the model just 2 short years ago, two relevant
phenomena occurred. First, several advancements in social media
strategy have revealed the opportunity for further development of the
original STREMII model. Recognizing the increasing use of social
media platforms and the ways in which they influence the flow of
information and communication during a storm, it is critical to understand the benefits and pitfalls to social media communication during
crisis events. Second, the recent increase in hurricane crises has also
contributed to the relevancy of revisiting the original work on the
STREMII model at this time. This article presents a revised development of the model, emphasizing the needs for ongoing social listening
and engagement with target audiences throughout the crisis event at
all of its phases. These aspects of the revised model are discussed in
interpersonal and organizational contexts related to the examples of
social media use during Hurricane Matthew. Through this discussion,
the need for further practical development and empirical testing is
recognized and explored.
Review of Literature

Noting the limited research in crisis communication and social media
literature, particularly involving hurricane events, Stewart and Wilson
(2015) introduced the STREMII (pronounced STREAM-ee) model to
“take into consideration the need for organizations to monitor and
respond to contemporary communication processes and to develop a
social media strategy and/or crisis management plan for when a crisis
arises” (p. 639). The model is theoretically grounded in Coombs’s (2007)
situational crisis communication theory and the life cycle phases of a
crisis—before, during, and after the event. Using Hurricane Sandy as an
example, Stewart and Wilson (2015) captured this cyclical process of six
interconnected elements: (a) social listening, (b) targeting audience(s),
(c) engaging and responding, (d) monitoring and evaluating, (e) interacting, and (f) implementing changes. As the intensity, strength, and
numbers of hurricanes increase, so too does the reliance on social media
by organizations and individuals. Since the inception of the model,
several advancements to social media platforms and updates to best
practices for crisis communication have revealed further developments
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of the model. The new developments to STREMII resulting from these
advancements are discussed using examples from the more recent events
of Hurricane Matthew. In the section that follows, an overview of the
timeline and events of Hurricane Matthew within the state of Florida
is provided. Additionally, we summarize the state of social media at
the time that the storm occurred in October 2016.
Timeline of Hurricane Matthew Events

Hurricane Matthew was the 13th tropical storm of the 2016 hurricane
season. Hurricane Matthew has been recognized as an especially devastating storm, according to Drye (2016). The storm is estimated to
have imposed roughly $10 billion in damage in the United States along
the Atlantic coast from Florida to North Carolina. The storm evolved
from Tropical Storm Matthew into a hurricane on the afternoon of
September 29, 2016. It started out as a minimal hurricane, yet by the
time the storm made landfall in Haiti and Cuba on October 4, 2017, it
was a Category 4 (Drye, 2016).
By October 6, 2017, the storm had reached the United States. Although the hurricane’s eye wall never touched land in Florida as it
continued its way north, the storm remained a powerful Category 2
hurricane as it swept up the Atlantic coast of the southeastern part of
the United States. By October 8, 2017, as the storm made it to coastal
Georgia and South Carolina, the associated flooding from the storm
was devastating many areas. The conditions were so serious in Orlando,
Florida, that Walt Disney World closed—only the fourth time since the
park’s opening in 1971 (Drye, 2016).
While the physical storm surged through the American coastal
Southeast, social media experienced their own storm of activity. When
considering social media during hurricane events, it is critical to recognize the powerful role and influence that social media platforms
have in the flow of information during the storm. To appreciate the
need for ongoing development of the STREMII model in the dynamic
social media climate, it is necessary first to consider the historical role
of social media during Hurricane Matthew and then to compare the
data on social media use during Hurricane Sandy in 2012 to Hurricane
Matthew in 2016.
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Hurricane Matthew: “The First Truly Social Media Hurricane”

A writer for the Palm Beach Post acknowledged this phenomenon,
exclaiming that Hurricane Matthew “broke the ground for being the
area’s first truly social-media hurricane . . . as the tech savvy took to live
streaming, Facebook, Twitter, Instagram and SnapChat to chronicle
the event” (Pacenti, 2016). During Hurricane Matthew, social media
features including Facebook Live, safe check-ins, and specified SnapChat
stories captured and broadcast the storm events online to a national and
global audience. A WTHR Indianapolis station staff member (WTHR
Indianapolis, 2016) netted various tweets, videos, and memes during
Hurricane Matthew as “the story [was] unfolding in real time on social
media as residents and news agencies share their experiences.”
Hurricane Matthew occurred during an incredible wave of social
media pervasiveness and popularity. According to the Pew Research
Center’s Social Media Update 2016, published November 11, 2016,
roughly 1 month after the hurricane, Facebook continues to be the
most popular social networking platform in America. With nearly
79% of adult American Internet users maintaining a social presence
on Facebook, this is greater than Twitter (24%), Pinterest (31%), Instagram (32%), or LinkedIn (29%; Greenwood, Perrin, & Duggan, 2016).
Facebook users typically visit the platform more regularly than users of
other social media sites, with 76% of all active Facebook users reporting
that they visit the site daily, 55% visiting several times a day, and 22%
visiting about once per day (Greenwood et al., 2016).
Of note is the “modest but statistically significant increase” in 2016
from 2015, when only 70% of Facebook users indicated daily visits to
the social networking site. On Instagram, 51% of users access the site
daily, and 35% visit several times a day. On Twitter, 42% of users are
daily visitors, and 23% visit multiple times day (Greenwood et al., 2016).
Rationale for Revisiting STREMII:
The Differences Between 2012 and Today

When Pew Research Center (2017) began tracking social media data
in 2005, only 5% of American adults were using (at least) one social media platform, compared to today, when 69% of the American
population is using some form of social media. As of February 2012,
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when Hurricane Sandy took place, only 14%–15% of online adults were
using Twitter, and only 8% used the platform on a daily basis. This is
noteworthy because the proportion of online American adults who
used Twitter daily has quadrupled since 2010, when daily use was just
2% (Smith & Brenner, 2012). In August 2012, just prior to Hurricane
Sandy, only 54% of American adults were using Facebook; at the time
of Hurricane Matthew in 2016, 68% of the entire U.S. population was
using Facebook (Pew Research Center, 2017). The increases in social
media usage across the majority of the American population reveal
the reliance on these popular communication channels during crisis
events such as a natural disaster.
Shortly after the events of Hurricane Sandy, the U.S. Department
of Homeland Security (2013), in conjunction with the Virtual Social
Media Working Group, published a report available online titled Lessons
Learned: Social Media and Hurricane Sandy, documenting how Sandy
marked a shift in the use of social media in disasters. More than ever
before, government agencies turned to mobile and online technologies
before, during, and after Sandy made landfall, to communicate with
response partners and the public in order to share information, maintain
awareness of community actions and needs, and more.

This report also “identified various gaps in technology, process, and
policy; these gaps will require further discussion in order to enhance
future response and collaboration efforts.”
Additionally, Lin, Spence, Sellnow, and Lachlan (2016) revisited
Seeger’s (2006) best practices in crisis communication through social
media. Seven practices emerged for emergency managers, crisis practitioners, and government agencies to consider when dialoguing with
audiences via socially networked platforms:
1. Integrating social media into organizational decisions and policies
2. Monitoring, listening and responding to stakeholders’ concerns,
actively promoting dialog
3. Setting up official social media accounts to increase source credibility for information
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4. Scheduling timely, effective, relevant, and frequent updates of messages, to dispel rumors and decrease misinformation
5. Own and monitor the use of hashtags, in all phases of a crisis to
ensure accuracy and usefulness
6. Cooperate with gatekeeper and “gatewatchers,” keeping audiences
in the information loop
7. Monitoring the social media landscape for rumors or misinformation (p. 604)

The authors concluded that social media present innovative opportunities for agencies and practitioners to reach, inform, and motivate
audiences; these new platforms and the opportunities they invite require that crisis communicators constantly monitor the social media
landscape (Lin et al., 2016). Young (2016) additionally offered revised
best practices for integrating social media into crisis communication
strategies, focusing on the implications for government agencies during natural disasters.
The Red Cross and the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA) have recognized the value of social media and have changed the
way they respond to disasters, turning to social listening, realizing that
the best information they can gather during an emergency or natural
disaster does not come from their own government-built apps. It comes
from existing social media channels. . . . Scott Shoup, chief data officer at
FEMA [states], “Instead of trying to do everything ourselves, we need to
find smarter ways to integrate the social media world more effectively
into how we perform our business functions . . . by monitoring social
media outlets, collecting information in real time, and using it to act
immediately.” (Ogrysko, 2016)

The lack of predictability of hurricane crises emphasizes the importance of understanding more about the role of social media in crisis
communication. For these reasons, we propose an extension of the
original STREMII model to account for the ongoing needs for social
listening and engagement with target audiences throughout the entire
crisis and all of its phases, as well as during periods of noncrisis. We
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describe these extensions of the revised STREMII model through the
discussion of examples from Hurricane Matthew and how they reveal
the ongoing processes of social listening and responsive engagement
that occurred at organizations and interpersonal communication levels
during this particular hurricane event. With this is mind, this article
explores the overarching question, How is STREMII exemplified within
the social media landscape based on the crisis event of Hurricane
Matthew?
Theoretical Foundations

To proactively assess the STREMII model in this changing social media
climate and within the events of Hurricane Matthew and make a case
for future application and investigation, we consider Coombs’s (2007,
2014) situational crisis communication theory (SCCT) and revisit the
STREMII model, briefly describing its original phases in the section
to follow.
Situational Crisis Communication Theory

Coombs (2007, 2014) created SCCT as a theoretical framework for crisis
and organizational communication research and practice. SCCT strategically maps effective crisis response to the degree of organizational
responsibility and reputational threat brought about by the crisis, asserting that “crisis communication should be strategic; efforts should
be designed to improve the situation for stakeholders and the firm in
crisis” (Coombs, 2015, p. 141).
Coombs’s research advised crisis managers to recognize the importance of evaluating the type of crisis, crisis history, and organizational reputation when trying to predict the level of crisis effects and
reputational outcomes (positive or negative) for their organizations.
Additionally, Coombs specified the ethical responsibilities for a crisis
response, focusing on protecting stakeholders rather than reputation,
through instructing information and adapting information. As crises
create an informational void, affected individuals need to be told what
to do to protect themselves physically, need information to cope with
the event psychologically, and need to know that organizations are
concerned for their welfare as victims.
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From a traditional perspective, SCCT emerges from a mass communication model focusing on media frames and a one-to-many communication flow. Today, the pervasive nature of social media culture
challenges this directionality of communication and dictates dialogic
interaction with stakeholders, as information flow is constant, is interactive, and involves individual users as message actors, agents, and
creators (Utz, Schultz, & Glocka, 2012).
Since 2007, this theory has been tested, critiqued, and updated with
information regarding the changing nature of crisis responses, including
variables other than organizational reputation, namely, “negligence in
providing base crisis responses (i.e., instructing and adjusting information)” (Kim & Sung, 2014, p. 62). Despite advances in SCCT, natural
disaster situations like hurricanes challenge this organization-centric
tendency, as responsibility for the cause of the crisis cannot be attributed
to any organizational wrongdoing. Instead, a dual or parallel responsibility evolves in which organizations are responsible for repair of their
reputations as well as relationship and information management via
legacy and social media.
As an example, FEMA recently launched an initiative to monitor
social media during disasters in an attempt to save more lives and improve rescue efforts. Part of FEMA’s responsibilities during disasters
is to provide situational awareness for partners at the federal, state,
local, tribal, and territorial levels as well as for international partners
(Thomas, 2016). Now that we have considered SCCT, let us explore the
life cycles of a crisis, particularly as they pertain to hurricane disasters.
The Original STREMII Model of Social
Media Crisis Communication

Stewart and Wilson’s (2015) STREMII model of social media crisis
communication introduces a cyclical process for organizations to reference when engaging in crisis communication on social media. The
six interconnected elements of STREMII include (a) surveillance and
social listening, (b) targeting the appropriate audience, (c) responding to the crisis and conversation, (d) monitoring the landscape and
evaluating outcomes, (e) interacting with consumers and publics, and
(f) implementing necessary changes (Stewart & Wilson, 2015). An illustration of this original model is presented in Figure 1.
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1. Surveillance &
Social Listening

6. Implement
Necessary
Changes

2. Identify Target
Audiences

5. Interact w/
Consumers,
Publics

3. Respond &
Engage
Audiences
4. Monitor
Landscape &
Evaluate
Outcomes

FIGURE 1 The STREMII (STREAM-ee) model of social media crisis
communication (Stewart & Wilson, 2015).

During the first phase of STREMII, social listening, crisis professionals attend to, process, and respond to the flow of information
continuously from a wide range of social media sources before, during,
and after crisis, which improves their ability to obtain information and
respond accordingly on social media platforms (Lindsay, 2011). Stewart
and Arnold (2017) defined social listening as “an active process of attending to, observing, interpreting, and responding to a variety of stimuli
through mediated, electronic, and social channels” (p. 86); thus this
critical first step of the STREMII model can be very empowering for an
organization during a time of crisis, when decision makers truly need
to gather information to provide an informed response to concerned
or compromised stakeholders.
The second phase of STREMII is to target audiences. Social listening
and targeting audiences go hand in hand in that social listening provides
an opportunity to discover warning signs or false information on social
media that can potentially trigger a crisis; identify influencers, advocates,
and critics who can both potentially help or hinder crisis response; and
determine which social media channels are most appropriate given the
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organizational or institutional culture and audience (Syme, 2014). The
third phase of STREMII is response and engagement, which should be
done in a timely and informed manner to stakeholders. When engaging
with stakeholders during a crisis, it is important for organizations to
acknowledge the crisis directly, disclose actions toward resolution and
their anticipated timeline, be sympathetic and empathetic, be honest
and straightforward, provide stakeholders with contact information and
preferred communication channels, and remain timely with updates
(Geller, 2014; Jaume, 2013). The phases of social listening and responsive
engagement are revisited and recommended for ongoing procedures
throughout the phases of a crisis event and even as the other steps of
STREMII occur (Stewart & Wilson, 2015).
In recognizing social listening as an ongoing activity when applying STREMII to a crisis, the fourth stage of STREMII is monitoring
and evaluating outcomes, which is an extension of the social listening
process. This phase typically occurs as the crisis is winding down or as
the acute phase of the crisis has concluded, and organizational leaders
implement resolution efforts, evaluate crisis communication measures,
and continue ongoing interaction with consumers and publics during
the fifth stage. Last, the sixth and final stage of the STREMII model is
to implement necessary changes to the organization’s social media crisis
communication strategy based on what has been learned throughout
the event (Stewart & Wilson, 2015).
Methodology

Considering the question of how STREMII is exemplified within the
social media landscape, this section describes the case study research
method. Yin (2018) argued that a case study method is best for research
inquiries based on how/why questions. Using this particular methodology “arises out of the desire to understand complex phenomena. Case
studies allow you to focus in-depth on a ‘case’ . . . [and study] organizational and managerial processes” (p. 6), within a contemporary (not
historical) context. To be rigorous in application, researchers using the
case study research method must identify the case, determine what
data are to be collected as evidence, decide how to analyze the case,
and report what was learned.
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Yin (2018) identified five rationales for selecting a single case: It
should be critical for understanding a theory, provide an unusual outcome, represent a common occurrence, reveal a hidden aspect of a
phenomenon, or provide longitudinal evidence. Out of the five rationales, we selected a common case “to capture the circumstances and
conditions of an everyday situation [hurricane] . . . because of the lessons
it might provide about the social processes related to some theoretical
interest” (Yin, 2018, p. 50). Because STREMII emerged from Hurricane
Sandy, we chose Hurricane Matthew as a more contemporary case on
which to focus.
For data, we collected organizational and interpersonal communication examples from online news articles and stories, timelines, social
media posts, and personal experiences that revealed the complementary
nature of social listening and engaging with stakeholders on social
media. To analyze this information, we executed Yin’s (2018) strategy,
which involves following theoretical propositions and conducting an
expansive and critical review of the literature. The next section highlights the role of social listening and responsive engagement at different
phases of the crisis during Hurricane Matthew. These examples provide
support for the revised model, which presents that social listening and
engagement underpin the model. Last, we report what we have learned
in the “Discussion” and “Conclusion” sections.
Revisiting STREMII: Examples From Hurricane Matthew
Social Listening During Crisis

As discussed earlier, the sheer number of social media channels available
in 2016, when Hurricane Matthew occurred, revealed the expectation
for social listening and more conversation among individuals and
stakeholder groups. As such, there is a constant opportunity to tune in
to relevant conversations, carefully consider and assess the messages,
develop appropriate responses, and engage accordingly. This process,
essentially described as social listening, is defined as “an active process
of attending to, observing, interpreting, and responding to a variety of
stimuli through mediated, electronic, and social channels” (Stewart &
Arnold, 2017, p. 86). The increase in connectivity from social media
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influences how we attend and respond to mediated messages. Social
listening has implications within organizational communication as well
as in interpersonal relationships.
Cofounder and president of Shoutlet Aaron Everson described social
listening as monitoring activity on social networks. This is achieved by
tracking keywords, performing customer service, or analyzing hashtag
or brand handles; the information potentially gathered through social
listening inspires ideas based directly on the behavior of the consumer
base (Wagner, 2014). According to Crawford (2009), listening to social
media interactions online potentially alters the relationship between
organizations and consumers because it enables a dynamic communication environment full of e-word-of-mouth and influencer opportunities.
Research has suggested that conversations and social interactions are
happening constantly, so during a crisis event, the ongoing challenge
is to channel them, capture them, and integrate them into actionable
insights (De Clerck, 2016). Social listening becomes urgent because of its
immediacy of rich information and its global scope and because it contributes well to the development of actionable insights (Genpact, 2012).
These insights influence efforts for effective and responsive engagement.
There were several examples of social listening during Hurricane
Matthew at both organizational and interpersonal levels. During Hurricane Matthew, citizens, agencies, and organizations relied on social
listening through global and hyperlocal coverage. Many people posted
videos, photos, and updates from the storm, capturing and documenting their experiences from their individual locations. A Port St. Lucie
resident, Isaac Cubillos, posted significant video, picture, and text context about the storm and used social media to check in on his friends,
neighbors, and loved ones, commenting,
Social media allows for the connection that brings us closer during
severe conditions like this hurricane. It let my friends and family know
how I was and the conditions of the environment that they would not
get from network broadcast. (Pacenti, 2016)

Lives were even spared due to the impact of social media and the
real-time communication value it affords. Chris Williams, a veteran,
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and his dog Lana were stranded inside their home and were at risk
of being flooded out as waters rose. A social media account shared a
drone image of flooded homes. Chris’s brother saw the image and recognized one home as belonging to his brother. Not surprisingly, when
his brother reached out to rescuers for help, they were overwhelmed
with calls, so instead the brother used social media to contact the citizen
who posted the image. Curiously enough, the man with the drone also
used the drone device to capture the attention of nearby rescuers, who
were able to come in and save Chris and his dog. The drone provided
the rescue team with Chris and Lana’s specific location (Joseph, 2016).
This example of Chris and Lana reveals how social listening during a
crisis contributes to increased online engagement followed by actionable response, and these instances demonstrate the interpersonal side
of social listening during a crisis event such as Hurricane Matthew.
From an organizational perspective, police, fire, government, and
emergency officials all seemed to gravitate to Twitter as their platform
of choice to distribute information during Hurricane Matthew (Pacenti,
2016). The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (2016)
published a list of social media accounts to follow before, during, and
after the storm—including links to get local storm information and
forecasts; links to national, state, and local emergency management
offices like FEMA; and links to county resources in Florida, Georgia,
and the Carolinas. Encouraging the public to access information using
social media channels is a relatively new historical milestone in natural
disaster crisis response.
Continuous Responsive Engagement

A hurricane in the digital technology era where a drone and a picture on
social media had a role in saving the lives of a man and his dog during
vicious hurricane flooding demonstrates the emerging importance of
social media during natural disaster events. The picture was posted to
Instagram and Twitter along with the hashtag #HopeMills, and by social
listening to the conversation affiliated with this hashtag, Craig Williams, who lives in Texas, was able to intervene on behalf of his brother
Chris. Scrolling through Twitter looking for posts tagged #HopeMills,
he contacted Chris via Facebook messenger to cheer him up when it
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turned out his was one of the homes in trouble. When Craig’s repeated
911 calls could not get through, Craig wrote on a GoFundMe page for
his brother and decided to reach out to the owner of the original post
directly. The man deployed the drone back out to Chris and was able
to flag down a FEMA boat to intervene (Joseph, 2016).
A new social media feature that was revolutionary during the Hurricane Matthew crisis was Facebook Live, which launched only 9 months
prior to Hurricane Matthew, in January 2016. With Facebook’s recently
launched Facebook Live feature making waves and the SnapChat platform growing at an incredible rate, as the first major hurricane of the
Periscope era, Hurricane Matthew demonstrates technological determinism during crisis. Periscope is a mobile video-streaming platform
acquired by Twitter. Mobile live streaming allows social media users
to initiate a public or private video broadcast, and viewers can send
comments as they watch. In the case of Hurricane Matthew, several
Florida news networks, such as WPEC in West Palm Beach and WSVN
in Miami, used Periscope and Facebook Live to broadcast online news
coverage. During Hurricane Matthew, a single live stream on WPEC
gathered an audience of more than 700,000 viewers (King, 2016).
Facebook Live and streaming video are not only critical to the engagement among new organizations during a story but are also incredibly popular at an interpersonal level. Citizens used Facebook Live to
bring the storm to life, especially to share with families, friends, and
loved ones across the county who were not able to see the events in
person. Citizens praised the organic nature of the live stream content
during the storm and expressed appreciation for the ability to be part
of a live conversation that allowed for comments and conversation. One
Periscope video from storm chaser Jeff Piotrowski is said to have gained
an audience of more than 92,000 viewers. During Hurricane Matthew,
Periscope set up a channel dedicated exclusively for live streams from
the storm (King, 2016).
Pacenti (2016) indicated that Hurricane Matthew resulted in a social media storm as citizens took to Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and
SnapChat to chronicle the storm event. Instagram and Facebook featured countless hurricane photos. The #hurricanematthew2016 hashtag
showed photos ranging from #evacuationparty to hunkering down and
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reinforcing doors and windows and, of course, the roaring ocean. Many
of the images also captured the true damage and destruction of the
storm. SnapChat compiled video that revealed a montage of hurricane
experiences and damages. Facebook opened its Safety Check feature
during the storm so that people could alert friends and family of their
safety. All of this social media frenzy during the hurricane influenced
organizational response in that companies such as AT&T waived fees
for data usage during the period of the storm in areas affected (King,
2016; Pacenti, 2016).
The Facebook Safety Check is a feature that is critical to interpersonal and organizational response during a storm crisis. Facebook
activates the Safety Check feature to enable users to alert their loved
ones, friends, and family that they are safe during a dangerous event
or natural disaster. Examples where Safety Check is put in use include
the 2015 Paris terrorist attacks and the 2016 Orlando nightclub shooting. Facebook issued a statement that “our hearts go out to the people
affected by this tragic event. We hope the people in the area find the
tool a helpful way to let their friends and family know they are okay”
(Chang, 2016). On a global scale, Facebook’s responsiveness regarding
activating the tool has been criticized. For instance, during Hurricane
Matthew, the Safety Check was turned on when the storm made its way
toward the United States rather than while it was in Haiti. Given that
the tool is fewer than 3 years old, there is speculation as to its saliency
(Chang, 2016).
The intersection between the digital and live events of Hurricane
Matthew provides an ample case for consideration of these critical stages
during a hurricane crisis event. Features such as live streaming and
Safety Check are noteworthy developments that directly impact how
crisis communication on social media during natural disaster events
occurs. These new features warrant a different type of approach for
organizational response during a crisis and simultaneously recognize
the interpersonal attributes and individual power of social media. The
case of Hurricane Matthew reminds us that social media during a crisis
can enable our ability to communicate and share information with
members of these networks. Thus understanding more about social
media crisis communication will continue to be vital, and maintaining
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knowledge of how changing social media platform features affect the
social media landscape is necessary. With these examples in mind, we
revisit the overarching question and discuss next steps for academic
and practical research of STREMII.
Discussion

This article set out to revisit the STREMII model, originally derived
through an analysis of Hurricane Sandy in 2012. This article considered how certain elements of the model evolve related to changes in
the social media landscape, including different features and platforms.
Today, we recognize that social listening and responsive engagement
are continuously interwoven throughout the other cyclical phases of
STREMII, which is discussed more within this final section, along with
limitations, next steps, and future research opportunities.
Evolving STREMII

The necessity for ongoing social listening and responsive engagement
throughout the phases of the original STREMII model is supported
in the interpersonal and organizational examples of social media crisis communication during Hurricane Matthew. With this in mind, a
slightly revised visual representation of the STREMII model is designed.
Figure 2 displays the latest STREMII image for recognition as a contemporary social media crisis communication model.
Revisiting Best Practices

When considering Lin et al.’s (2016) extension of Seeger’s (2006) best
practices in social media crisis communication, social listening and
responsive engagement are encompassed in each of the presented
practices. For examples, integrating social media into organizational
decisions and policies would likely involve an aspect of social listening
and responsive engagement within a developed social media strategy.
Monitoring, listening to, and responding to stakeholders’ concerns
exemplify social listening activities, and actively promoting dialog
would include responsive engagement. Responsive engagement would
also be demonstrated when setting up official social media accounts
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Social Listening
1. Surveillance & social
listening

6. Implement
necessary changes

2. Identify target
audiences

5. Interact with
consumers & publics

3. Respond to the crisis &
engage in the conversation

4. Monitor the landscape &
evaluate outcomes

Responsive Engagement

FIGURE 2

Revised STREMII model.

to increase source credibility for information, as well as scheduling
timely, effective, relevant, and frequent updates of messages, to dispel
rumors and decrease misinformation. Social listening is represented
in the owning and monitoring of the use of hashtags in all phases of a
crisis to ensure accuracy and usefulness. Cooperating with gatekeeper
and “gatewatchers” and keeping audiences in the information loop (Lin
et al., 2016) imply responsive engagement.
Last, several interpersonal and organizational examples are cited
and discussed throughout this article. Also, recognizing the difference
in the social media climate between Hurricane Sandy and Hurricane
Matthew, as mentioned by the Red Cross and FEMA, shows the value
of social media, and organizations have realized that they can use social
media as information tools to effectively respond to disasters (Ogrysko,
2016). FEMA recently launched an initiative to monitor social media
during disasters in an attempt to save more lives and improve rescue
efforts (Thomas, 2016). These organizations are now turning to social
listening as they realize that the information that can be gathered from
online conversations is rich and valuable. Social listening affords real-
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time surveillance by monitoring social media outlets, attending to
and processing that information in real time, and using it to provide
immediate and effective responses (Ogrysko, 2016).
Limitations

Von Mending and Forino (2016) lamented that “disasters are not a
natural phenomenon. Humans play a central role. As a result, a natural
hazard such as Hurricane Matthew impacts each country in its path
differently.” One of the limitations of this study is that we primarily
focused on the impact of Hurricane Matthew within the United States.
Future research on social media crisis communication should take into
consideration an additional situational variable: international crisis
communication response strategies. Included in this variable would be
differences in cultural approaches to disasters, differences in the uses
and functions of social media, and difficulties with language barriers
when responding to multilingual audiences. As an example, in the event
of the Pulse nightclub shooting in Orlando, the Hispanic community
had different informational needs than the LGBTQ community.
Second, the original STREMII model grew out of and has been applied within the context of hurricanes. This model and its application
presently do not extend to other types of organizational crises and
events as they are both created and managed in social media (STREMII
is limited to managing crises only). To date, research on the STREMII
model has been exploratory. Thus it makes sense that the next steps
would include more practical development for use of the model in applied research as well as empirical testing.
Next Steps

There is a gap in the existing STREMII literature when it comes to the
procedure of each stage of the model. We recognize that the audience
interested in STREMII would benefit from a practical explanation about
how to use it, namely, what to do at each stage of the model and how
to integrate the model into existing crisis communication and social
media strategies. While we have explained the purpose of each stage
of the model clearly and showcased these purposes through various
hurricane crisis examples across two storms, we recognize the clear
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and obvious opportunity to enhance the understanding of STREMII
by providing a practical process for implementation. Our next step for
this line of inquiry is to extend beyond the theoretical knowledge about
the model and to present the how-to process of STREMII.
Opportunities for Future Research

There are several options for next steps to explore STREMII. Using
SCCT and/or the best practices for crisis communication on social
media, STREMII is able to support matching the social media response
of the crisis to the nature and impact of the crisis itself. As discussed,
further pragmatic application would surely benefit the analysis and
evaluation of the effectiveness of STREMII through the use of case
study research methods. STREMII is posited and developed for natural
disasters, but further analysis may reveal applicability to other types of
organizational crises as well. If so, then it will be beneficial to examine
the nuances of STREMII applications across several different types of
crisis events and determine if any differences in the process occur or
are necessary based on the nature of the crisis event.
In addition, STREMII is a model that is beneficial for classroom
pedagogy within crisis communication courses (Stewart & Young,
2016). The revised model has yet to be tested or evaluated within the
classroom; however, feedback from previous pedagogical applications
of the original model was considered in its redesign. This presents a
similar opportunity for the current model to be discussed and analyzed
within the classroom setting using an identical pedagogical procedure
so that longitudinal data regarding the model as it progresses can be
gathered and aggregated over time. Last, as more social media research
develops, the opportunity exists for empirical testing of the STREMII
model. Once the procedure for the model is introduced and the model
is used for practical implementation, appropriate measures can be
determined for how to best evaluate the model.
Conclusion

As social media continuously evolve, STREMII will have to be periodically evaluated and redeveloped. STREMII has the potential to become
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a dynamic social media crisis communication model that will advance
over time and progress in tandem with the social media landscape. The
utility of STREMII for social media crisis communication for natural
disasters, specifically hurricanes, invites further practical scholarship.
Understanding the model and its extensions more clearly considers
how this process can be integrated into an organization’s existing social media strategy to be prepared in the event of a hurricane or other
weather-related natural disaster. This current research also reflects
on how STREMII may apply to other types of crisis events. For now,
STREMII provides a versatile framework to guide crisis communication
on social media during hurricane events through a carefully designed
process based on examples from actual storm events, with a recent
emphasis on the areas of social listening and engagement.
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ABSTRACT
The social force of race in relation to natural resources plays a prominent role in which communities are disproportionately affected by pollution. Scholars have described how people of color
are disproportionately victims of environmental discrimination and disparities because they lack
the necessary social capital to bring attention to their plight, as demonstrated by the case of the
Flint, Michigan, Water Crisis. In this article, we use a critical race theory lens to explore how the
Flint Water Crisis constitutes a case study of environmental racism. More specifically, we discuss
the public health implications of environmental racism on the residents of Flint and conclude
with a discussion of the overall implications of environmental justice for public health and social
science research.
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Over the course of the 20th and 21st centuries, much attention has been
paid to the inequitable exposure to pollution based on socioeconomic
status. In the United States, sources of pollution, such as toxic waste
dumps, incinerators, manufacturing plants, and other facilities, are
typically located in lower income neighborhoods. The social force of
race in relation to natural resources plays a prominent role in which
communities are disproportionately affected by these environmental
factors. According to Hines (2015),
racially based environmental discrimination was made apparent
in 1971 when President Nixon’s Council on Environmental Quality
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acknowledged that racial discrimination negatively affects the quality
of environment among the urban poor. (pp. 198–199)

Scholars and activists have discussed extensively how people of color
are more exposed to toxic waste, are disproportionately the victims of
environmental discrimination and disparities, and suffer excessively
from environmentally related health problems (Bullard, 1992, 1993, 1994,
2000, 2001; Hines, 2015; Loh & Sugerman-Brozan, 2002; Mohai & Saha,
2007; Ringquist, 2005). The term used to describe this phenomenon is
environmental racism: racial discrimination in environmental policy
making, decision-making, and practice that results in inequitable distribution of environmental burdens based on race or color (Bullard,
2000). Most communities that are victims of environmental racism
are poor and African American or Latino (Bullard, 1992, 1993, 1994;
Bullard & Wright, 1986; Hines, 2001, 2015).
The challenge for environmental justice movements continues, as
courts and governmental agencies typically require solid evidence of
intentional discrimination in claims of environmental racism. However,
a wealth of evidence exists that points to the linkages between pollutants and the hazardous exposure of the communities that lie in close
proximity to them. Numerous studies have examined the ill-health effects of exposure to pollutants (Downey & Willegen, 2005; Hines, 2015;
Mohai & Bryant, 1992). Additional studies have linked diseases such
as cancer, cardiovascular disease, birth defects, respiratory problems,
and a host of other health complications to exposure to pollutants
from industrial facilities (Collins & Williams, 1999; Roux et al., 2001;
Geschwind, 1992; Lagatos, Wessen, & Zelen, 1986). Moreover, several
scholars have discussed the differential environmental risks based on
race and socioeconomic status (Bryant, 1995; Institute of Medicine, 1999;
Mohai, 1996; Mohai & Bryant, 1992; Szasz & Meuser, 1997). While some
would argue that class is the biggest indicator, research has shown that
race cannot be separated from class because race helps to perpetuate
a system of inequalities that create a space for acts of environmental
racism (Charles, 2003; Feagin, Vera, & Batur, 2001). In response, environmental justice efforts attempt to promote practices that enable equal
protection. However, as critical race theory scholars have contended,
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an unfortunate narrative frames racial practices like environmental
racism as historical incidences that no longer exist (Delgado & Stefancic, 2001; Dickinson, 2012; Tate, 1997). Yet, as the case of the Flint,
Michigan, Water Crisis demonstrates, spaces continue to be sites of
racialized practices and discrimination as the underlying historical
and political economic relations of racial inequality are perpetuated
in the present day. Unfortunately, the demographics of Flint, Michigan, have made it the poster child for a community that was most at
risk to experience the failure of our infrastructure in severe ways. The
population of Flint is 56.6% Black, with a median household income
from 2009 to 2013 of $24,830. Additionally, 41% of the population lives
below the poverty line, and only 11% holds an education of at least a
bachelor’s degree (U.S. Census, 2017). Consequently, the Flint Water
Crisis represents an ideal environmental racism case study because it
is a well-documented crisis that could have been prevented, echoing
Rothstein (2016) that “Flint matters because the water utility industry
can do better. The crisis, tragic in so many respects, also presents an
opportunity for lasting benefit—benefit from recognizing that we are
Flint” (p. 37). To understand the systematic factors that led to the Flint
Water Crisis, we will employ a critical race lens to see how Flint has
been a crisis in the making.
Flint Water Crisis

In April 2014, the city of Flint, Michigan, changed its water supply from
Detroit-supplied Lake Huron water to the Flint River, as an interim
source to save money while overhauling its supply system. Moving
forward, it is important to emphasize that the single, unitary motivator for the switch from Detroit-supplied water to water from the Flint
River was cost (Felton, 2016; Lin, 2016; Walters, 2016). Shortly after
the switch, residents noted concerns regarding water color, taste, and
odor (Carmody, 2016; Ganim & Tran, 2016; Ingraham, 2016; Laylin,
2016; Lurie, 2016). Findings from FlintWaterStudy.org concluded that
the water in Flint is 8.6 times more corrosive than water in Detroit
(Siddhartha, 2015). However, independent tests by the Flint River
Watershed Coalition contradicted this characterization. Their testing
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found chlorine levels ranging between 49 and 81 mg/L.1 Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) secondary (nonmandatory) limit for chloride
in drinking water is 250 mg/L, which is well above the level of the raw
water from the Flint River, and the danger in exceeding this limit is
merely “salty taste,” implying that the river itself cannot be to blame
for corrosion (Environmental Protection Agency, 2017). This suggests
that, although the river certainly has faced a sordid history with pollution, something else must have caused the corrosion that caused lead
to leech into the drinking water.
Internal discussions and reports suggested that Flint’s water was so
corrosive as a result of the City of Flint Water Treatment Plant itself.
Prior to switching its water source to the Flint River, the City of Flint
bought all of its water from the City of Detroit. As a result of this longstanding deal, the Flint Water Treatment Plant ran only 4 days a year,
serving primarily as an emergency backup (Schuch, 2014). Before the
plant reopened, a series of poor decisions and oversights that would
propel the crisis had already been made. Internal e-mails from Mike
Glasgow, Flint’s laboratory and water quality supervisor, revealed a hurried operation to reopen the plant by Detroit’s April 25, 2014, deadline:
“if water is distributed from this plant in the next couple of weeks, it
will be against my direction . . . but they [city officials] seem to have
their own agenda” (Egan, Spangler, & Shamus, 2016).
In response to increased bacteria levels in the city water soon after
the shift, the city increased the amount of chlorine it used to treat
the water, in turn causing increased levels of THM, a dangerous byproduct of the disinfection process (Gottesdiener, 2015). In response to
this problem, a report conducted by Lockwood, Andrews, & Newman
Inc. recommended increasing the treatment dosage of ferric chloride,
a coagulant that could help reduce THM levels (Gottesdiener, 2015).
These two actions, however, had the unfortunate side effect of making
the posttreatment water significantly more corrosive than even the pretreatment water. If the city had added any kind of corrosion inhibitor, as
had been present in the water they purchased from Detroit, this would
have been the end of their problems. However, city officials worried that
adding phosphates, a common inhibitor, might feed bacterial growth,
as those same compounds are frequently used in fertilizers (Flesher,
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2016). Disturbingly, Flint officials knew that increasing the water’s
ability to corrode, without adding any sort of inhibitor, was likely not
to end well; yet, they chose to proceed with a wait-and-see approach.
In a September 3, 2016, email to numerous state and local officials,
then public works director Howard Croft said a different concern had
been identified. As the city water plant was designed to begin treating
river water, “optimization for lead was addressed and discussed” with
an engineering firm and the Michigan Department of Environmental
Quality (MDEQ). Croft continued, “It was determined that having more
data was advisable prior to the commitment of a specific optimization
method” (Flesher, 2016).
We believe that this choice to take a wait-and-see approach, in the
face of the myriad potential health problems caused by lead poisoning,
demonstrates a clear negligence on the part of the City of Flint, yet the
Flint River has become the scapegoat for the city’s inappropriate action
(Carmody, 2016; Laylin, 2016). While the pollution in Flint certainly
contributed to the crisis, emphasis on historic pollution rather than
recent misconduct deflects blame from the people who directly allowed
the crisis to occur. Therefore we agree with Brulle and Pellow (2006)
that the exploitation of the environment and human populations are
linked and that the key social dynamics that create this environmental inequality are (a) the functioning of the market economy and (b)
institutionalized racism. In this article, we use a critical race theory
(CRT) lens to argue how the Flint Water Crisis constitutes a case of
environmental racism and to what extent. More specifically, we discuss
the public health implications of environmental racism on the residents
of Flint, Michigan, in terms of the ongoing water crisis and conclude
with a discussion of the overall implications of environmental justice
for public health and social science research.
Critical Race Theory

CRT was developed in the mid-1970s as a number of scholars noticed
that there was a need for new theories and strategies to combat the
more covert forms of racism that were gaining ground in the era. The
basic CRT model consists of five elements: (a) the centrality of race
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and racism and their intersectionality with other forms of subordination, (b) the challenge to dominant ideology, (c) the commitment to
social justice, (d) the centrality of experiential knowledge, and (e) the
transdisciplinary perspective (Solorzano, 1997; Solorzano & Yasso,
2000). The heart of CRT lies in the rejection of color-blind orientations of equality, expressed as “rules that insist only on treatment that
is the same across the board, [as this] can thus remedy only the most
blatant forms of discrimination and instead calls for aggressive, color
conscious efforts to change the way things are” (Delgado & Stefancic,
2012, p. 49). Moreover, CRT argues for race-conscious decision-making
as a routine, nondeviant mode to be used in distributing positions of
wealth, prestige, and power (Guinier, 1995; Harris, 1995).
CRT also uniquely relies on narratives to substantiate claims. According to DeCuir and Dixson (2004), “an essential tenant [sic] of
Critical Race Theory is counter storytelling” (p. 27). Deconstructing and understanding narratives can be used “to reveal the circular,
self-serving nature of particular legal doctrines or rules” (Delgado &
Stefancic, 2001, p. xvii). While many scholars argue for universalism
over individual narratives, CRT emphasizes the role of individual narratives to the sense-making process, as we understand context through
narrative. The unique focus on narratives coupled with a call for raceconscious decision-making provides a useful lens when addressing
the complexities of environmental racism overall, and in particular
the Flint Water Crisis.
Flint and Environmental Racism

The case of the Flint Water Crisis demonstrates how the market economy and institutional racism have interacted in a manner to create a
space filled with discrimination toward poor minorities. However, to
understand the severity of the situation, we must look at the history of
Flint. The Flint Water Crisis has been 150 years in the making due to the
toxic legacy of the automotive industry operating in the city without
penalty, in part because of weak environmental regulations (Carmody,
2016; Craven & Tynes, 2016; Mailman School of Public Health, 2016;
Morley, 2016). The weak environmental regulations were due in part to
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the long-standing perception of the adverse economic effects of environmental policies. Therefore this crisis lies at the intersection of this
lengthy history of environmental pollution, racism, and shortsighted
governance. Although we argue that the most tangible smoking gun for
the crisis was the failure to use an inhibitor, such steps would not have
been necessary were the pollution addressed appropriately—Flint is a
derivative of a century of manipulation of the city’s residents (Rosner,
2016). Thus we must examine every step at which these damning decisions have been made to apply CRT properly.
Starting in the 1830s, industrial pollutants started to be introduced
into the Flint River by way of the first lumber mills in the area (Carmody, 2016). Soon afterward, paper mills started to settle into the city,
and with their arrival came chemical processing. The trend of pollution
continued as the city began to grow, reaching a population of 150,000 by
1930, as various industries arrived, such as the carriage and automobile
industries (Carmody, 2016). During this time, untreated waste was being discharged downstream, and the effects of tainted water could be
seen when the fish began to disappear, which was determined to be a
result of lowered oxygen levels in the river (Carmody, 2016).
The problem of water pollution grew as General Motors increased
its presence in the area in the 1940s through an investment strategy
focused on rural and suburban areas, resulting in the creation of eight
industrial complexes from 1940 to 1960 (Hakala, 2016). Although there
were discussions about water pollution in the 1940s, no regulations
forced businesses to treat and dilute their waste with city water until
the 1950s (Carmody, 2016). Following these new regulations was a
demand from the Michigan Water Resources Commission to Flint in
1960 to “abate unlawful pollution of the Flint River” (Carmody, 2016).
As a result, in 1967, Flint started to buy its water from Detroit, which
continued to be the case until spring 2014 (Carmody, 2016; Mailman
School of Public Health, 2016). General Motors helped to worsen the
situation because by the 1980s, most of General Motors’s Flint plants
were marked for potential noncompliance with EPA standards, partially
leading to the closure of existing plants in Flint one by one (Carmody,
2016). General Motors’s mistreatment of the people of Flint continued
because the company had knowledge that the water supply was tainted
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with high levels of chloride, which was rusting the company’s engine
blocks (Colias, 2016). Rather than notify officials, General Motors simply
switched its water supply, allowing the company to avoid a financial
pitfall while the residents of Flint suffered.
However, simply to blame General Motors for negligence would
paint an inaccurate picture of the forces that collided in Flint. The state
government made numerous missteps in its decision-making approach,
making them culpable for this crisis. When Michigan governor Rick
Synder was debating whether to change the water supply, he did not do
any pilot testing of Flint River water (Masten, Davies, & McElmurry,
2016). The only pilot test occurred in 2002, a treatability study, meaning
that the government was working with outdated information about the
water supply (Lockwood, Andrews, & Newman Inc., 2015) When you
consider the fact that the American Water Works Association clearly
recommends that “if a municipality is considering changing how its
source water is treated, the potential effects on the corrosivity of the
treated water and the need for corrosion control should be evaluated,”
and that no sufficient testing was ordered, the municipality did not
look out for its residents (Masten et al., 2016; Muylwyk et al., 2014).
This circulation of inaccurate information continued when the MDEQ
incorrectly identified the Flint water supply as being safe for human
use, which was then understood as accurate by other state agencies
(Campbell, Greenberg, Mankikar, & Ross, 2016; Flint Water Advisory
Task Force, 2016).
This poor decision-making continued even after government officials began to suspect a problem. Some of Synder’s staff realized the
severity of the Flint water situation and attempted to advocate for a
change in water supply, despite General Motors’s large role in creating
the problem. For instance, Dennis Muchmore, the governor’s chief of
staff, stated in a February 5, 2017, email,
Since we’re in charge, we can hardly ignore the people of Flint. After all,
if GM refuses to use the water in their plant and our own agencies are
warning people not to drink it . . . we look pretty stupid hiding behind
some financial statement. (Covert, 2016)
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Additionally, like others on Synder’s staff, policy makers realized
that although General Motors used the Flint area until it was no longer
economically viable to do so, the State of Michigan still had a responsibility to the people of Flint. However, instead of moving forward
with switching the water supply, it took over a year for a solution to be
partially implemented. This history, coupled with a massive decline in
industrial and residential tax bases and lower city population densities,
reduced the water demand in the distribution system, exacerbating
problems with lead corrosion (Lewis, 1965; Zimmer & Hawley, 1956).
Additionally, Carmody’s (2016) investigation shed light on the Flint
River’s history with pollution, noting account after account of illegal
dumps, industrial carelessness, and the mess that followed.
Even more troubling is that several former Flint residents were in
positions of power within Michigan government. For instance, Michael
Gadola, a former Flint resident and a member of Snyder’s legal counsel,
voiced his concerns throughout the governor’s administration, but his
opinion was never requested by Darnell Earley, the state-appointed
emergency manager of Flint in April 2014 (Covert, 2016). Growing up
in Flint, Gadola knew that taking water from the Flint River was a poor
choice, but his position of power did nothing to help Flint residents,
because the economic cost of an imbalanced budget was too much to
bear (Covert, 2016). Compounding this, the MDEQ, the agency with
the responsibility of keeping drinking water safe, had limited resources
to monitor Michigan’s water (Roelofs, 2016). This combination demonstrates one particular instance of environmental racism within the Flint
Water Crisis: Despite personal narratives and a paper trail detailing the
economic mismanagement, the people of Flint were continually ignored.
Many residents also took note of how their voices had been ignored.
For example, resident Diane Thornton stated that the Flint Water Crisis
was “a blind disaster” and that “if we would have had a tornado or hurricane, they would have rushed in to help us” (Levin, n.d.). Instead of
support, Flint residents were and are continuing to be subjected to unfair
economic policies. A report by the Food and Water Watch (2016) found
that residents of Flint faced the single most expensive water service in
the entire country during 2015. The unfortunate irony of this situation
was not lost on the residents of Flint, as resident Helena Jones stated:
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“We’ve worked hard all our life, and we’ve paid our dues and pay our
taxes. And this is what we get” (Berlinger & Netto, 2016). Currently
8,000 Flint homeowners will receive tax liens because of unpaid water
bills, which can result in foreclosure of their homes (Delaney, 2017).
Furthermore, receiving these liens makes one ineligible for lead pipe
replacement (Dennis, 2017). The overpriced water, threat of tax liens,
and ultimately those liens disqualifying residents from lead pipe replacement clearly demonstrate to Flint residents that the State of Michigan
only considers their lives valuable if they can contribute economically.
At this point, even if state officials were to radically change course, the
damage would already have been done. Despite assurances that Flint
is working to resolve the crisis fully, “nearly three years later, many
residents still don’t trust the water. And they trust government officials
even less” (Dennis, 2017)—and for good reason.
Most troubling about the Flint Water Crisis is that attention was only
raised when a concerned team of physicians started to notice increases
in lead levels in children. Attisha, LaChance, Sadler, and Schnepp (2016)
tested children under the age of 5 years who had elevated blood lead
levels in Genesee County and found a striking increase in the percentage
of Flint children with elevated blood lead levels after the water source
switch. According to Attisha et al.,
as in many urban areas with high levels of socioeconomic disadvantage
and minority populations, we found a preexisting disparity in lead poisoning. . . . Flint children already suffer from risk factors that innately
increase their lead exposure: poor nutrition, concentrated poverty, and
older housing stock. (p. 286)

Following reports of increased blood lead levels in the children of
Flint, who were disproportionately poor and African American, many
began to question whether this issue constituted a case of environmental
racism (Eligon, 2016; Shafer, 2016). As we have noted previously, the
abhorrent series of policies regarding the residents affected by the crisis,
as well as the negligence that allowed such a crisis to happen in the first
place, most definitely constitute a case of environmental racism. The
pollution of the Flint River, as well as the economic conditions suffered
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by the people of Flint, created a dangerous intersection at which this
crisis could happen. As the crisis played out, the response by state officials, discussed below, has demonstrated fully this systemic racism.
As more and more attention was placed on the crisis through social
media and the sharing of narratives of residents, Flint city and Michigan state officials started to lob accusations of blame back and forth
at each other. As applying CRT requires identifying the true decision
makers, we must wade through this fog of accusations to determine
those responsible for policy. Prior to the mass releases of internal
e-mails of both city and state officials in 2016, a column penned by
Darnell Earley stated,
The decision to separate from Detroit Water and Sewerage Department
and go with the KWA [Karegnondi Water Authority], which included
the decision to pump Flint River water in the interim, were part of a
long-term plan that was approved by Flint’s mayor and confirmed by
a City Council vote of 7–1 on March 25, 2013. . . . The mayor’s approval
of the plan and the subsequent near unanimous vote by City Council
were in no way coerced, forced or demanded by the state, nor any
emergency manager. Council’s affirmative vote was supported and
signed as an Executive Order by then-Emergency Manager Edward
Kurtz on March 29, 2013.

The title of Earley’s column, “Don’t Blame EM for Flint Water Disaster,”
clearly demonstrates this article’s communicative purpose. However,
an email by Harvey Hollins, Michigan’s state director of urban initiatives, written 2 weeks prior to Earley’s column, stated unambiguously,
“It is important to note that council did not take a vote to use Flint
river” (Ridley, 2016). For Earley to write a column in which he claims
that not only was there a vote in favor of changing the water source
but that such a vote was nearly unanimous, 2 weeks after other state
officials explicitly noted that no vote took place, seems suspicious under
even the best possible interpretation. Furthermore, the most damning
instance of a governmental about-face was the purchase of bottled
water for government staff well before the state of emergency was declared in December 2015. Although officials claim the decision had no
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relationship whatsoever to the question of lead levels, “management
and budget department decided to provide water coolers in a Flint state
office building after the city sent out a notice saying it had been found
in violation of the state’s Safe Drinking Water Act because of high levels
of disinfection byproducts” (Oosting, 2016). Ignoring the discussion
on whether the government knew about the lead, its decision to limit
its own staff ’s exposure to potentially unsafe water, while telling its
residents not to worry, demonstrates clear negligence.
This represents the intersection of Flint’s troubled history with
systemic problems at the governmental level. The State of Michigan
stripped away Flint’s ability to make these choices for itself, meaning
those making the decisions would not be affected by the crisis. As that
crisis unfolded, despite government officials’ knowledge of problems
with the drinking water, public officials continued to tell the citizens
of Flint that the water coming through their pipes was safe for consumption. Worse yet, as those citizens sought accountability from their
government, that government responded by tossing blame back and
forth, possibly even consciously lying in the process. When considered
against the backdrop of Flint’s demographics, we see that it was only
a matter of time before Flint faced such a crisis. Moreover, according
to Jones (2017),
[the] inability to afford and have access to self-monitoring water quality
systems, absence of education on poisoning symptoms, lack of financial resources to just pick up and leave, and low political power and
economic mobility are all factors that aid in vulnerable communities
becoming victims to environmental justice.

Brulle and Pellow (2006) explained that the exploitation of the environment and human populations are linked because of the functioning
of the market economy and institutionalized racism, which led in this
case to environmental racism. As we have emphasized previously, the
city of Flint changed its water supply from Detroit-supplied water to
the Flint River solely to reduce costs for the government, even in the
face of known potential dangers. This initial attention to the bottom
line, the subsequent wait-and-see approach to potential dangers from
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Flint River water, the gross mishandling of the crisis, the clear economic
exploitation through tax liens, and the refusal to replace lead pipes for
anyone who cannot afford Flint’s astronomic water bills all coalesce to
demonstrate the relationship of environmental and human exploitation that is environmental racism. While no one in the government
intentionally tried to poison the people of Flint, attempting to enact a
color-blind decision-making process, it did poison the people of Flint
by ignoring the materiality of the situation (Michigan Civil Rights
Commission, 2017).
Implications for Environmental Justice

Investigations into cases of environmental racism have several implications for environmental justice and policy. Populations that have the
highest risks of water poisoning are also the least represented politically. Additionally, marginalized people who are at greater risk to be
victims of environmental racism and environmental injustice often
lack the agency and education to fight back. For this reason, grassroots
movements are needed to empower these vulnerable populations. We
have seen from the crisis in Flint that local residents occupying policymaking positions will not necessarily result in representative decisionmaking. For modern and future governments to practice justice for
marginalized communities, those communities must make their voices
heard on all levels; they cannot merely rely on good faith from the top.
Thus any discussion of the Flint Water Crisis would be incomplete
without consideration of the tactics we can employ to prevent such a
tragedy from happening again. The separation of these discussions,
and the consideration of them merely as academic issues, is a privilege
that is not enjoyed by those who are actually affected by these crises.
Laurent (2011) outlines four goals that must be achieved for communities to become more empowered: (a) People must have the opportunity to participate in decisions about activities that may affect
their environment and/or health, (b) the public’s contribution must
be able to influence the regulatory agency’s decisions, (c) the public’s
concerns must be considered in the decision-making process, and (d)
the decision makers must seek out and facilitate the involvement of the
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potentially affected. For grassroots movements to be effective at creating effective policy changes, however, they cannot be a hollow gesture.
These movements need to make a genuine effort at understanding the
systemic factors that have led to environmental racism but also the
lived experiences of those affected by a system of inequality. Otherwise, these grassroots efforts are simply talking for these marginalized
groups without considering their perspective, undermining the goal
of the grassroots efforts and increasing the likelihood that such crises
will reappear in the near future. The crisis in Flint, combined with the
insultingly ineffective response to it on both a local and state level,
demonstrates that we still have much work to do toward enacting
these goals.
Conclusion

It is imperative that we learn from the mistakes of Flint. We have seen
the disastrous effects of the failure to acknowledge a history of environmental injustice, combined with current negligence and systemic
racism. Having applied CRT, we conclude that, quite simply, the Flint
Water Crisis could not have happened in a wealthier, whiter city and
therefore is a clear case of environmental racism. Flint city and Michigan
state officials felt they had the political capital to take their disastrous
wait-and-see approach because their constituents initially lacked the
political capital to resist. Yet, as the narrative of a scandal emerged and
solidified, state officials continued to feign a publicly ignorant aboutface, lobbing blame back on the city officials they had stripped power
from in the first place.
Lost amid this political bickering is an entire generation who will
face countless health problems from which they have little to no hope
of recovery. However, it is possible to change this narrative for future
generations, but it starts when we stop ignoring marginalized communities when they have concerns. We cannot simply wait and see when
an entire community raises its voice in resistance to the status quo.
Rather, we must consider their perspective, because it can help lead
to a greater understanding about particular crises. Flint is a tragedy,
but to prevent future ones, we must start giving marginalized groups
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a seat at the table, increasing their agency regarding decisions about
their health and environment.
Tomeka M. Robinson, PhD, is an associate professor in rhetoric and
public advocacy and director of forensics at Hofstra University. She
primarily teaches courses in intercultural, organizational, and health
communication, and her scholarly interests lie at the intersections of
health, culture, and policy.
Sabrina Singh is a first-year MA student at the University of Montana.
She is studying communication studies with a concentration in health
and organizational communication. Her primary scholarly interests lie
in the interplay between health risks and communities of color.
Garrett Shum is a senior-year undergraduate at Hofstra University. He
is studying rhetoric and public advocacy, linguistics, philosophy, and the
Japanese language. His primary scholarly interests are in intercultural
communication and epistemology.
ORCID

Tomeka M. Robinson

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7766-9875
Note

1. See http://flintriver.org/blog/

318

robinson, shum, and singh

References
Attisha, M., LaChance, J., Sadler, R., & Schnepp, A. (2016). Elevated blood
lead levels in children associated with the Flint drinking water crisis: A
spatial analysis of risk and public health response. American Journal of
Public Health, 106, 283–290. https://doi.org/10.2105/AJPH.2015.303003
Berlinger, J., & Netto, J. (2016, January 21). Voices of Flint: How residents are
coping. Retrieved from http://www.cnn.com/2016/01/21/us/flint-resident
-voices/index.html
Brulle, R. J., & Pellow, D. N. (2006). Environmental justice: Human health
and environmental inequalities. Annual Review Public Health, 27, 103–124.
https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.publhealth.27.021405.102124
Bullard, R. D. (1992). Race and the incidence of environmental hazards: A time
for discourse. Boulder, CO: Westview.
Bullard, R. D. (1993). Confronting environmental racism. Boston, MA: South
End.
Bullard, R. D. (1994). Unequal protection. San Francisco, CA: Sierra Club Books.
Bullard, R. D. (2000). Dumping in Dixie: Race, class, and environmental quality. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
Bullard, R. D. (2001). Environmental justice in the 21st century: Race still
matters. Phylon, 49, 151–171. https://doi.org/10.2307/3132626
Bullard, R., & Wright, B. (1986). The politics of pollution: Implication for the
Black community. Phylon, 47(1), 71–78. https://doi.org/10.2307/274696
Bryant, B. (1995). Pollution prevention and participatory research as a methodology for environmental justice. Virginia Environmental Law Journal,
14, 589–613. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/24782273
Campbell, C., Greenberg, R., Mankikar, D., & Ross, R. D. (2016). A case study
of environmental injustice: The failure in Flint. International Journal of
Environmental Research and Public Health, 13, Article 951. https://doi
.org/10.3390/ijerph13100951
Carmody, T. (2016, February 26). How the Flint River got so toxic. The Verge.
Retrieved from http://www.theverge.com/2016/2/26/11117022/flint-mich
igan-water-crisis-lead-pollution-history
Charles, C. A. (2003). The dynamics of racial residential segregation. Annual Review of Sociology, 29, 167–207. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev
.soc.29.010202.100002

Politically Unhealthy

319

Colias, M. (2016). How GM saved itself from Flint water crisis. Retrieved from
http://www.autonews.com/article/20160131/OEM01/302019964/how-gm
-saved-itself-from-flint-water-crisis
Collins, C. A., & Williams, D. (1999). Segregation and mortality: The deadly
effects of racism? Sociology Forum, 14, 495–523. https://doi.org/10.1023
/A:1021403820451
Covert, B. (2016, February 26). Snyder aide says governor knew about Flint
water issues a year before action was taken. Retrieved from https://think
progress.org/snyder-aide-says-governor-knew-about-flint-water-issues
-a-year-before-action-was-taken-308444eb494/
Craven, J., & Tynes, T. (2016, February 3). The racist roots of Flint’s water
crisis. Huffington Post. Retrieved from http://www.huffingtonpost.com
/entry/racist-roots-of-flints-water-crisis_us_56b12953e4b04f9b57d7b118
DeCuir, J., & Dixson, A. (2004). So when it comes out, they aren’t that surprised that it is there: Using critical race theory of analysis of race and
racism in education. Educational Researcher, 33(5), 26–31. https://doi
.org/10.3102/0013189X033005026
Delaney, A. (2017, May 3). Some Flint residents could face foreclosure over
unpaid water bills. Huffington Post. Retrieved from https://www.huff
ingtonpost.com/entry/flint-residents-unpaid-water-bills-foreclosure_us
_5909e494e4b05c397684e4ec
Delgado, R., & Stefancic, J. (2001). Critical race theory: An introduction. New
York, NY: New York University Press.
Delgado, R., & Stefancic, J. (2012). Critical race theory: An introduction (2nd
ed.). New York, NY: New York University Press.
Dennis, B. (2017, February 28). Flint residents must start paying for water they
still can’t drink without a filter. Washington Post. Retrieved from https://
www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-environment/wp/2017/02/28
/flint-residents-must-start-paying-for-water-they-still-cant-drink-without
-a-filter/
Dickinson, E. (2012). Addressing environmental racism through storytelling:
Toward an environmental justice narrative framework. Communication,
Culture, and Critique, 5, 57–74. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1753-9137.2012.01119.x
Downey, L., & Willegen, M. (2005). Environmental stressors: The mental
health impacts of living near industrial activity. Journal of Health and
Social Behavior, 46, 289–305.

320

robinson, shum, and singh

Egan, P., Spangler, T., & Shamus, K. J. (2016, February 12). E-mails: Flint water
plant was rushed into operation. Detroit Free Press. Retrieved from http://
www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/flint-water-crisis/2016/02/12/e
-mails-flint-water-plant-rushed-into-operation/80300220/
Eligon, J. (2016, January 22). A question of environmental racism in Flint.
New York Times. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/22
/us/a-question-of-environmental-racism-in-flint.html
Environmental Protection Agency. (2017, February 8). Secondary drinking water
standards: Guidance for nuisance chemicals. Retrieved from https://www
.epa.gov/dwstandardsregulations/secondary-drinking-water-standards
-guidance-nuisance-chemicals
Feagin, J., Vera, H., & Batur, P. (2001). White racism: The basics. Cambridge,
England: Routledge.
Flesher, J. (2016, February 10). Email: Anti-corrosive chemicals weren’t applied
to Flint pipes over bacteria worries. Retrieved from http://detroit.cbslocal
.com/2016/02/10/email-anti-corrosive-chemicals-werent-applied-to-flint
-pipes-over-bacteria-worries/
Felton, R. (2016, January 23). How Flint traded safe drinking water for costcutting plan that didn’t work. The Guardian. Retrieved from https://www
.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/jan/23/flint-water-crisis-cost-cutting
-switch-water-supply
Flint Water Advisory Task Force. (2016). Flint water task force final report.
Lansing, MI: Office of Governor Rick Snyder.
Food and Water Watch. (2016, February 16). The state of public water in the
United States. Retrieved from https://www.foodandwaterwatch.org/insight
/state-public-water-united-states
Ganim, S., & Tran, L. (2016, January 13). How tap water became toxic in Flint,
Michigan. Retrieved from http://www.cnn.com/2016/01/11/health/toxic
-tap-water-flint-michigan/
Geschwind, S. (1992). Risk of congenital malformations associated with proximity to hazardous waste sites. American Journal of Epidemiology, 135,
1197–1207. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.aje.a116226
Gottesdiener, L. (2015, April 3). Flint, Mich., residents find state water control hard to swallow. Al Jazeera America. Retrieved from http://america
.aljazeera.com/articles/2015/4/3/flint-residents-find-state-water-control
-hard-to-swallow.html

Politically Unhealthy

321

Guinier, L. (1995). Groups, representation, and race-conscious districting: A
case of the emperor’s clothes. In K. Crenshaw (Ed.), Critical race theory:
The key writings that formed the movement (pp. 205–236). New York, NY:
New York University Press.
Hakala, J. (2016). Flint’s struggles began with GM’s move to suburbs in 1940s,
historian says. Michigan Radio. Retrieved from http://michiganradio.org
/post/flints-struggles-began-gms-move-suburbs-1940s-historian-says
Harris, C. (1995). Whiteness as property. In K. Crenshaw (Ed.), Critical race
theory: The key writings that formed the movement (pp. 276–291). New
York, NY: New York University Press.
Hines, R. (2001). African Americans’ struggle for environmental justice and
the case of the Shintech plant: Lessons learned from a war wage. Journal
of Black Studies, 31, 777–789. https://doi.org/10.1177/002193470103100605
Hines, R. (2015). The price of pollution: The struggle for environmental justice in Mossville, Louisiana. Western Journal of Black Studies, 39, 198–208.
Ingraham, C. (2016, January 15). This is how toxic Flint’s water really is.
Washington Post. Retrieved from https://www.washingtonpost.com/news
/wonk/wp/2016/01/15/this-is-how-toxic-flints-water-really-is/?utm_term
=.7c858cdf431e
Institute of Medicine. (1999). Toward environmental justice: Research, education, and health policy needs. Washington, DC: National Academy Press.
Jones, D. (2017, March 7). Flint Water Crisis: The importance of building a
grassroots environmental justice infrastructure. Retrieved from http://
lawatthemargins.com/2553-2/
Lagatos, S. W., Wessen, B. J., & Zelen, M. (1986). An analysis of contaminated
well water and health effects in Woburn, Massachusetts. Journal of the American Statistical Association, 81, 583–596. https://doi.org/10.1080/01621459
.1986.10478307
Laurent, E. (2011). Issues in environmental justice within the European Union.
Ecological Economics, 70, 1846–1853. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon
.2011.06.025
Laylin, T. (2016, January 18). How Michigan’s Flint River came to poison a
city. The Guardian. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/environ
ment/2016/jan/18/michigan-flint-river-epa-lead-contamination-mdeq
-pollutants-water-safety-health
Levin, S. (n.d.). Still standing: Flint residents tell their stories about living with

322

robinson, shum, and singh

poisoned water. Retrieved from http://www.mlive.com/news/index.ssf
/page/still_standing_flint_residents.html
Lewis, P. F. (1965). Impact of negro migration on the electoral geography of
Flint, Michigan, 1932–1962: A cartographic analysis. Annual Association
of American Geography, 55(1), 1–25. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8306.1965
.tb00504.x
Lin, J. (2016, January 15). The reach of lead in Flint’s water supply. New York
Times. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/01/15
/us/flint-lead-water-michigan.html
Lockwood, Andrews, & Newman Inc. (2015). Trihalomethane formation concerns: Operational evaluation report. Flint, MI: City of Flint.
Loh, P., & Sugerman-Brozan, J. (2002). Environmental justice organizing
for environmental health: Case study on asthma and diesel exhaust in
Roxbury, Massachusetts. Annals of the American Academy of Political and
Social Science, 584, 110–124. https://doi.org/10.1177/000271620258400108
Lurie, J. (2016, January 26). A toxic timeline of Flint’s water fiasco. Mother
Jones. Retrieved from http://www.motherjones.com/environment/2016/01
/flint-lead-water-crisis-timeline
Mailman School of Public Health. (2016). Flint’s toxic industrial legacy. Retrieved from https://www.mailman.columbia.edu/public-health-now
/news/flints-toxic-industrial-legacy
Masten, S. J., Davies, S. H., & McElmurry, S. P. (2016). Flint water crisis: What
happened and why? Journal of the American Water Works Association,
108(12), 22–34. https://doi.org/10.5942/jawwa.2016.108.0195
Michigan Civil Rights Commission. (2017). The Flint water crisis: Systemic
racism through the lens of Flint. Lansing, MI: Author.
Mohai, P. (1996). Environmental justice of analytic justice? Social Science
Quarterly, 77, 500–507. http://www.jstor.org/stable/i40108871
Mohai, O., & Bryant, B. (1992). Environmental racism: Reviewing the evidence.
In B. Bryant & P. Mohaid (Eds.), Race and the incidence of environmental
hazards (pp. 163–176). Boulder, CO: Westview.
Mohai, P., & Saha, R. (2007). Racial inequality in the distribution of hazardous
waste: A national level reassessment. Social Problems, 54, 343–370. https://
doi.org/10.1525/sp.2007.54.3.343
Morley, M. (2016, February 10). Highsmith: Flint crisis a long time coming and
could have been prevented. Retrieved from https://wdet.org/posts/2016/02

Politically Unhealthy

323

/10/82461-highsmith-flint-crisis-a-long-time-coming-and-could-have
-been-prevented/
Muylwyk, Q., Sandvig, A., & Snoeyink, V. (2014). Developing corrosion control
for drinking water systems. Opflow, 40(11), 24–27. https://doi.org/10.5991
/OPF.2014.40.0073
Oosting, J. (2016, January 28). State staff in Flint got water before crisis
emerged. Detroit News. Retrieved from http://www.detroitnews.com
/story/news/michigan/flint-water-crisis/2016/01/28/progress-michigan
-flint-water/79483054/
Ridley, G. (2016, February 26). Flint water emails show Flint City Council never
approved switch. Retrieved from http://www.mlive.com/news/flint/index
.ssf/2016/02/snyders_staff_signed_off_on_ed.html
Ringquist, E. J. (2005). Assessing evidence of environmental inequities: A
meta analysis. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 24, 223–247.
https://doi.org/10.1002/pam.20088
Roelofs, T. (2016, February 10). Signs of trouble at MDEQ, years before Flint water crisis. Retrieved from http://www.mlive.com/politics/index.ssf/2016/02
/signs_of_trouble_at_mdeq_years.html
Rosner, D. (2016). Flint, Michigan: A century of environmental injustice.
American Journal of Public Health, 106, 200–201. https://doi.org/10.2105
/AJPH.2015.303011
Rothstein, E. P. (2016). Why Flint matters. Journal of the American Water Works
Association, 108(7), 36–42. https://doi.org/10.5942/jawwa.2016.108.0136
Roux, A. V. D., Merkin, S. S., Arnett, D., Chambless, L., Massing, M., Nieto,
F. J., . . . Watson, R. L. (2001). Neighborhood of residence and incidence
of coronary heart disease. New England Journal of Medicine, 345, 99–106.
https://doi.org/10.1056/NEJM200107123450205
Schuch, S. (2014, March 12). Flint residents should be drinking Flint River water
by mid-April, officials say. Available at http://www.mlive.com/news/flint
/index.ssf/2014/03/flint_residents_should_be_drin.html
Shafer, G. (2016). Confronting whiteness and the Flint water crisis. The Humanist, 3, 22–26.
Siddhartha, R. (2015, September 29). Research update: Corrosivity of Flint
water to iron pipes in the city—a costly problem. Retrieved from http://
flintwaterstudy.org/2015/09/research-update-corrosivity-of-flint-water
-to-iron-pipes-in-the-city-a-costly-problem/

324

robinson, shum, and singh

Solorzano, D. (1997). Images and words that wound: Critical race theory, racial
stereotyping, and teacher education. Teacher Education Quarterly, 24, 5–19.
Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/23478088
Solorzano, D., & Yasso, T. (2000). Toward a critical race theory of Chicana
and Chicano education. In C. Tejeda, C. Martinez, & Z. Leonardo (Eds.),
Demarcating the border of Chicana(o)/Latina(o) education (pp. 35–65).
Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press.
Szasz, A., & Meuser, M. (1997). Environmental inequalities: Literature review
and proposals for new directions in research and theory. Current Sociology,
45(3), 99–120. https://doi.org/10.1177/001139297045003006
Tate, W. F. (1997). Critical race theory and education: History, theory, and
implications. Review of Research in Education, 22, 195–247. https://doi
.org/10.1177/1077800414557825
U.S. Census Data. (2017). Quickfacts, Flint city, Michigan. Retrieved from
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/table/PST045216/00
Walters, J. (2016, January 21). Flint water crisis: Governor’s brand of corporate
politics set stage for disaster. The Guardian. Retrieved from https://www
.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/jan/21/michigan-governor-rick-snyder
-flint-water-crisis
Zimmer, B. G., & Hawley, A. H. (1956). Approaches to the solution of fringe
problems: Preferences of residents in the Flint metropolitan area. Public
Administration Review, 16, 258–268. https://doi.org/10.2307/973138

JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL CRISIS AND RISK
COMMUNICATION RESEARCH
2018, VOL. 1, NO 2, 325–326
https://doi.org/10.30658/jicrcr.1.2.7

Nicholson School of
Communication and Media
University of Central Florida
www.jicrcr.com

A Change of Header
Between the first and second issues in this volume, you may notice
a change in the header from Nicholson School of Communication
(NSC) to Nicholson School of Communication and Media (NSCM).
This change results from the creation of a new administrative structure
stemming from the merger of academic programs and the founding of
a new intercollege school at the University of Central Florida (UCF).
On July , , the Nicholson School of Communication and academic
units from the School of Visual Arts and Design were administratively
reconfigured to create expanded academic programs in the areas of
communication, games and interactive media, film and mass media,
and interactive entertainment. This academic reorganization promises
to provide a robust and integrated curriculum for the benefit of the
nearly , students who enroll annually in NSCM’s majors, minors,
and certificate programs. We are excited about our future and our efforts
to provide high-quality instructional experiences for our students. This
excitement is ungirded by the anticipated doctoral program in strategic
communication to be launched at UCF through NSCM in .
Back to the header: In , the Nicholson School of Communication took steps to found this Journal of International Crisis and Risk
Communication Research. Though leading scholars in crisis and risk
communication had been calling for such a journal for nearly a decade, NSC provided the administrative and financial support to make
the journal a reality. UCF was well positioned to publish this journal
because of its sponsorship of the annual International Crisis and Risk
Communication Conference since . JICRCR published its first
issue in , and this publication constitutes the second issue. We
want to assure you that NSCM will continue to support the publication
of JICRCR, because an academic journal dedicated to crisis and risk
© 2018 by Journal of International Crisis and Risk Communication Research. All rights reserved.

325

326

littlefield

research is essential to strengthening the resources available for scholars
and enhancing the continued legitimacy of risk and crisis within the
broader communication discipline.
While some may expect the creation of our new school to reflect
Juliet’s words from William Shakespeare’s play Romeo and Juliet that
“a rose by any other name would smell as sweet,” we expect our new
school to “smell sweeter” and blossom and thrive in the years ahead.
We look forward to your continued readership and participation in
our efforts to enhance crisis and risk communication.
—Robert S. Littlefield, Founding Director
Nicholson School of Communication and Media

Department of Communication
~ Offering M.A. and Ph.D. degrees ~

Is your f

e
r
e
h
?
e
r
u
ut

Dept: http://comm.uconn.edu/grad/
Grad School: http://grad.uconn.edu/admissions/
Dept phone: (860) 486-6734

Review of applicants for the fall 2019
cohort begins December 1st.

BRIDGING
THE GAPS

BRIDGING THE GAP
CONFERENCE HELD

EVERY
MARCH
IN

ORLANDO
FLORIDA

icrcconference.com
icrc@ucf.edu
@icrc_conference
/icrcconference

Contact Information:
Dr. Deanna Sellnow
Professor of Strategic Communication
Nicholson School of Communication and Media
Deanna.Sellnow@ucf.edu
Dr. Tim Sellnow
Professor of Strategic Communication
Nicholson School of Communication and Media
Timothy.Sellnow@ucf.edu
Dr. Boyd Lindsley
Senior Associate Director
Nicholson School of Communication and Media
Boyd.Lindsley@ucf.edu
Dr. Robert Littlefield
Founding Director
Nicholson School of Communication and Media
Robert.Littlefield@ucf.edu
Tommiea Jackson
Coordinator of Communication, Marketing and Events
Nicholson School of Communication and Media
Tommiea.Jackson@ucf.edu
Dorothy Loman
Conference Coordinator
Nicholson School of Communication and Media
Dorothy.Loman@ucf.edu

For More Information Visit:
icrcconference.com

